United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 9, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-11311
Summary Calendar
LONNIE CHARLES CHALMERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COLLEEN L. RIDGE, Chief of Police; LARRY WILSON, Director
Human Resources University of Texas at Dallas
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:03-CV-2145-G
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Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lonnie Charles Chalmers proceeding pro se, moves for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the appeal of the
district court’s dismissal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Chalmers’ IFP
motion is a challenge to the district court’s certification that
his appeal is not taken in good faith. Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d
197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-11311
-2-
Chalmers sued UTD Chief of Police Colleen Ridge and UTD
Director of Human Resources Larry Wilson, alleging a denial of
due process. Chalmers sought enforcement of an order issued in
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0528-H in which the court stated that
sex offender registration laws are regulatory and not punitive.
Chalmers reiterates his contention that he was denied due
process when his employment with UTD was terminated. Chalmers
argues that he does not have a felony conviction because his 1996
conviction for sexual assault of a child was set aside pursuant
to TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE 42.12 § 20.
As the district court determined, a government official
cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of
respondeat superior. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 & n.58 (1978). A government official can be
held liable only if he was personally involved in the acts
causing the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional rights,
or if there was a causal connection between his wrongful conduct
and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed.
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987).
Chalmers has not challenged the district court’s conclusion
that his complaint did not provide a basis for the defendants’
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although we apply less
stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties
represented by counsel and liberally construe the briefs of pro
se litigants, pro se parties must still brief the issues and
No. 03-11311
-3-
reasonably comply with the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 28.
Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). When an
appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s
reasons for dismissing his complaint, it is the same as if the
appellant had not appealed that judgment. Brinkmann v. Dallas
County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Chalmers has not shown that the district court erred in
certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. He
has not shown that he will present a nonfrivolous issue on
appeal. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983).
Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is
DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. Baugh, 117 F.3d
at 202 n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Chalmers is cautioned that
additional frivolous appeals filed by him or on his behalf will
invite the imposition of sanctions.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED;
SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.