United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 22, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10593
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KENNY WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:02-CR-00287-1
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kenny Washington appeals his conviction and sentence for
conspiracy to commit bank theft. After a thorough review of the
record, we AFFIRM.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting
the cross-examination of Ralphcel Eaton or in allowing Tom Young
to testify. Neither Eaton’s plea agreement in a pending and
unrelated state prosecution, nor his testimony suggests that his
testimony was motivated by the pending state charges. Eaton’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-10593
-2-
deferred adjudications were not convictions under FED. R. EVID.
609, and Washington did not include motive as a reason for cross-
examining Eaton on the deferred adjudications. As for Young,
contrary to Washington’s assertion, he was not a summary witness.
Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion. United States v.
Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir.), modified by, 116 F.3d
119 (1997); United States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d 262, 268 (5th Cir.
1994).
Nor did the district court clearly err in applying a four-
point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for Washington’s role
as an organizer or leader in the offense. The record reflects
that Washington exercised considerable decision-making authority
and that Washington’s participation in the offense was integral.
See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d
374, 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
Finally, the district court did not clearly err in
determining that the scheme at Nationsbank should be considered
relevant conduct. The modus operandi was nearly identical at
both Nationsbank and Wells Fargo. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.
n.9(A) (Nov. 2000); United States v. Anderson, 174 F.3d 515, 526
(5th Cir. 1999).
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.