I agree that the People have failed to make out a case but I desire to add a few words to make clear the reasons by which I have reached that conclusion.
Much may be said on the historical distinction between lawyers and scriveners and notaries, as has been admirably done by PUTNAM, J., in the dissenting opinion (180 App. Div. 654) below and in People v. Alfani (186 App. Div. 468). Doubtless many individuals, unlearned in the law, occasionally draw deeds, wills, mortgages and other instruments without rendering legal services in the common acceptance of the term who would be startled to learn *Page 379 that they had criminally engaged in the practice of law. The test of the legislative intent is to be found, however, in the present day evil which the legislation aims to correct. The evil addressed seems to be, both in the case of the individual and the corporation, the practice of rendering, with some continuity, services of the character now generally performed by lawyers as a part of their ordinary routine — not merely trying cases, giving advice or preparing difficult papers, but ordinary conveyancing as well. Arguments based on the ancient rivalry of the attorneys and the scriveners; the unique rights and privileges of the continental notary and the convenient custom of laymen to draw wills and other legal instruments must give way to a consideration of the well-known work of the modern law office. The legislation is in aid of the lawyers, and for the protection of the public, and is antagonistic to the policy which would permit any one to act habitually as a scrivener or conveyancer. The question is not one of sound public policy but is one of legislative policy merely. The lawyer's profession or calling does not cover the preparation of all papers of legal significance, such as promissory notes, for which lawyers are not as a rule resorted to, but it does, I think, cover the preparation of bills of sale and chattel mortgages. I am unable to rest any satisfactory test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The most complex are simple to the skilled and the simplest often trouble the inexperienced. Skill is sought when another is employed to do the work. If the blank forms used by the trust companies are prepared or approved by their legal counsel then, when the clerks fill them out, the corporation tacitly advises the client that the forms are proper and sufficient for the purpose and one would expect that he was getting good legal advice, indirectly, if he had papers thus prepared. So the giving of oral advice is not a satisfactory test. If such services as were rendered *Page 380 in this case are customarily rendered, I think that they should be characterized as legal services. This does not imply that a real estate broker may not prepare leases, mortgages and deeds, or that an installment house may not prepare conditional bills of sale, in connection with the business and as a part thereof. The preparation of the legal papers may be ancillary to the daily business of the actor or it may be the business itself. The emphasis may be upon the services of the broker or the business of the trader or it may be upon the practice of law.
In the case before us, I think that the defendant may not make it a business to prepare even simple legal papers for all who apply, independently of its chartered powers. The corporation is not, however, chargeable criminally for the isolated act of its employees as here charged, which might well occur otherwise than as an incident of a general practice. On the evidence, it does not hold itself out as preparing legal instruments generally but only in connection with its legitimate business.
For these reasons, I concur in the result that the judgment should be reversed and the information dismissed.