The principle of law which requires the exercise of reasonable care to avoid doing injury to others, requires also the exercise of reasonable care to avoid being injured by the negligence of others, and as a general rule one cannot recover compensation for an injury occasioned by the mere negligence of another, which he might have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. If the injury would not have happened to him but for his own want of ordinary care, he cannot legally charge to the negligence of the other party the consequences of his own carelessness. And this doctrine of contributory negligence applies to cases of injury by animals. Cool. Torts 346; 1 Ad. Torts, s. 261; Shear. Red. Neg., s. 199.
It is contended that the common-law rule has been changed by G. L., c. 115, ss. 10, 11, and that the doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply to cases arising under the statute. The provisions of the statute are as follows: "Sec. 10. Any person to whom or whose property any damage may be occasioned by a dog *Page 373 not owned or kept by said person, shall be entitled to recover of the person who owns, or keeps, or has said dog in possession, all damages which may be so occasioned, except in cases where the same have been occasioned to the party suffering such damage while engaged in the commission of a trespass or other tort." "Sec. 11. Every owner or keeper of a dog shall forfeit to every person injured by it double the amount of the damage sustained by him, to be recovered in an action of debt." The action is brought under section 11, and it is claimed that under this statute the liability of the owner or keeper of a dog is not affected by the negligence of the person injured. It is said that the statute is penal and should be construed strictly, and that its terms impose an absolute liability.
The statute is neither distinctively penal nor remedial. It is so far penal that it is not unconstitutional by reason of authorizing the recovery of double damages. Craig v. Gerrish, 58 N.H. 513. But it is not within the statute limiting the time within which suits founded on penal statutes must be brought. Whitaker v. Warren, 60 N.H. 20. It is penal so far as it imposes the payment of double damages as a forfeiture, and remedial so far as it provides for the recovery of damages as compensation for the injury done. But by whatever name it is called, whether penal or remedial, the statute is substantially remedial. It furnishes a statutory remedy for enforcing the common-law right of recovery of damages for the actual injury sustained, and a recovery under the statute is a bar to any subsequent action for the recovery of damages. The statute must receive a reasonable interpretation whatever its nature. The rule requiring penal statutes to be construed strictly, means only that they are not to be extended by implication so as to embrace cases or acts not fairly and reasonably within the prohibition or penalty of the statute; and in cases of doubtful construction, that interpretation should be adopted which restricts the operation and enforcement of the forfeiture. Where there is such an ambiguity as to leave reasonable doubt of the meaning, the penalty is not to be inflicted. Disregarding the general principle of contributory negligence, the language of section 11 imports an absolute liability. This interpretation gives a broader application to the statute than is contended for. It is said that sections 10 and 11 are to be construed together, and that the exception in section 10 of the right of a party to recover damages for injuries received while engaged in the commission of a trespass or other tort is to be regarded as applicable to section 11 also; and it is argued that the express mention of this exception is to be construed as excluding any other exception to the absolute liability implied in the language of the statute.
In Orne v. Roberts, 51 N.H. 110, 113, it is said, in considering this statute, that it apparently originated in the idea that much damage was done by dogs, for which the injured person had no *Page 374 remedy, by reason of the practical difficulty of charging the owner with knowledge of the mischievous character of the dog, and therefore it was thought best to make the owner or keeper absolutely liable for the injuries caused by his dog, without regard to the fact whether he had knowledge of the vicious character of the animal or not. Assuming this view to be correct, that the purpose of the statute is to obviate the difficulty of showing the owner's knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog, in an action for damages, a reasonable interpretation limits it to the accomplishment of that object, and the language of the statute is to be construed with reference to the established rule of law, that a party cannot recover for injuries resulting from his own negligence. In the interpretation of a statute, the general purpose is entitled to great weight in ascertaining the meaning of particular words; and if the literal meaning of particular words is inconsistent with the general purpose, or if the language used, if understood literally, is inconsistent with a well settled principle of law of general application, there is grave reason to doubt whether the literal sense is the sense intended by the legislature.
A construction of the statute making the owner of a dog absolutely liable for injuries, regardless of the conduct of the party injured, might in some cases hold the owner responsible for injuries occasioned solely by the reckless carelessness of the party injured. It would make the owner liable to a person injured while intentionally exposing himself by worrying and irritating a dog for the purpose of testing his temper and disposition. Such a construction would be unreasonable. We think the rule of interpretation applicable to this statute is analogous to that applied to the statute making towns liable for damages happening from defective highways, which, although literally imposing an absolute and unqualified liability, is construed with the qualification that the party injured is not entitled to recover if his own negligence contributed to the injury.
As the statute is to be interpreted with reference to the general principle that a party cannot recover damages for the negligence of another if his own negligence contributed to the injury, the expressed exception that the injured party cannot recover if the injury is received while he is in the commission of a trespass or other tort, is not to be regarded as excluding the doctrine of contributory negligence. The purpose and effect of the exception is to limit the right of recovery, and not to extend it. The fact that the party injured is in the commission of a trespass or a tort may or may not contribute to the injury. The fact that a person injured by a dog is trespassing on the premises of the owner of the dog at the time of the injury may not in any respect contribute to the injury. He might be injured in the same manner if he was rightfully on the premises by the owner's permission. The effect of the exception is to limit the liability of the owner by prohibiting *Page 375 a recovery in all cases where the party injured is engaged in the commission of a trespass or a tort, regardless of the fact whether he is chargeable with contributory negligence or not. It merely imposes the condition upon the injured party's right of recovery, that it must appear that he was not a trespasser when the injury was received, and the doctrine of contributory negligence is applicable to cases under the statute as at common law.
Case discharged.
SMITH, J., did not sit: the others concurred.