United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 21, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10810
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BENITO CHAPA-IBARRA, also known as Benito Ibarra Chapa,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________
No. 03-11216
______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BENITO IBARRA CHAPA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:03-CR-32-ALL-K
USDC No. 3:03-CR-365-ALL-K
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
Nos. 03-10810 &
03-11216
-2-
Benito Chapa-Ibarra (“Chapa”) appeals from his conviction of
illegal reentry following deportation and from the revocation of
his term of supervised release based on the illegal-reentry
conviction. IT IS ORDERED that Chapa’s appeals are consolidated.
Chapa contends that the district court erred by declining to
give his proposed instruction regarding his state of mind about
his citizenship status; erred by declining to instruct the jury
that the Government’s burden of proving alienage meant more than
proving Chapa’s alien birth; erred by denying his motion for a
mistrial; erred by denying him a sentencing adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility; and erred by revoking his term of
supervised release. Chapa’s contentions are unavailing.
Illegal reentry is not a specific-intent crime. The
Government therefore did not need to prove that Chapa had any
intent or knowledge regarding his citizenship status. See United
States v. Treviño-Martinez, 86 F.3d 65, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1996).
The district court therefore did not err by declining to give
Chapa’s requested instruction regarding his state of mind.
The district court’s instructions regarding alien status
adequately explained the law and the Government’s burden of
proof. The district court did not err by declining to give
Chapa’s requested instructions on alien status. See United
States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 553 (5th Cir. 2001).
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Nos. 03-10810 &
03-11216
-3-
The denial of Chapa’s mistrial motion was not an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 298 (5th
Cir. 1999). First, the district court sustained Chapa’s
objection to the prosecutor’s question on which the mistrial
motion was based, before the question was answered. Second, the
question related to a peripheral issue in the case. It is highly
unlikely that the jurors would have relied on the prosecutor’s
question to make a finding on the central issue in the case.
Because Chapa did not seek an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment apart from his downward-departure motion, we review
his contention under the plain error standard. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 52(b). There was no plain error in Chapa’s case. Chapa
continued to deny that he was an alien after he was convicted,
and he accused a witness of committing perjury about his mother’s
birth certificate. No adjustment was warranted. See U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(a).
Chapa’s contention that the district court erroneously
revoked his supervised release is based on his challenge to his
conviction. Because the conviction is affirmed, the revocation
also is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.