Affirming.
This suit was brought pursuant to KRS Chapter 242 to enjoin the defendants J.B. Osborne and Earl Osborne from conducting their business as a nuisance and to padlock for a period of six months the building in which the business was operated in Pineville, Ky., which is in local option territory. The business conducted by defendants is a restaurant and is known as the "Coffee Pot." Its location in Pineville is described in the petition. It is alleged in the petition that it is operated in an illegal manner and the building is being used for illegal purposes; that said building is being used *Page 224 for the storage and sale of illicit beer and intoxicating liquors; that drunks, boisterous and rowdy men and women congregate therein in riotous assemblies and gambling is conducted unlawfully therein. The defendants by answer denied the allegations of the petition. Upon trial of the case the court sustained the motion of the defendant Earl Osborne that the case be dismissed as to him and it adjudged that the business being operated by appellant J.B. Osborne, known as the Coffee Pot on Pine Street in Pineville, be padlocked for a period of six months from September 21, 1949. This appeal is from that judgment.
The testimony for the defense given by the appellant J.B. Osborne was that he had operated the Coffee Pot Restaurant for approximately a year before this suit was filed; that during that time neither the chief of police nor anyone else had ever raided his place prior to August 2 when it was searched by the officers heretofore mentioned; that there had been no intoxicating liquors stored or sold on his premises since the raid of August 2, nor had there been any person arrested there as being drunk or charged with being drunk since August 2; that the room in which the juke boxes and pinball machines were located and in which the whiskey was alleged to have been found by the officers in the August 2 raid was leased to the Pineville Music Company and that he had nothing to do with the operation of that company. On cross-examination, he again stated that there had been no whiskey sold on his premises since August 2, but admitted that before that time he had sold some, approximately one-half case, and that he had only been selling it about twenty days before the search was made, and admitted that he was selling whiskey when the place was searched.
KRS 242.340 provides that any Commonwealth's attorney may maintain an action in equity in the name of the state to enjoin any nuisance described in KRS 242.310. This suit was brought by the Commonwealth's attorney under the authority of this section.
KRS 242.350(2) provides as follows: "It shall not be necessary for the court to find the property involved is being unlawfully used as described in KRS 242.310 at the time of the hearing, but on finding that the material *Page 226 allegations of the petition are true, the court shall order that no alcoholic beverages shall be sold, bartered or stored on the premises or vehicle, or any part thereof. Upon judgment of the court ordering the nuisance abated, the court may order that the premises or vehicle shall not be occupied or used for six months."
It is also urged as a ground for reversal that there is no proof of any violation of the law after August 2 and since the suit was filed on September 10 there is no showing of a continuing and existing violation which would justify padlocking the place of business. In other words, it is contended that while it is not necessary to show that the property involved is being unlawfully used at the time of the hearing, it is appellant's contention that the violation must have continued and existed at the time the suit was filed, which in this case was September 10. We think this is a strained and untenable construction of the statute and would do violence to the apparent legislative intent. If violators could temporarily cease their operations between the time when the premises were searched and when the suit was filed, that is while the suit was being prepared, the provisions *Page 227 in the statute for injunction and padlock proceedings could never be enforced. We think the plain intent of subsection (2) above quoted is that the action may be brought for violations occurring within a reasonable time prior thereto and that it is not necessary that it continue up to the time of the filing of the suit. It is only necessary that it be shown that the material allegations of the petition are true. We think that was established in this case.
Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.