09-0530-cv
Dargahi v. Hymas
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1.
W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 22 nd day of March, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 RICHARD K. EATON,
10 Judge. *
11
12
13
14 ALAIN AND CATHERINE DARGAHI,
15
16 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
17
18 -v.- 09-0530-cv
19
20 HONDA LEASE TRUST,
21
22 Defendant-Appellee,
23
24 ROBERT A. HYMAS,
25
26 Defendant. **
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*
The Honorable Richard K. Eaton, of the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
**
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official
caption as set forth above.
1 FOR APPELLANTS: RICHARD M. STEIGMAN, Gair, Gair, Conason,
2 Steigman, Mackauf, Bloom & Rubinowitz,
3 New York, New York.
4
5 FOR APPELLEE: ANNETTE G. HASAPIDIS, Segal McCambridge
6 Singer & Mahoney, Ltd., New York, NY.
7
8 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
9 Court for the Southern District of New York (Jones, J.).
10
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
12 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District
13 Court for the Southern District of New York be AFFIRMED.
14 Appellants, Alain and Catherine Dargahi, appeal from
15 the October 15, 2008 order of the United States District
16 Court for the Southern District of New York (Jones, J.),
17 granting appellee Honda Lease Trust’s motion for judgment on
18 the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19 12(c). 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
20 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
21 presented for review.
22 Appellants are French citizens and domiciliaries of
23 France. Appellee is a Delaware statutory trust whose
1
By an order of December 30, 2008, the district court granted
appellants’ motion for a final judgment in favor of appellee pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to
“allow[] for the entry of a partial final judgment and thereby permit[]
immediate appeal.” Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d
485, 495 (2d Cir. 2004). This was necessary in this case as the action
involves multiple defendants, but the district court’s October 15, 2008 order
pertains only to the appellee before this Court. No party contests the
propriety of the district court’s December 30, 2008 order.
2
1 governing instrument states that it is created under,
2 governed by, and construed according to the internal laws of
3 the State of Delaware “without regard to any otherwise
4 applicable principles of conflicts of laws.” Honda Lease
5 Trust maintains its principal place of business in
6 California and does business in many states but does not do
7 business in New York.
8 This litigation arises out of a collision in Manhattan
9 between an individual who was driving a vehicle leased from
10 the appellee and Mr. Dargahi, who was riding a bicycle.
11 Appellants seek to hold Honda Lease Trust vicariously liable
12 for the alleged negligence of the driver. The parties
13 dispute which state’s vicarious liability law should govern
14 this action. Appellants argue New York law, which would
15 impose vicarious liability on appellee, applies. By
16 contrast, appellee argues that New York has no interest in
17 applying its law to this action and that under the laws of
18 the parties’ respective domiciles, appellants cannot
19 maintain a cause of action against it.
20 A grant of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is proper
21 “if, from the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to
22 judgment as a matter of law.” Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc.
3
1 v. Int’l Union, 47 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
2 We review de novo a district court’s choice of law
3 determination. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
4 Co., 363 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
5 The district court properly determined that in a
6 diversity case such as this one, “federal courts apply the
7 choice of law rules of the forum state, in this case, New
8 York.” Gilbert v. Seton Hall Univ., 332 F.3d 105, 109 (2d
9 Cir. 2003). Vicarious liability laws are loss allocating
10 rules and in determining which state’s laws apply, the locus
11 of the accident “has at best a minimal interest in
12 determining the right of recovery or the extent of the
13 remedy” when the accident did not involve a citizen of the
14 forum state. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d
15 189, 198 (1985).
16 Our “choice of law analysis is governed by the so-
17 called Neumeier rules.” Lee v. Bankers Trust, Co., 166 F.3d
18 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31
19 N.Y.2d 121 (1972)). As the district court recognized, the
20 manner in which a court should identify the domicile of a
21 statutory trust is far from pellucid. We affirm because on
22 any theory of the domicile of Honda Lease Trust, we conclude
4
1 that neither France nor any of the states in which Honda
2 Lease Trust could be said to be a domiciliary would allow
3 appellants to maintain a cause of action against the
4 appellee. Under such circumstances, “displacing” the
5 inconsistent law of the forum “advance[s] the relevant
6 substantive law purposes” of the parties’ domiciliary
7 states. Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d at 129.
8 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
9 court is hereby AFFIRMED.
10
11 FOR THE COURT:
12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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