United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 17, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 02-30934 Clerk
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALD XAVIER COLLINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(99-CR-20029-ALL)
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Ronald Xavier Collins appeals the 15-year
sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). He argues that the imposition of the 15-year enhanced
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) was plain error because two of
his prior convictions should not have been used as a basis for the
enhancement. Assuming arguendo that Collins’s 1979 drug possession
conviction and his 1980 second-degree burglary conviction should
not have been used as a basis for the enhancement under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), there was no plain error as Collins had three other prior
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
convictions for violent felonies that were sufficient to support
the enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), including second-degree
robbery, voluntary manslaughter, and assault with a deadly weapon.
Collins does not dispute that these three prior convictions fall
with the meaning of the term “violent felonies” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Further, Collins’s convictions for voluntary
manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon are considered two
separate convictions for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 824(e), even
though they were part of the same judicial proceeding, as they were
committed on two separate occasions. See United States v. Kimball,
15 F.3d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1994) (“temporal proximity will not
transform two crimes into one.”); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d
1464, 1474 (5th Cir. 1993) (“‘multiple convictions arising from
multiple criminal transactions should be treated as separate
convictions, regardless of the number of judicial proceedings
involved in the conviction’”).
Collins also argues that his counsel was ineffective in not
objecting to the enhancement of his sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e). Because Collins did not raise this issue in the district
court, the record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to
evaluate fairly the merits of the claim. See United States v.
Gibson, 55 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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