United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 19, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60579
Summary Calendar
CLAUDIA LUNA-PEREZ,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A90 895 279
Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Claudia Luna-Perez, represented by counsel, petitions
this court for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s decision finding
her removable under to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i) (1997), and
denying her application for cancellation of removal. In the
instant petition Luna-Perez does not challenge the denial of her
application for cancellation of removal, therefore, she has
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
abandoned that argument. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830,
833 (5th Cir. 2003).
Without citation to any authority, Luna-Perez argues that
she did not make an “entry” as required by § 1227(a)(a)(1)(E)(i),
because she was not “admitted,” as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). She asserts that under § 1101(a)(13)(C), as a
lawful permanent resident, she is not subject to being “admitted”
unless she, inter alia, committed an illegal activity after
departing from the United States. She asserts that the evidence
that she departed the United States to engage in an unlawful
activity was inadmissible and that its admission without affording
her an opportunity for cross-examination violated her right to due
process.
The BIA rejected Luna-Perez’s argument that “entry” for
the purpose of § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i) means “admission” under §
1101(a)(13). Luna-Perez does not address the BIA’s determination
that for § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i), “entry” means “any entry within the
commonly-understood meaning of that term,” i.e., crossing the
border into the United States. Nor does Luna-Perez challenge the
BIA’s factual finding that she made an “entry” based on her
admission that she crossed the border into the United States before
her arrest for alien smuggling. Because Luna-Perez has not briefed
any argument challenging the BIA’s decision, she has abandoned the
only issue before this court. See Soadjede, 324 F.3d at 833; Yohey
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v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224- 25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v.
Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.
1987).
The BIA’s conclusion that Luna-Perez had made an “entry”
for the purpose of § 1227(a)(1)(E) was not based on any evidence
which would show that she engaged in illegal activities after
departure. Thus, this court will not address whether the
challenged evidence was admitted improperly or whether its use
violated Luna-Perez’s right to due process.
Luna-Perez’s petition for review is DENIED. The Respon-
dent has filed a motion for summary affirmance of the BIA's
decision and various motions regarding briefing. The motions are
DENIED as UNNECESSARY.
PETITION DENIED; MOTIONS DENIED AS UNNECESSARY.
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