United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10276
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TIMOTHY COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:00-CR-34-ALL-R
Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Timothy Coleman appeals his guilty-plea conviction of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Coleman argues that
no lawful basis existed for City of Mesquite officers to stop him
in the City of Dallas because, under Texas law, the jurisdiction of
police officers to detain an individual for minor traffic viola-
tions ends at the city limits. Therefore, he argues, the search
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
incident to arrest was unreasonable.
At the suppression hearing, evidence was adduced that a
City of Mesquite Police Department officer observed Coleman drive
off in a Cadillac without wearing his seat belt. The officer
followed the Cadillac as it entered the City of Dallas, where a
City of Mesquite marked police car stopped it. The police officers
placed Coleman under arrest for the traffic violation observed
within the City of Mesquite. A search of the vehicle incident to
arrest revealed a kilogram of cocaine and a firearm. An inventory
search revealed an additional 15 grams of crack cocaine in the
console. Coleman consented to a search of his hotel room, where
additional incriminating evidence was found.
Coleman’s vehicle was stopped for a traffic violation,
i.e., not wearing a seatbelt, and that traffic violation created
sufficient probable cause to support the stop. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996); United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d
459, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1999). The stop and subsequent arrest of
Coleman were proper under the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 185
F.3d at 463-64.
The district court did not err in denying Coleman’s
motion to suppress the evidence. Coleman’s arguments to the
contrary do not overcome the applicable precedents of this circuit.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
2