United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the April 28, 2004
United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III
for the Fifth Circuit Clerk
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m 03-50624
Summary Calendar
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BLAYNE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MARGO FRASIER,
SHERIFF, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
m A-01-CV-470-JN
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Before SMITH, DEMOSS, and STEWART, Blayne Williams sues for alleged violations
Circuit Judges. of title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1981. The district
court dismissed for failure to prosecute.
PER CURIAM:* Finding no error, we affirm.
Williams assert s the following in the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published and
*
is not precedent except under the limited cir- (...continued)
(continued...) cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
conclusion to his appellate brief: previous attorney, or both are at fault.
Especially in a civil proceeding, a party who
Williams hired an attorney to presecute acts through counsel cannot get a second bite
his employment discrimination claims. at the apple because he perceives that counsel
Williams discovered at the end of the dis- did not do enough. Nor do we express any
covery period that his initial attorney had view on whatever merits plaintiff might have
done virtually nothing to get his claims fair- attempted to present.
ly adjudicated on the merits. Williams then
hired present counsel to attempt to get his The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
case properly before the Court. The only
“litigation” of this case occurred between
April 14, 2003 and May 27, 2003, about six
(6) weeks. All Williams [sic] efforts were
thwarted and upon appeal Williams request
[sic] that this Court reverse and remand
this case, with directions to allow Williams
to amend his complaint, to open discovery
for a six (6) month period and for the case
to pursue a normal course, via a revised
scheduling order, to a trial by jury, as the
facts and law may dictate.
The district court, in its order of dismissal,
provides a similarly gloomy assessment:
Plaintiff failed to file a response to De-
fendant’s motion [to dismiss, and, in the al-
ternative, to compel sanctions]. Pursuant
to Local Rule CV-7(d), Defendant’s
motion for dismissal is granted as
unopposed.
Plaintiff’s failure to respond caps a
demonstrated history of intransigence and
delay. Plaintiff refuses to cooperate in dis-
covery. Plaintiff refuses to respond to dis-
covery requests, answer interrogatories, or
appear for deposition. This case has been
on the docket since July of 2001. To date,
there has been no discovery.
Dismissal was therefore proper. We
express no opinion on whether plaintiff, his
2