United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
Revised December 4, 2003
November 17, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-61033
TYRONE ALEXANDER; KEVIN CARROLL
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
TIPPAH COUNTY MISSISSIPPI; JAMES PAGE, In Both His Official
and Individual Capacities; PAUL GOWDY; GARY WELCH, In Both
His Official and Individual Capacities
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Tyrone Alexander and Kevin Carroll,
both Mississippi state inmates, bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for two incidents that occurred during their stay at the Tippah
County Detention Facility. The first incident led Alexander to
bring an Eighth Amendment claim for use of excessive force. The
second incident, which involved both Alexander and Carroll, gave
rise to claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Alexander and Carroll brought these Eighth Amendment claims
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before the district court pursuant to § 1983. The district court
dismissed Alexander’s use-of-excessive-force claim for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and granted summary judgment on
Alexander’s and Carroll’s conditions-of-confinement claims. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
On February 6, 2001, Alexander and Carroll, inmates in the
Mississippi state prison system, were transported from the
Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi to the
Tippah County Detention Facility (“the Detention Facility”).
Alexander and Carroll were housed in the Detention Facility for
ten days while awaiting appearances in the Tippah County Circuit
Court. Upon arrival, they were each provided with an Inmate
Handbook outlining the Detention Facility’s policies and
procedures, including its grievance procedures.
The day after arriving at the Detention Facility, a dispute
arose between Alexander, Carroll, Defendant Deputy Paul Gowdy,
and two prison guards, which lead to a physical altercation. As
a result, Alexander and Carroll were both charged with simple
assault of a law enforcement officer and assigned to twenty-four
hour administrative segregation in an isolation cell known to the
prisoners as “the hole.”
The isolation cell is a sparse eight-by-eight concrete room,
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meant to house one person. There is no running water and no
toilet in the room; the only sanitary facility is a grate-covered
hole in the floor, which can be “flushed” from outside the room.
The only “bed” in the cell is a concrete protrusion from the wall
wide enough for one person. The cell contains no mattress,
sheets, or blankets. Alexander and Carroll concede that the cell
was clean and dry when they arrived. When first placed in the
hole, Alexander and Carroll were stripped of all their clothes;
eventually, they were given their boxer shorts to wear.
Approximately one hour after being placed in the cell,
Alexander and Carroll were dressed in jumpsuits, handcuffed and
shackled, and transported to the courtroom for arraignment on
three counts of assault on a law enforcement officer. Inside the
courtroom, Alexander attempted to approach the bench, and
interrupted the judge numerous times. Defendant Sheriff James
Page told Alexander to “shut up” and to step back from the bench.
Alexander disobeyed this order, so Defendant Deputy Gary Welch
placed his gloved hand over Alexander’s mouth. Alexander
continued to interrupt the judge, so Page ordered him removed
from the courtroom. Alexander alleges that Page punched him, and
that Welch shoved him out of the courtroom. Once outside,
according to Alexander, Welch shoved him, causing his forehead to
hit the concrete wall. Alexander alleges that he developed a
knot in the center of his forehead, and that his wrists and
ankles bled from the pressure of his handcuffs and shackles.
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Alexander was charged with disorderly conduct for his behavior in
the courtroom.
Upon returning to the isolation cell, Alexander and Carroll
were again stripped down to their boxer shorts. Carroll
developed an upset stomach and had to defecate into the floor
drain. He was given one sheet of toilet paper with which to
clean himself. Carroll’s feces--and later, Alexander’s feces--
obstructed the hole. Carroll and Alexander tried to push the
feces down the drain with a piece of a paper plate, which further
clogged the drain. When Alexander and Carroll subsequently
attempted to urinate, the clogged drain caused their urine to
splatter onto the cell floor. At some point, Carroll became
nauseated from the smell of the sewage and vomited into the
drain.
Alexander and Carroll repeatedly requested help from the
guards. The guards attempted to flush the drain, but this did
not work. Finally, Gowdy instructed an inmate trusty to spray
water into the cell through an opening at the bottom of the cell
door. This, unsurprisingly, did not unclog the drain. Instead,
it spread the sewage throughout the cell. Alexander and Carroll
allegedly requested a mop to clean up the mess, but their request
was denied. They contend that they were never given any cleaning
supplies.
Alexander and Carroll ate lunch and dinner in the isolation
cell. Since the cell had neither running water nor soap, the
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inmates were not able to wash their hands before eating.
Furthermore, according to Alexander and Carroll, they were given
no utensils with which to eat.
That night, Alexander and Carroll requested a mattress and a
blanket, but were refused. They shared the small concrete slab
and attempted to sleep dressed only in boxer shorts. Although
the cell is equipped with heat, Alexander and Carroll allege that
it was uncomfortably cold that night.
After approximately twenty-four hours in the cell, Alexander
and Carroll were released. At this time, they were given paper
and writing instruments. Alexander claims that he asked for a
grievance form but was told that the Detention Facility had run
out. Alexander, however, knew how to compose a grievance and,
indeed, wrote to Page and Gowdy to complain about other issues.
Alexander never submitted a grievance regarding either the
courtroom incident or the conditions in the isolation cell.
After ten days in the Detention Facility, Alexander was
transported back to the State Penitentiary in Parchman, where he
remains incarcerated. Carroll is currently incarcerated in the
Marshall County Correctional Facility in Holly Springs,
Mississippi.
B. Procedural History
Alexander and Carroll brought suit under § 1983, alleging
violations of their Eighth Amendment rights. Alexander claims
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that Page and Welch used excessive force against him in the
courtroom incident, and both inmates claim that the conditions of
confinement in the isolation cell were cruel and unusual.
Additionally, Alexander and Carroll assert that Defendant Tippah
County failed to instruct, supervise, control, or discipline the
individual Defendants regarding the performance of their duties.
Alexander and Carroll seek damages for pain and suffering, mental
anguish, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, all other
damages arising from the alleged constitutional violations,
injunctive relief, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and a
declaration that the Defendants violated their civil rights.
After filing an answer, the Defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court dismissed Alexander’s use-of-
excessive-force claim because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Regarding Alexander’s and Carroll’s
conditions-of-confinement claims, the district court granted the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, after finding that
Alexander’s and Carroll’s Eighth Amendment rights had not been
violated and that they were not entitled to any relief as a
matter of law.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Alexander’s § 1983 Excessive Force Claim
The district court dismissed Alexander’s excessive force
claim, finding that he did not properly exhaust his
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administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We
review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 suit for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Days v. Johnson, 322
F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 2003).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, § 1997e(a), declares: “No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” Exhaustion is mandatory for “all inmate suits about
prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).1
Alexander argues on appeal that the Detention Facility’s
grievance procedures were inadequate. But it is not for the
courts to inquire whether administrative procedures “satisfy
‘minimum acceptable standards’ of fairness and effectiveness.”
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 n.5 (2001). Under
§ 1997e(a), a prisoner must exhaust such administrative remedies
as are “available,” whatever they may be. Wright v.
Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). If a prisoner
has not exhausted all available administrative remedies,
1
Alexander’s contention that Porter does not apply to
this case is without merit. See Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328,
330 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Porter retroactively).
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dismissal is appropriate. See id. at 359.
Alexander also argues that the grievance procedures were not
“available” to him and that he made reasonable attempts to comply
with them. The evidence, however, shows that grievance
procedures were available to Alexander and that he, nonetheless,
failed to pursue them. The Detention Facility’s grievance
procedures were explained in the Inmate Handbook given to
Alexander when he first arrived. Alexander admits that he knew
how to prepare a handwritten grievance and that he was given the
necessary paper and writing instruments. Alexander failed to
file a grievance not because he was unable to do so, but because,
in his words, “those things were already done, and nothing could
be done about it.” While it may be true that the Detention
Facility’s guards did not give Alexander a pre-printed grievance
form, this does not change the fact that he was provided with the
means to write one himself.
In light of Alexander’s admissions, it is clear that he did
not pursue the administrative remedies available to him. Thus,
we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
Alexander’s excessive-force claim.
B. Alexander’s and Carroll’s § 1983 Conditions-of-Confinement
Claims
The district court granted summary judgment on Alexander’s
and Carroll’s conditions-of-confinement claims, after finding
that they suffered no Eighth Amendment violations and that they
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were not entitled to any relief as a matter of law.
We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, applying
the same standards applicable in the district court. Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001). In analyzing whether
summary judgment was appropriate, we view the summary judgment
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id.
We can assume, without deciding, that the deplorable
conditions2 of Alexander and Carroll’s isolation cell were “so
serious as to deprive [them] of the minimal measure of life’s
necessities,” in this case the basic human need for sanitary
living conditions. Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir.
1995)(quotation marks omitted). At least two additional hurdles
to recovery under the Eighth Amendment remain. First, there is
the question whether forcing Alexander and Carroll to endure
these conditions rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation, given that the inmates were released from the
isolation cell after twenty-four hours. On the one hand, our
court has found violations of the Eighth Amendment for conditions
lasting less then twenty-four hours. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d
346, 354 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding Eighth Amendment violation
where inmates were herded into a small outdoor space, deprived of
protection from excessive cold and wind, and provided no sanitary
2
Although we must view the facts in the light most
favorable to Alexander and Carroll, we pause to note that the
Defendants do not deny many of the allegations in this case.
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means of disposing of their waste, even though the conditions
lasted approximately seventeen hours). On the other hand, the
length of time spent in the offensive conditions should be taken
into account. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)
(“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding
whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A
filthy, overcrowded cell . . . might be tolerable for a few days
and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”); Davis v. Scott, 157
F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no Eighth Amendment
violation where inmate was kept in filthy cell for only three
days and was given cleaning supplies). Since we ultimately
conclude that Alexander and Carroll are not entitled to relief,
however, we decline to decide whether twenty-four hours in the
conditions present in the isolation cell violated their Eighth
Amendment rights.
The second hurdle relates to the statutory requirement of a
physical injury in order to recover for mental and emotional
damages, the denial of which is the focal point of Alexander and
Carroll’s efforts in this appeal. The district court found that
Alexander and Carroll were not entitled to mental and emotional
damages because 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) requires a physical injury
in order to recover these damages, and Alexander and Carroll did
not suffer physical injuries.
Under § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
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facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” The
“‘physical injury’ required by § 1997e(e) ‘must be more than de
minimus [sic], but need not be significant.’” Harper v. Showers,
174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Siglar v. Hightower,
112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original).
The district court found that the only physical injury
suffered by either Alexander or Carroll was nausea: Carroll
allegedly vomited from the smell of the raw sewage covering the
floor of the isolation cell. While we recognize that vomiting is
an unpleasant experience, there is no indication that Carroll’s
nausea was severe enough to warrant medical attention.
Furthermore, Carroll has not alleged that his nausea was a
symptom of some more serious malady, or had any lasting effects.
Cf. Siglar, 112 F.3d at 193 (holding that an ear that was sore
and bruised for three days was nevertheless a de minimis injury).
Without these additional allegations, we agree with the district
court that the injury (if any) suffered by Carroll was de
minimis. Furthermore, we note that Alexander never claimed to
have suffered a physical injury from confinement in the isolation
cell. Therefore, we find that § 1997e(e) precludes Alexander and
Carroll from recovering for their emotional and mental injuries.
In sum, we hold that Alexander and Carroll are entitled to
no relief as a matter of law. Thus, we find that the district
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court properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants on
Alexander’s and Carroll’s conditions-of-confinement claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of
Alexander’s claim of excessive use of force and the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on Alexander’s and Carroll’s
claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are
AFFIRMED.
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