United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
March 30, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 03-31040
(Summary Calendar)
GREGORY P. AUCOIN,
Plaintiff,
versus
PHIL HANEY, Individually and in
his capacity as District Attorney
for the 16th Judicial District
Court,
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON, Subscribing to Color Note,
Certificate and/or Policy No.
CEM 701, Endorsement No. 14542 and
Authorization # CP 9907770-A,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(00-CV-698)
Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
As third party plaintiff, District Attorney Phil Haney appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment and
grant of the motion of summary judgment of appellee Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (“Underwriters”), dismissing Haney’s
third party claims against Underwriters for failure to provide (or
to reimburse him for the costs of) a legal defense against the
§ 1983 claims of Plaintiff Gregory P. Aucoin. We affirm.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
After Haney’s precedessor as district attorney for Louisiana’s
16th Judicial District Court resigned in mid-term, Haney became
acting district attorney and announced his candidacy to fill his
predecessor’s unexpired term. According to Aucoin, Haney’s
predecessor talked with Aucoin, a 20-year assistant district
attorney in the same office, urging that he either support Haney’s
election bid or resign. Aucoin alleged that he declined this
suggestion and thereafter rejected Haney’s entreaty of political
support, whereupon Haney fired Aucoin.
Aucoin sued Haney in federal district court, alleging various
constitutional violations, each of which stemmed from Aucoin’s
firing by Haney for failure to support Haney’s candidacy for
district attorney (and, apparently, for supporting an opposition
candidate). Haney requested that Underwriters provide defense and
indemnification under its lawyers professional liability insurance
policy (the “policy”), but Underwriters declined based on (1) the
policy’s express exclusions of claims related to employment
practices, and (2) Haney’s predecessor’s rejection of employment
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practices coverage when that policy was applied for and obtained to
cover legal claims arising from professional liability, personal
injury, disciplinary proceedings, punitive damages, and criminal
defense.
The district court denied Haney’s motions for summary judgment
seeking dismissal of Aucoin’s suit or, alternatively, a grant of
qualified immunity, and Haney appealed to us. We reversed the
district court, holding that Haney had not violated Aucoin’s First
Amendment rights, and remanded to the district court for further
consistent proceedings.1
Haney pursued his third party demand against Underwriters to
recover attorneys’ fees and other costs and expenses incurred in
his successful defense of Aucoin’s claims. Haney and Underwriters
filed opposing motions for summary judgment, each relying
principally on the language of the policy and the application of
the district attorney’s office for professional liability coverage.
The district court denied Haney’s summary judgment motion and
granted Underwriters’s, dismissing Haney’s claims in their
entirety. Haney timely filed a notice of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Our employment of the de novo standard of review of a district
court’s grant of summary judgment is too well known to require
citation. Here, the applicability of de novo review is all the
more obvious, given that neither party asserted the existence of
1
See Aucoin v. Haney, 306 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2002).
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factual disputes, so that the outcome turned on undisputed facts
and contractual interpretation of the subject insurance policy and
related documents.
B. Discussion
It took the district court only seven pages of double-spaced,
typewritten, letter-size stock (2-1/2 of which pages were devoted
to a long-form reiteration of the summary judgment standard that
both we and the district court employ) to explicate pellucidly its
grant of Underwriters’s motion for summary judgment and its denial
of Haney’s. Our careful review of the district court’s ruling, the
summary judgment record, and the arguments advanced by the parties’
respective counsel in their appellate briefs convinces us beyond
cavil that the district court was correct in all respects.
That court charitably characterized Haney’s interpretation of
the policy as “highly doubtful” and his arguments as “unusual.” We
shall be more frank: Haney’s appellate arguments and his
characterization of the provisions of the subject insurance policy
and application are sophistry incarnate. Not only did the insured
affirmatively decline coverage of employment practices claims, the
policy itself expressly, unequivocally, and unambiguously excludes
employment claims of every nature from its coverage. And, we are
satisfied that, as a matter of law, there can be no non-frivolous
contention that the claims asserted by Aucoin were anything other
than employment claims, pure and simple: Haney fired Aucoin when
he refused to support Haney’s election bid, and all of Aucoin’s
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judicially asserted claims arose from or were connected with that
termination of his employment.
III. CONCLUSION
For essentially the same reasons advanced by the district
court in its succinct yet completely definitive Memorandum Ruling,
we affirm summary judgment in favor of Underwriters, dismissing
Haney’s claims for costs and expenses incurred in defending
Aucoin’s lawsuit.
AFFIRMED, at Haney’s cost.
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