United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 31, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-40638
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ENRIQUE FRANCISCO GARZA, IV,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. L-02-CR-1721-1
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Enrique Francisco Garza, IV, was convicted by
a jury of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute it,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
His principal contention is that the district court erred by
denying his FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
Garza argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-40638
-2-
knew there was marijuana hidden in the tractor-trailer that he
was driving. We AFFIRM.
To convict a defendant of possessing a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, the Government must prove that the
defendant (1) knowingly (2) possessed a controlled substance
(3) with intent to distribute it. United States v. Cartwright,
6 F.3d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1993). However, there is no need for
the Government to prove that the defendant knew the type or
amount of the substance that he possessed. United States v.
Gamez-Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 699-700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2241 (2003).
“A jury may ordinarily infer a defendant’s knowledge of
the presence of drugs from his control over the vehicle in which
they are found.” United States v. Villareal, 324 F.3d 319,
324 (5th Cir. 1993). “If the contraband is hidden, however, we
require additional circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in
nature or demonstrates guilty knowledge.” Id.
In Garza’s case there were circumstances, in addition to
his control over the tractor-trailer, that were sufficiently
suspicious that they support the jury’s finding of guilty
knowledge. If Garza had gotten past the Border Patrol
checkpoint, the load of marijuana he was transporting would
have been worth more than two million dollars. The jury could
reasonably have inferred that Garza would not have been entrusted
No. 03-40638
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with that extremely valuable cargo if he had not been involved in
the trafficking scheme.
Furthermore, a defendant’s implausible story can constitute
circumstances warranting a finding of knowledge. See Villarreal,
324 F.3d at 325; United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d 463,
466 (5th Cir. 1999). A defendant’s incomplete answers when
responding to questions about coming into possession of the
vehicle and its destination can also constitute circumstantial
evidence of guilty knowledge. See United States v. Gutierrez-
Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1114 (2003).
Garza’s explanations as to how he came into possession of
the tractor-trailer, how he was to be paid, and the destination
for the tractor-trailer load were implausible. He told a Border
Patrol agent that an unknown person called him and told him to
pick up the rig at a gas station. When he got there, he said,
the keys were in the ignition. Garza said that no arrangements
were made to pay him and that he had to spend $260 of his
own money to fuel the rig. In addition, the jury could have
reasonably concluded, from the time stamped on the fuel receipt,
that Garza had failed to adequately disclose his whereabouts
during the ensuing three hours. Garza said he had no contact
information for the recipient of the load, and the address on
the fraudulent bill of lading turned out to be nonexistent.
Finally, the evidence showed that Garza was an experienced
No. 03-40638
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truck driver who would have recognized the obvious invalidity
of the bill of lading that accompanied the load. See United
States v. Garcia-Flores, 246 F.3d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Garza, 990 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1993).
Thus, the evidence amply supports the jury’s finding that
Garza knowingly possessed the marijuana found in the rig he was
driving.
Garza also contends that he is entitled to reversal because
the district court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of
the business procedures followed by his former employer, Jacaman
Transportation. In particular, he argues that evidence regarding
Jacaman’s procedures in weighing transportation loads, in
preparing bills of lading, and in ensuring that trailers bore
a license plate was unfairly used to make his innocuous actions
and omissions appear to be evidence of guilt.
The only objection raised in the district court to this
evidence was on the grounds of relevance, based on the fact
that Garza was no longer working for Jacaman at the time he
attempted to bring the load of marijuana through the checkpoint.
“In reviewing the district court’s rulings on matters of
relevancy, this Court is guided by the principle that district
courts have wide discretion in determining relevancy under
Rule 401.” United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir.
1999). Accordingly, “[t]he district court’s decision will not
be disturbed absent a substantial abuse of discretion.” Id.
No. 03-40638
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Garza’s prior experience as a professional truck driver
with Jacaman, a freight transportation company that followed
standard practices in the trucking industry, supported the
reasonable inference that Garza was familiar with those
practices. The Jacaman employee’s testimony that particular
practices were utilized in relation to Garza’s activities
at Jacaman made it more likely than not that his possession
of the marijuana in this case was knowing. Specifically, Garza’s
knowledge that the circumstances surrounding the shipment he was
hauling deviated greatly from standard practices showed his
awareness of the illegality of his activities. Therefore, Garza
has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting this evidence over the objection that it
was not relevant. See United States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d 989, 994
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gonzalez-Lira, 936 F.2d 184,
191-92 (5th Cir. 1991).
AFFIRMED.