United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT June 3, 2004
_______________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 03-60565 Clerk
_______________________
JUN ZHANG,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________
Petition for review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A76 939 781)
______________________________________________________________________________
Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jun Zhang has brought this petition for review of the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering his
deportation. After Zhang overstayed his visa and the INS
instituted these proceedings, Zhang applied for asylum and
withholding of deportation, and also sought relief from
deportation under the Convention Against Torture.
The Immigration Judge (IJ), after an evidentiary hearing,
granted relief under the Convention Against Torture, finding it
more likely than not that Zhang would be subject to torture if he
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
were returned to China, but denying plaintiff’s request for
asylum and withholding of deportation. Both sides appealed to the
BIA. The BIA, over the dissent of Board Member Villageliu,
agreed with the INS and rejected Zhang’s cross-appeal. The
majority stated, among other reasons for siding with the INS,
that “we find it unlikely that a government intent on persecuting
the respondent would issue him a passport and allow him to leave
the country in an orderly fashion.”
The BIA disagreed with the IJ’s conclusion that Zhang would
likely face arrest and torture if he returned to China. The IJ’s
conclusion relied in part on the State Department’s China Country
Report on Human Rights Practices detailing the use of torture.
The BIA, however, questioned why Zhang faces arrest if returned
to China, noting that he owns two businesses in China which are
still operating in his name, that “the authorities well knew his
whereabouts and did not harm him even when he did not cooperate
with them when he was questioned,” and that “he was never
physically or mentally harmed prior to his leaving China.” The
BIA also noted that the State Department report “reveals that the
Chinese government is interested in combating corruption among
its officials, even high-ranking persons,” and that the report
“indicates that the Chinese government investigates, and
prosecutes when appropriate, complaints of torture, which rebuts
the [IJ’s] conclusion that essentially all detainees in Chinese
facilities are subject to torture.”
2
Zhang argues that he has a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of his political opinions. We review the BIA’s
factual findings for substantial evidence. Efe v. Ashcroft, 293
F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002). The BIA’s “administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
We have reviewed the administrative record and cannot say
that the BIA’s determination that Zhang does not face a well-
founded fear of persecution is unsupported by substantial
evidence. The evidence would not compel any reasonable
factfinder to find such a fear of persecution. Insofar as the
BIA noted the absence of past persecution, we see no error in
reasoning that the absence of past persecution weighed against
finding a well-founded fear of persecution upon Zhang’s return to
China. Insofar as the BIA considered the State Department
country report, we have noted that these reports are the “most
appropriate and perhaps the best resource . . . to obtain
information on political situations in foreign nations.” Rojas
v. INS, 937 F.2d 186, 190 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991).
Insofar as Zhang separately sought withholding of
deportation, as a general rule if the petitioner fails to meet
the well-founded fear standard for asylum, he does not meet the
higher standard for withholding of deportation. See Efe, 293
3
F.3d at 906; Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1994).
As to the Convention Against Torture, we question whether
this claim has been preserved for our review, since the entire
argument in Zhang’s opening brief regarding this claim is one
sentence long. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824,
831 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Questions posed for appellate review but
inadequately briefed are considered abandoned.”); Webb v.
Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an appellant waives all issues not raised and argued in the
initial brief on appeal). Assuming this issue was not waived, we
cannot say that the BIA erred in finding that Zhang did not
establish that he was more likely than not to face torture upon
his return to China. See Efe, 293 F.3d at 907; 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c)(2) (2003). The absence of past torture is relevant
to this determination. Id. § 208.16(c)(3)(i).
PETITION DENIED.
4