United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 6, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60581
Summary Calendar
DERRICK SOLOMON PRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EMMITT SPARKMAN, Superintendent; MARTIN ARMSTRONG,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:01-CV-195-P-D
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Derrick Solomon Pruitt, Mississippi prisoner # 46846,
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
Defendants-Appellees and the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint.
Pruitt moves this court for permission to file an out-of-
time reply brief. This motion is GRANTED. Pruitt also moves
this court to recuse Judge Clement and a deputy clerk from this
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. This motion is DENIED
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-60581
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because Pruitt has failed to demonstrate bias resulting from a
personal, extrajudicial source. See United States v. MMR Corp.,
954 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1992).
Pruitt argues that the district court erred in dismissing
his claims that the Mississippi Department of Corrections’
allegedly inadequate Inmate Legal Assistance Program (“ILAP”)
resulted in a denial of access to the courts. Pruitt has not
shown that the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application as
untimely resulted from any action by the named defendants. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (to state claim for
denial of access to the courts prisoner must establish that the
defendants’ conduct “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim”). This claim is without merit.
Pruitt also asserts that the district court erred by
dismissing his claims that prison officials confiscated portions
of his legal materials that allegedly violated a regulation
limiting the amount of material that could be kept in a cell.
Because Pruitt has failed to show that these actions interfered
with his ability to file a claim, we conclude that he has not
established any denial of access to the courts. See Lewis, 518
U.S. at 351-52. Because Pruitt has not shown direct evidence of
retaliation or “a chronology of events from which retaliation may
plausibly be inferred,” we conclude that he has not shown that
the defendants’ actions were in retaliation for his legal
activities. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995)
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(internal quotations and citation omitted). We also conclude
that Pruitt has not shown that this regulation “is [not]
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
Pruitt appeals the district court’s denial of his motions to
compel discovery. We conclude that the district court’s denial
was not “arbitrary or clearly unreasonable,” and therefore the
district court did not abuse its discretion. Moore v. Willis
Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 2000). Pruitt also
argues that, despite his timely request, he was denied a jury
trial. This issue is frivolous; the district court properly
granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed his
complaint.
Pruitt argues that the district court erred by denying his
motions for a temporary restraining order or injunctive relief.
This court has no jurisdiction over the denial of an application
for a temporary restraining order. Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d
741, 742 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court also did not abuse
its discretion in denying Pruitt’s other motions for a
preliminary injunction. White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211
(5th Cir. 1989) (this court reviews the denial of a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion and will reverse “only
under extraordinary circumstances”).
Pruitt appeals the district court’s denial of his notice of
complaint against an employee of the ILAP, Laura Hopson, for
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failure to notarize a portion of a pleading in another
proceeding. Hopson was never properly named or served as a
defendant in this case. In addition, Pruitt has not alleged that
Hopson’s refusal to notarize this portion of the pleading caused
him any harm, such as the dismissal of the petition. This issue
is without merit.
AFFIRMED.