United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 11, 2004
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-20720
_____________________
DWAYNE PREJEAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
District Court Cause No. H-02-CV-1524
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, JONES and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
PRADO, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit in which appellant Dwayne
Prejean sued his former employer, appellee Cypress-Fairbanks
Independent School District (the School District), for violations
of the Rehabilitation Act and the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA). In his complaint, Prejean alleged the School District
unlawfully terminated him because of his disability (depression),
and failed to accommodate his disability by denying him FMLA
leave. The School District moved for summary judgment on both of
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
1
these claims. After considering the summary judgment evidence,
the district court determined Prejean failed to produce evidence
that he is an individual with a disability, that he is otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of his former job as
a buyer, and that the School District discharged him from his job
as a buyer solely because of his alleged disability. Based on
these determinations, the district court dismissed Prejean's
Rehabilitation Act claim. The district court also determined
Prejean failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that Prejean notified the School
District he needed to take additional FMLA leave or that the
School District wrongfully denied his request for additional
leave. Consequently, the district court dismissed Prejean's FMLA
claim, and entered summary judgment in favor of the School
District. Prejean challenges the summary judgment in this
appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s summary judgment
decision de novo. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246
F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Consequently, this Court will
uphold a summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of
material fact. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c).
2
Prejean’s Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act
In its motion, the School District maintained that Prejean
could proffer no evidence to satisfy the elements of his claim
under the Rehabilitation Act. To establish a prima facie case
under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is an
individual with a disability, (2) he was otherwise qualified to
perform the duties of his position, (3) he worked for a program
or activity that received federal financial assistance, and (4)
he suffered an adverse employment action solely because of his
disability.2 The School District challenged the first, second
and fourth elements. After reviewing the evidence in this case,
this Court agrees.
Whether Prejean is an individual with a disability.
Although Prejean presented evidence that indicates he suffers
from depression, he did not present evidence that raised a
genuine issue of material fact about whether he is an individual
with a disability. Prejean attested in an affidavit that at
times his depression prevented him from doing simple tasks like
mowing the grass or working on his car, and that his depression
made it difficult to attend work, but he failed to present
evidence that raised a question about whether his depression
limits his ability to perform a major life activity. To show
2
See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.
1993).
3
that he is substantially limited with regard to the activity of
working, a plaintiff must show that he is
significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working.3
Prejean attested that his depression required him to take time
off from work from his job as a buyer, but did not raise a
question of fact about whether his depression rendered him unable
to work in a broad class of jobs. Prejean also failed to present
evidence that indicated his ability to perform manual tasks at
home was substantially limited by his depression. As a result,
the district court did not err in its determination that Prejean
failed to produce evidence that he is an individual with a
disability.4
3
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
4
After being placed on a deficiency plan, Prejean informed
his supervisor he was being treated for depression and that “when
[my] medication has been balanced, I will be able to perform my
duties in compliance with the expectations of the district.”
Prejean relies on Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 889 F.2d
869 (9th Cir. 1989), to suggest the School District was obliged
to accommodate him while his medications were balanced.
Plaintiff Kimbro, however, presented evidence that his migraine
headaches constituted a handicap under Washington law. To the
extent Prejean complains the School District failed to
accommodate his depression, the claim fails because he did not
present evidence that raised a question about whether he is
disabled.
4
Whether Prejean was otherwise qualified to perform the
duties of his position. “The term ‘qualified individual with a
disability’ means an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.”5 To determine whether an individual is otherwise
qualified for a given job, a court must first determine whether
the individual can perform the essential functions of the job,
and then determine whether any reasonable accommodation by the
employer would enable that person to perform those functions.6
In this case, the School District complained that Prejean did
not, or was unable, to attend work and therefore was not
otherwise qualified to perform the duties of his position as a
buyer.
An essential element of most jobs is an ability to appear
for work and to complete assigned tasks within a reasonable
period of time.7 Here, Prejean maintains he could have returned
to work as a buyer if the School District had granted him
additional leave. The summary judgment evidence, however,
indicates Prejean did not ask for additional leave until he was
terminated. But even if a belated request for additional leave
5
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
6
See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393-94.
7
See Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755,
759 (5th Cir. 1996).
5
constituted a request for a reasonable accommodation, Prejean’s
assertion that he could have returned to work had he been given
additional leave is too conclusory to raise a genuine issue of
material fact about whether he was otherwise qualified for his
job as a buyer. As a result, the district court did not err in
its determination that Prejean failed to produce evidence that he
is otherwise qualified for the essential functions of his former
job as a buyer.
Whether Prejean was terminated solely because of his
disability. To constitute a violation under the Rehabilitation
Act, an employee’s disability must play a role in the employer’s
decision making process and have a determinative influence on the
outcome.8 Although Prejean maintains the School District
terminated him because of his disabling depression, he failed to
present any evidence that suggests the School District terminated
him for any reason other than Prejean’s declining job
performance. Prejean contends his depression caused his poor
performance, but he presented no evidence to support that
assertion other than his own conclusory opinion. Notably,
neither of the notes written by Prejean’s doctors suggest that
depression caused Prejean’s performance problems. As a result,
the district court did not err in determining Prejean presented
no evidence that raised a question of fact about whether he was
8
See Soledad v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 504
(5th Cir. 2002).
6
terminated solely because of his alleged disability.
Because Prejean failed to present summary judgment evidence
that raised a question of fact about whether he is disabled,
whether he is otherwise qualified to perform the duties of his
job as a buyer, and whether he was terminated solely because of
his alleged disability, the School District was entitled to
summary judgment on Prejean’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
Consequently, the district court did not err by granting the
School District’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Prejean’s FMLA Claim
In its motion for summary judgment, the School District
maintained it was entitled to summary judgment on Prejean’s FMLA
claim because Prejean took FMLA leave when he requested it, and
because Prejean failed to give adequate notice of the need to
take additional leave before he was terminated. The FMLA allows
eligible employees working for covered employers to take
temporary leave for medical reasons without the risk of losing
employment.9 Prejean maintains the School District improperly
denied his request for additional leave because he maintains the
School District knew that he returned to work with a partial
release–that is, that he might need additional time off from work
to balance his medications. The record, however, does not
9
See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) & (2); see also Hunt v. Rapides
Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2001).
7
support this claim. Instead, the summary judgment evidence
indicates although the School District granted Prejean’s request
for FMLA leave and approved leave from February 25 to June 30,
Prejean returned to work on March 20 with a note from his doctor.
The note read that “Prejean should be able to return to work
without restrictions on 3-20-00.” The note did not indicate
Prejean might need additional time off to balance his medication
or that Prejean was only partially released for work.
The School District terminated Prejean on April 28 after he
failed to complete items on his deficiency plan. To the extent
he requested the balance of his earlier-approved FMLA leave,
Prejean waited until after he was terminated to ask for more
leave. The FMLA, however, requires an employee to provide his
employer written notice at least 30 days before the leave or, if
the leave is not foreseeable, as soon as practicable. Because
operation of the deficiency plan had not been suspended,
Prejean’s notice was not as soon as practicable because he was
released to work without restrictions, and he knew that he was
not meeting the requirements of the deficiency plan. To have
given notice as soon as practicable, Prejean should have
requested leave as soon as he was unable to adequately meet the
requirements of his deficiency plan. Because Prejean failed to
give the School District adequate notice of a request for FMLA
lease, the School District was entitled to summary judgment on
Prejean’s FMLA claim. Consequently, the district court did not
8
err by granting the School District’s motion for summary judgment
on this claim.
Conclusion
Prejean failed to present summary judgment evidence that
raised a question of fact about the elements of his claim under
the Rehabilitation Act. As a result, the district court did not
err by granting summary judgment on that claim. Prejean also
failed to present summary judgment evidence that raised a
question of fact about whether he gave the School District notice
of a request to take additional FMLA leave. As a result, the
district court did not err by granting summary judgment on that
claim. Because the district court properly granted the School
District’s motion, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
9