UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 97-51032
________________________
TIMOTHY J. VOLK,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSE G. GONZALES, Warden; ET AL.,
Defendants,
G. MEGLARENO, Officers under their Individual
and Official capacity; DONALDA FISCHER,
Defendants - Appellants.
________________________
No. 98-50199
________________________
TIMOTHY J. VOLK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOSE G. GONZALES, Warden; ET AL,
.
Defendants,
JOSE G. GONZALES, Warden; ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
No. 98-50386
________________________
TIMOTHY J. VOLK,
Plaintiff - Appellee - Cross - Appellant,
v.
JOSE G. GONZALEZ, Warden; ET AL.,
Defendants,
G. MEGLARENO, Officers under their Individual
and Official Capacity; DONALDA FISCHER,
Defendants - Appellants - Cross - Appellees.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-95-CV-63)
____________________________________________________
January 4, 2000
Before JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and PRADO*, District Judge.
PER CURIAM*
After careful consideration of this appeal in light of the briefs, oral arguments of counsel,
and pertinent portions of the record, the court will affirm in part, vacate the award of injunctive
and declaratory relief, and reverse and remand for calculation of attorney’s fees in light of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
We have determined that there was no abuse of discretion in either denying the
Defendants’ requested instruction on qualified immunity or in denying Volk’s motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages. Even without the proposed instruction on qualified immunity, the
instructions provided proper guidance to the jury, and the verdict was not inconsistent.
Defendants Megliorino and Fischer argue that there was not sufficient evidence to support
the verdict. Because they failed to move for a directed verdict, we are limited to examining
whether there was any evidence to support the verdict or whether there was plain error that
resulted in a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290,
*
District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not
precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
297 (5th Cir. 1978). We conclude that there was evidence supporting the verdict and no plain
error was committed.
On the other hand, we conclude that the district court’s grant of declaratory and injunctive
relief was not proper. Neither defendant in this action had the power to effect the court’s
directives to expunge disciplinary cases, restore custodial classification, and restore lost good-
time credits, and the district court therefore lacked power to order such relief. As a result, we
vacate the district court’s grant of injunctive and declaratory relief with the understanding that the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division will recognize the implications of
this court’s judgment for Volk’s custodial status.
Finally, we conclude that the trial court erred in not applying the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) to the award of attorney’s fees. This case was filed,
and counsel was appointed, before the April 26, 1996 effective date of the PLRA. The amount of
fees for work done by Volk’s attorney before the effective date of the PLRA is not restricted by
the PLRA. See Martin v. Hadix, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (1999). In Martin the Supreme Court
determined that the PLRA applied to monitoring done after its effective date, but did not apply
retroactively. Id. The fees for work done after its effective date, the Court held, must be
examined in light of the PLRA. Id. Accordingly, we will send this case back for the magistrate
judge to determine the award of attorney’s fees for the work done after the PLRA’s effective date
in light of restrictions contained in the PLRA.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, in part, regarding the jury
instructions given, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict, and the denial of the
motion for a new trial. The award of injunctive and declaratory relief is vacated, and the
judgment is reversed and remanded in part for determination of the award of attorney’s fees.