09-0996-cv
Bronzini v. Classic Security LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the
City of New York, on the 6th day of April, two thousand ten.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
REENA RAGGI,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
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LOLITA BRONZINI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
EIMONT BRONZINI,
Consolidated-Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-0996-cv
CLASSIC SECURITY L.L.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS: EIMONT BRONZINI (Lolita Bronzini, on the
brief), pro se, Brooklyn, New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: ANDREW W. SINGER, Tannenbaum Helpern
Syracuse & Hirschtritt LLP, New York, New
York.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Pro se plaintiffs Lolita and Eimont Bronzini appeal from the January 15, 2009 order
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Harold Baer,
Judge) granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Classic Security L.L.C. on
plaintiffs’ discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; the New York
State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.; and the New York City Human
Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the facts and procedural history.
We review de novo orders granting summary judgment, focusing on whether the
district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff
& Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We analyze discrimination claims
under the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d
Cir. 2009) (ADA); Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2004)
(FMLA); Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2007)
(ADEA).
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We independently conclude, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court,
that plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that defendant’s non-discriminatory, legitimate business reasons for the challenged
employment actions were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at
802-04; see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995).
Insofar as plaintiffs argue that the district court failed specifically to address Lolita
Bronzini’s FMLA claim, we conclude that any oversight was harmless. The district court
referenced the factual predicate of the underlying FMLA claim twice in its order and,
properly reviewing Lolita Bronzini’s claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, concluded there was no evidence to support a showing of pretext. Upon
independent review of the record, we likewise conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
support an inference that defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were in fact
in retaliation for Lolita Bronzini’s taking FMLA-protected leave. See United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 156 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that this court is “free to affirm an
appealed decision on any ground which finds support in the record” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that
they are without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
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