United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 13, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-50978
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEYUMBA WEBB,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. A-02-CR-301-ALL
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Leyumba Webb (“Webb”) appeals his jury trial conviction for
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Webb argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
evidence of standing at the hearing on his motion to suppress.
As Webb moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of
the Government’s case and at the close of the evidence, the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-50978
-2-
standard of review in assessing his sufficiency challenge is
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence
presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to reasonably
infer that Webb exercised control or dominion over the trailer in
which the crack cocaine was found. See United States v. De Leon,
170 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1999). The evidence, taken as a
whole, was also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that
Webb knew of and had access to the crack cocaine. See United
States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1430 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1086 (5th Cir. 1991); see also De
Leon, 170 F.3d at 497 (“the sum of the evidence may be greater
than the individual factors”). Accordingly, the evidence was
sufficient to support Webb’s conviction. See United States v.
Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993).
We generally do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel on direct appeal because the record is rarely
sufficiently developed. United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359,
363 (5th Cir. 1998). As Webb’s counsel was not questioned under
oath about his allegedly ineffective assistance and the district
court did not make factual findings regarding the alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel, the record is insufficient for
us to consider Webb’s claim on direct appeal. See United States
No. 03-50978
-3-
v. Kizzee, 150 F.3d 497, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly,
the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED without prejudice to
Webb’s right to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
in a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. We express no view on the merits of such a
motion.