United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 15, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-50628
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS ARTURO SNYDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. P-03-CR-1-ALL
--------------------
Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Carlos Arturo Snyder appeals his conviction after a jury
trial of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Snyder argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
that he knowingly possessed marijuana. Snyder failed to renew
his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the
evidence. Snyder acknowledges that when defense counsel fails to
renew a motion for judgment of acquittal, this court reviews
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-50628
-2-
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine
whether affirmance would result in a manifest miscarriage of
justice. See United States v. McIntosh, 280 F.3d 479, 483 (5th
Cir. 2002). Snyder argues, however, that the manifest
miscarriage of justice standard should not be applied because it
finds no support in the plain language of FED. R. CRIM. P. 29,
contravenes Supreme Court precedent on reasonable doubt as set
forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), and
undermines the requirements established for ensuring that waivers
of constitutional rights are knowing and voluntary.
Because only the court sitting en banc can reverse
precedent, Snyder’s insufficiency claim must be reviewed under
the “miscarriage of justice” standard. See United States v.
Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 151 and fn.15 (5th Cir. 1995). This court
will find a manifest miscarriage of justice only where the record
is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or contains evidence on a
key element of the offense that is so tenuous that a conviction
would be shocking. McIntosh, 280 F.3d at 483. Moreover, as the
following discussion indicates, the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the Government, establishes that a
reasonable jury could have found guilty knowledge beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Therefore, even
under the standard set forth in Jackson, the evidence was
sufficient to convict Snyder.
No. 03-50628
-3-
Snyder, a commercial driver, was apprehended after Border
Patrol Agents discovered 257 pounds of marijuana with a value of
over $200,000 in the trailer that he was hauling. Since the
evidence does not establish that the marijuana was clearly
visible or readily accessible, Snyder’s control of the trailer
alone is insufficient to establish knowledge. United States v.
Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 598-99 (1994).
Circumstantial evidence, however, supports the jury verdict.
Based upon trial testimony and exhibits, it was reasonable for
the jury to conclude that Snyder took possession of a sealed
trailer, that the seal was then broken for the purpose of loading
a significant amount of marijuana with a value of over $200,000
into the trailer, and that this valuable cargo would not have
been entrusted to Snyder if he had not been part of the drug
trafficking scheme. See United States v. Villarreal, 324 F.3d
319, 324 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Resio-Trejo,
45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasonable inferences are to be
resolved in favor of the verdict). Moreover, the record
indicates that Snyder detoured from his claimed route, which
provided an opportunity to load the marijuana into the trailer.
Thus, the jury’s decision that Snyder knowingly possessed
marijuana was rational based on the evidence. See Pennington, 20
F.3d at 598-99 (issue is whether jury made a rational decision to
convict or acquit based on the evidence); see also United States
v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1999) (no single piece
No. 03-50628
-4-
of circumstantial evidence need be conclusive when considered in
isolation). The evidence of Snyder’s knowledge is therefore not
so tenuous that his conviction is shocking, and affirmance of the
conviction therefore does not result in a manifest miscarriage of
justice. See McIntosh, 280 F.3d at 483. Moreover, the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
establishes that a reasonable jury could have found guilty
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319.
Snyder also argues that the district court committed error
when it failed to grant his oral motion and written motion in
which he made a fair cross section challenge to the jury venire.
Snyder concedes that his challenge does not meet the requirements
of the Jury Selection and Service Act. The Sixth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require that a jury
be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. United
States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 567 (5th Cir. 2001). Snyder
has not shown that the district court erred by failing to grant
either the oral or written motion. Snyder did not argue in the
district court and fails to argue here that the claimed
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury selection process. Id. at 567-68 (setting forth
elements of prima facie violation of fair cross section
requirement). Snyder has therefore failed to establish an
essential element of the fair cross section challenge, and,
No. 03-50628
-5-
accordingly, has not shown that the district court erred by
failing to grant his motion. See United States v. Steen, 55 F.3d
1022, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to decide whether jury
pool reasonably mirrored racial composition of community when
appellant did not provide evidence of systematic exclusion of
group from jury selection process).
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.