United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 31, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-41703
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE CAMPOS-BELASQUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. L-02-CR-564-ALL
--------------------
Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jose Campos-Belasquez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry
after deportation and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment
and three years’ supervised release. He argues that the district
court erred in considering his prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction in assessing his criminal history points. He contends
that he had a right to counsel in his 1999 federal misdemeanor
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-41703
-2-
case under Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002).
He acknowledges that this court, in United States v. Perez-
Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2003), petition for cert.
filed, (Sept. 22, 2003) (No. 03-6535), held that an individual
convicted of a federal misdemeanor who receives a probationary
sentence, not coupled with a suspended sentence, does not have
a right to counsel. He concedes that this court’s decision in
Perez-Macias is binding and that he raises this issue to preserve
it for further review. In addition, he argues that Perez misread
Alabama v. Shelton in determining that a defendant sentenced to
“freestanding” probation has no right to counsel. He contends that
he had the right to counsel in his 1999 misdemeanor case because
he was potentially subject to imprisonment if his probation was
revoked and because he actually received a three-month sentence
upon revocation of his probation. Campos-Belasquez argues that
his case is distinguishable from Perez because Perez’s probation
was never actually revoked.
Campos-Belasquez also argues that his waiver of his right
to counsel was invalid because Magistrate Judge Notzon’s
plea colloquy was perfunctory and did not satisfy the strict
requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right
to counsel.
Assuming arguendo that Campos-Belasquez had a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, we hold that he validly waived his
right to counsel in his June 18, 1999, plea hearing for the same
No. 02-41703
-3-
reasons as those stated in our opinion in United States
v. Garcia-Hernandez, No. 03-10451 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2003)
(unpublished). Thus, the district court did not err in using
his prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in assessing his
criminal history points.
AFFIRMED.