United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 4, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-20560
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MANFRED KREUTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-01-CR-618-ALL)
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Manfred Kreuter appeals his convictions
for wire fraud and money laundering. He contends that the evidence
is insufficient to support his wire fraud convictions and that,
because those convictions do not stand, there is no underlying
illegal act to support the money laundering conviction. After
reviewing the record and the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied
that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence
established the essential elements of the offenses beyond a
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
reasonable doubt. United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 F.3d 374, 376
(5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th
Cir. 1995).
Kreuter also asserts that the district court erred in
admitting into evidence letters of credit and testimony relating to
those letters of credit, insisting that the documents were not
properly verified and constituted inadmissible hearsay. To the
extent that the records were introduced to show Kreuter’s knowledge
of what they said, the letters of credit were not hearsay. FED.
R. EVID. 801(c). To the extent that the documents were used to show
that Kreuter received funds as a result of his entering into
transactions with the international buyers, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence: It would be
admissible under the “residual exception” to the hearsay rule
contained in FED. R. EVID. 807. See United States v. Wilson, 249
F.3d 366, 374-76 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Perez, 217 F.3d
323, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2000).
Kreuter argues further that the district court erred in
allowing a witness to make legal conclusions in her testimony. He
cannot establish that the admission of the statements constituted
reversible error. See Kaiser v. New York, 394 U.S. 280, 381 n.5
(1969); United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir.
2001).
Finally, Kreuter asserts that the district court erred in not
instructing the jury that, to establish wire fraud, the government
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had to show that the defendant acted “willfully” or “voluntarily
with specific intent to disobey or disregard the law.” As he did
not object to the instructions on this ground or request this
instruction, review is for plain error. United States v. Martin,
332 F.3d 827, 834 (5th Cir. 2003). Kreuter has not shown that the
instruction given was plainly erroneous. See United States v.
Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Kreuter’s convictions
and the sentences imposed are, therefore ,
AFFIRMED.
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