While plaintiff has contracted the occupational disease of asbestosis, and more than likely his colon cancer was related to occupational exposure to asbestos, I must respectfully dissent from the majority decision to remand this case to reconsider an order of removal and pay 104 weeks of benefits pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT § 97-61.5(b) under an estoppel theory.
NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR ORDER OF REMOVAL/104 WEEKS Removal from employment under § 97-61.5 requires a finding of at least two conditions: (1) that the plaintiff has a compensable claim for asbestosis; and (2) that plaintiff is currently employed (at the time of the "hearing after first [panel] examination") in a position that causes harmful exposure to asbestos. See Austin v. Continental General Tire,141 N.C. App. 397, 415, 540 S.E.2d 824, 835 (2000) (J. Greene, dissenting), reversed and adopting dissenting opinion, 354 N.C. 334,553 S.E.2d 680 (2001); Moore v. Standard Mineral Company,122 N.C. App. 375, 469 S.E.2d 594 (1996). On the issue of removal, §97-61.5(b) specifically provides:
"If the Industrial Commission finds at the first hearing that the employee has asbestosis or if the parties enter into an agreement to the fact that the employee has asbestosis, it shall by order remove the employee from any occupation which exposes him to the hazards of asbestosis"
[Emphasis added] Plaintiff has met the first condition for removal through the agreement of the parties and the evidence that he has asbestosis. Plaintiff, however, has not met the second condition, and indeed has presented no evidence to prove that his occupation currently "exposes him to the hazards of asbestosis." Moreover, the evidence is that plaintiff retired from his employment with defendant on September 31, 1991. Although plaintiff testified that he retired, at least in part, due to shortness of breath the medical records relate the shortness of breath to plaintiff's then diagnosed, unrelated obstructive lung disease. Moreover, the pulmonary testing performed on plaintiff in 1989 and 1990 was negative for asbestos-related pulmonary disease. Thus, plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to an order of removal. Further, only an appropriate order of removal, that actually removes plaintiff from his employment in the industry, triggers the payment of 104 weeks of benefits. See Clark v. ITT Grinnell, 141 N.C. App. 417,539 S.E.2d 369, remanded for reconsideration, 354 N.C. 572, 558 S.E.2d 867 (2002); Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 415; Moore, supra (removal from industry by directive of Commission); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b) (if employee is removed from industry).
The application of the statutory provision regarding removal and subsequent payment of 104 weeks has a practical purpose and historical significance. By way of an explanation, employees in a dusty trade are entitled to a dusty trade card only after passing a chest x-ray screening, and for as long as their yearly chest x-rays remain clear. Upon a finding of asbestosis after clinical examination (the first panel examination), the employee's dusty trade card is revoked, prohibiting his continued employment in the dusty trade industry. The diagnosis of asbestosis and evidence of current hazardous exposure to asbestos thereby trigger an order of removal and the second and third panel examinations during which time the 104 weeks of benefits is paid. The length of the 104-week period is significant in the statutory scheme of the panel examinations. A 52-week period exists between the first and second panel examinations and another 52-week period exists between the second and third panel examinations. This accounts for the 104 weeks of benefits which are provided as a "safety net" for an employee who is suddenly prohibited from further employment in the dusty trade industry where the employee is currently hazardously exposed and whose final disability determination will not be made until after the third panel examination. Although § 97-61.5 has now been extended by the courts to non-dusty trade employment, the same principles apply. The 104 weeks of benefits is intended to compensate the employee who suddenly is prohibited from continuing in his current employment because it exposes him to the hazards of asbestos. Thus, evidence of plaintiff's current exposure to the hazards of asbestos is a critical element to be established prior to an order of removal and payment of 104 weeks of benefits.
Plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of current exposure to the hazards of asbestos. While plaintiff is not required to provide scientific proof of his current exposure to asbestos for purposes of § 97-61.5(b), nevertheless he must prove current exposure by the greater weight of the competent evidence. See Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 404. The Austin Court did not hold, as plaintiff suggests in this case, that plaintiff is entitled to removal without establishing that he iscurrently exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Further, § 97-61.5(b) compels removal from "hazardous exposure" to asbestos, not merely because a facility may have asbestos present, but because asbestos is present in such a form as it can be inhaled, i.e. friable. Asbestos that is non-friable, encapsulated, or in other form such that it would not be inhaled and therefore not cause or contribute to asbestosis is not, while in that form, a "hazardous" exposure. Thus, plaintiff must present evidence that there is asbestos in the facility that currently presents a hazardous exposure to him while working. See Austin,141 N.C. App. at 415.
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that his employment with defendant currently exposes him to the hazards of asbestos. Although plaintiff testified as to exposure to asbestos in his employment with defendant, he did not testify that he is currently exposed to asbestos in employment with defendant, or any other employer. Moreover, the undisputed evidence is that plaintiff retired in September 1991, more than 10 years before the "hearing after first examination."1 Thus, there is no evidence that plaintiff is currently employed with defendant, let alone that the employment is currently hazardous. The majority finds in Finding of Fact No. 4, "plaintiff was exposed to asbestos-containing materials on a regular basis for more than thirty working days or parts thereof within seven consecutive months from 1947 to 1991."2 However, there is no evidence, stipulation, or reasonable inference to support a finding that plaintiff is currently, hazardously exposed to asbestos in employment with defendant. The majority correctly finds in Finding of Fact No. 1 that plaintiff was last employed on September 1, 1991, and that plaintiff was many years later diagnosed with asbestosis. The parties also stipulated that plaintiff was last injuriously exposed (30 work days inside of seven consecutive months) to asbestos while employed by defendant. These findings and stipulation taken together, however, do not support the necessary element under § 97-61.5(b) to establish that plaintiff at the present time is hazardously exposed in his employment with by defendant. The stipulation does not define when during the forty-some years of employment plaintiff was last exposed to the hazards of asbestos, and more significantly, does not state that plaintiff is currently exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Thus, there is no evidence to support an essential element of plaintiff's claim under § 97-61.5(b).
Moreover, as discussed below in the section on estoppel, the majority has completely ignored the medical records concerning plaintiff's health during the time period immediately prior to plaintiff's retirement in 1991. First, plaintiff's pulmonary function was monitored prior to his retirement. B-reads for asbestosis and other dust-related pulmonary disease read by Dr. Weaver, a certified B-reader, in 1989 and 1990 reported that plaintiff's films were completely negative. Further, pulmonary function studies reported unrelated obstructive disease,3 however, failed to find evidence of restrictive disease that would be associated with asbestos exposure. Simply, the medical monitoring performed on plaintiff before his retirement did not indicate that he had asbestosis prior to his retirement. Plaintiff was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 1999. Second, although the majority finds, and defendant has not disputed, that plaintiff's colon cancer was more likely than not related to occupational asbestos exposure, no medical doctor expressed that opinion when plaintiff began this treatment in 1991. Rather, this information first comes from an after-the-fact peer review of medical records by Dr. Frank performed in 1999. Thus, there is no medical evidence to legally support removing plaintiff from hazardous employment prior to 1999, long after plaintiff had voluntarily retired. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b).
PLAINTIFF'S § 97-57 ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED Rather than presenting evidence of current exposure to the hazards of asbestos in his employment, plaintiff suggests that the stipulation, made pursuant to § 97-57, that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos for 30 days within a seven-month period,4 presents an irrebuttable presumption that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos in the last 30 days of his employment. Plaintiff's reliance on § 97-57 to determine current exposure is misplaced because § 97-57 is not applicable for determining current exposure. Section 97-57 determines liability for "last injurious exposure" when there is a series of defendants, all of whom are potentially liable because their employment caused plaintiff to be exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Defendant's stipulation to "last injurious exposure" merely indicates that, should plaintiff successfully establish a compensable claim for § 97-61.5(b) benefits, then defendant is the liable employer. Section 97-57 does not abrogate plaintiff's burden to prove the elements of his case, including but not limited to, the elements for removal and the award of 104 weeks under § 97-61.5(b).
Plaintiff's argument arises from a misinterpretation of the Court of Appeals' decision in Barber v. Babcock Wilcox Construction Company,101 N.C. App. 564, 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991) and the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Fetner v. Rocky Mount Marble Granite Works,251 N.C. 296, 111 S.E.2d 324 (1959). Both of these cases deal with the issue of "last injurious exposure" for purposes of determining the particular defendant liable for benefits. Plaintiff misapplies § 97-57 to abrogate plaintiff's burden of proof with regard to current exposure when § 97-57 is only applicable after plaintiff has carried all of the threshold burdens of proof for compensability of his disease. Section97-57, in and of itself, does not remove plaintiff's burden to prove a necessary element of his § 97-61.5(b) claim; i.e.: current exposure to the hazards of asbestos. Furthermore, as these cases dealt with dusty trade defendants whose facilities continued to cause current exposure, whether there was "current exposure" was not an issue in controversy and therefore not a litigated issue in these cases.
Plaintiff has misinterpreted the Barber decision. Plaintiff, out of context, quotes Barber to find that § 97-57 "creates an irrebuttable legal presumption that the last 30 days of work is a period of last injurious exposure." See Barber 101 N.C. App. at 565. The issue inBarber was whether plaintiff who was only employed for forty-eight days at the second of two employers nevertheless had to establish that his exposure to asbestos was "injurious." The Court of Appeals correctly applied § 97-57 and explained "[i]n light of the irrebuttable legal presumption that the last thirty days of work subjecting the plaintiff to the hazards of asbestos is the period of last injurious exposure and the Commission's holding that plaintiff was exposed to the inhalation during the forty-eight days he worked for the defendant, such exposure must be deemed injurious." Id. at 566 [emphasis added]. However, contrary to plaintiff's argument in the instant case, the Court of Appeals in Barber did not find that a plaintiff did not have to establish current exposure to asbestos for purposes of removal; rather, the Court of Appeals explained that the plaintiff did not have to prove that his exposure to asbestos was "injurious" because § 97-57 creates a presumption that 30 days of exposure within seven months is "injurious." Id. at 566. Further, the Court in Barber did not find evidence of exposure in the last 30 days of employment based on a presumption. In fact, the Barber court had evidence of record to determine that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos during the forty-eight days that he worked for defendant. Id.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in Fetner does not support plaintiff's argument that a stipulation of "last injurious exposure" is equivalent to a stipulation of current exposure. See Fetner v. RockyMount Marble Granite Works, 251 N.C. 296, 111 S.E.2d 324 (1959). InFetner, a dusty trades case, the issue was whether the exposure with a third employer for whom plaintiff only worked for eleven months was "injurious" when plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis before he went to work for the third employer. In this case, plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis on March 4, 1949, when he was working for the first employer, and his dusty trade card was revoked after his diagnosis. On August 10, 1950, plaintiff requested permission from the Industrial Commission to waive compensation and to go to work for the second employer. Plaintiff worked for the second employer from July 26, 1950 to October 19, 1950. Plaintiff then went to work for a third employer from November 4, 1950 to September 29, 1951. No waiver of compensation was sought for plaintiff's employment with the third employer, thereby raising the issue of whether the eleven-month employment with the third employer was "injurious" in light of the prior diagnosis of silicosis and prior revocation of plaintiff's dusty trade card based on that diagnosis. In examining the liability of the third employer, the Supreme Court held that the Commission may not arbitrarily select any thirty-day period of employment, but must select the last 30 days within a seven-month period during which the plaintiff was last exposed, as the period of "last injurious exposure." Fetner, 251 N.C. at 301. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not relieve plaintiff of the burden to present evidence on the period of hazardous exposure. Id. Competent evidence was presented and findings were made to determine when plaintiff was last exposed to the hazards of silica.
Contrary to the suggestion of plaintiff, the Fetner and Barber decisions do not abrogate the requirement of plaintiff to establish by the greater weight of the competent evidence the period of hazardous exposure. Rather, these decisions hold that § 97-57 creates for purposes of liability among two or more defendants, where plaintiff proved hazardous exposure, an irrebuttable presumption that exposure for at least 30 days during a seven-month period is an "injurious exposure." In light of the stipulation of the parties and the lack of evidence of other hazardous employment, this issue is not present in this case; the defendant has stipulated that plaintiff's "injurious exposure" occurred during his employment with defendant.
Further, the plaintiff's illogical argument that the last thirty days of employment was injurious, without producing evidence of exposure to any asbestos during this thirty-day period, directly violates the Supreme Court's holding in Fetner that the Commission may "not arbitrarily select any thirty days of employment." Fetner, 251 N.C. at 300,111 S.E.2d at 327. The relevant period under § 97-57 is the "last thirty days of employment while exposed to silica [asbestos] dust." Fetner,251 N.C. at 300, 111 S.E.2d at 327. Without evidence of current exposure to asbestos, the Commission cannot find that plaintiff has met the second element of his claim, entitling him to an order of removal, which when accomplished triggers the award of 104 weeks of benefits. See Austin,141 N.C. App. at 145; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b).
Further, the Barber and Fetner cases were only in litigation due to the apparent inequity resulting from the strict application of § 97-57 designating liability on the last hazardous employment and did not arise from any disagreement concerning "current exposure." For example, liability must be placed on the last employer where the plaintiff has been exposed to the hazards of asbestos for as little as 30 days even when a prior employer may have hazardously exposed plaintiff to asbestos for more than twenty years. However, an employer who escapes liability in one case despite long exposure may be the last, short-term employer in the next case. Thus, taken from a broad view, the statute is equitable, and is consistent with the goal of the Legislature to promote judicial economy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57.
REMOVAL FROM HAZARDOUS WORK Plaintiff has argued illogically that he is entitled to an order of removal because his employment5 involves a hazardous exposure to asbestos. The evidence, however, is undisputed that plaintiff is notcurrently employed with defendant, or anyone else; therefore, there is no foundation to order his removal. If plaintiff is currently hazardously exposed to asbestos, we must order his actual removal from employment.See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b). If he is not currently hazardously exposed to asbestos, he is not in an employment that requires removal.Id.; see Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 145. Plaintiff is only entitled to 104 weeks of benefits if he is actually "removed from the industry" following a sufficient order of removal. See Austin, supra; N.C. GEN STAT. § 07-61.5(b).
The question of current exposure to asbestos as a condition precedent to the award of 104 weeks of benefits was recently addressed by the Court of Appeals in Abernathy. See Abernathy v. Sandoz Chemical, 151N.C. App. 252, 565 S.E.2d 218, review denied, 356 N.C. 432, 572 S.E.2d 421 (2002). In Abernathy, the plaintiff was represented by the same firm who represents plaintiff in this case. The Court of Appeals' opinion notes that the parties agreed that the Commission's award of 104 weeks of benefits was in error when the employee had retired and thereby was notcurrently engaged in employment that exposed him to the hazards of asbestos. Despite this concession before the Court of Appeals, plaintiff's counsel has not abandoned this argument before the Industrial Commission in this case, and insists that employees who are retired (such as the instant case), as well as those who are currently employed in positions where there is no evidence of current exposure to the hazards of asbestos, are entitled to removal and the 104 weeks of benefits. Further, plaintiff argues before the Commission that Austin does not require plaintiff to prove current exposure to the hazards of asbestos; however, Judge Greene's dissenting opinion, adopted by the Supreme Court, clearly states:
"An employee who is no longer employed in a position that causes harmful exposure need not be `removed' from his employment."
Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 415, 540 S.E.2d at 835. Judge Greene's statement is consistent with the express language of the Act requiring the Commission to order removal from "any occupation that exposes him to the hazards of asbestos". If the employee is not exposed to the hazards of asbestos, there is no hazardous employment from which to order the removal and the order of removal would be a legal nullity and, hence, could not trigger an award for 104 weeks of compensation.6
The statutory mandate is for the Commission to determine "removal" and the award of 104 weeks of benefits at the "first hearing" after the panel examination. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5. If plaintiff, as in this case, is not employed in a position that causes harmful exposure at the time the Full Commission holds the "hearing after first [panel] examination" the removal and benefit provisions of § 97-61.5(b) are not applicable. See Abernathy, 565 S.E.2d at 257; Austin,540 S.E.2d at 835-36; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5. The benefits are for removal from "hazardous industry by a directive of the Commission." Clark,539 S.E.2d at 376, citing, Moore, 469 S.E.2d at 596.
NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL The evidence in this case consists of several medical depositions, stipulated medical records, the hearing agreement of the parties, and the testimony of plaintiff and his wife. The majority, however, would have the Commission decide this case on argument of counsel that is not supported by the record.7 There is no evidence before the Commission in this case to support the findings of the majority made in Findings of Fact Nos. 26, 27, and 28. These "findings" come solely from suggested argument of counsel for plaintiff. No evidence was presented to support the "findings" made by the majority. The argument of counsel is not evidence.
A major assumption in the plaintiff's argument, which has been blindly accepted by the majority, is that the defendant's voluntary medical monitoring program excluded its employees from coverage in the State's mandatory "dusty trades" medical monitoring program.8 The evidence, however, does not support the conclusion that Weyerhaeuser's implementation of a monitoring program caused Weyerhaeuser to be excluded from the dusty trades monitoring program.
On this issue, plaintiff submitted the testimony of William H. Stephenson, which was taken in I.C. No. 902274 and is included in the stipulated exhibits in this action. Mr. Stephenson is the former Chairman of the Industrial Commission who has held numerous positions with this agency from 1948 through 1990, and subsequently has served on the advisory board of this agency. Mr. Stephenson explained that the Industrial Commission originally administered the dusty trade program until 1943 when the industrial hygienist at the Commission, and the program, was transferred to the State Board of Health. Mr. Stephenson explained that the State Board of Health would notify the Industrial Commission that a particular employer employed persons in a hazardous environment that exposes them to the hazards of asbestos and/or silica and that the Industrial Commission could then declare the employer to be a "dusty trade" subject the dusty trades monitoring program.9 The Industrial Commission relied on the State Board of Health to determine the industries and employers that were subject to this program. The Industrial Commission has never been designated Weyerhaeuser a dusty trade and this determination is made by the Commission, upon the advice of the State Department of Health, not the employer.
Mr. Stephenson testified that Weyerhaeuser did not fail to perform any obligation that they had under the Act. To the contrary, Weyerhaeuser did more than the State required by adopting its own monitoring program and submitting chest x-rays to the State for review. The State Department of Health was clearly aware of Weyerhaeuser's circumstance through the review of the chest x-rays, however, the Department of Health never requested the Industrial Commission to add Weyerhaeuser to the Dusty Trade list. There is no evidence that the voluntary acts of Weyerhaeuser of monitoring its employees and submitting their x-rays for review by the State Board of Health precluded the Industrial Commission from declaring Weyerhaeuser a "dusty trade" or that defendant otherwise "convinced" the State that it did not have to be subject to this regulation.
Moreover, there is no evidence, available for review, to suggest that plaintiff exhibited signs of asbestosis in 1991, when he retired, or at any other times while he was employed by defendant. Rather, to the contrary, the evidence is that plaintiff was in a medical monitoring program which consisted of chest x-rays with B-reads and pulmonary function studies. Plaintiff's x-rays, performed in 1989 and 1990, were negative for evidence of any dust-related disease, including asbestosis. In addition, plaintiff's pulmonary function studies failed to reveal restrictive lung disease that would be anticipated in a person with asbestosis.10 Absent a chest x-ray with a 1/1 or greater profusion rating, the State Board of Health, would issue a dusty trades card. Thus, plaintiff's negative chest firms would not have triggered removal prior to his retirement. Although plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis in 1999, his medical records in 1989 and 1990 do not support this diagnosis prior to his retirement in 1991. Without medical evidence that plaintiff had diagnosable asbestosis while working for defendant, there is no basis to apply an estoppel theory. Thus, there is no basis to apply the estoppel doctrine under the circumstances of this case.
Inappropriately, the majority has chosen to decide this case based on the unsupported argument of plaintiff's counsel rather than to accurately review the evidence of record.
INSUFFICIENT ORDER OF REMOVAL To trigger the award of 104 weeks of benefits the order of removal must cause plaintiff to be removed from the industry. In Moore, the Supreme Court stated:
"the language regarding `removal from the industry' has specific application only to occasions when identified victims of occupational disease are thereafter `removed' from a hazardous industry by directive of the Commission."
Clark, 539 S.E.2d at 376, citing, Moore, 469 S.E.2d at 596. The majority's order to remand this case to reconsider the entry of an order of removal ignores the statutory mandate that plaintiff is to be actually removed from his employment with defendant.11 At best, this order of removal appears to be a legal nullity because there is no evidence that plaintiff is employed at all, let alone in an occupation that further exposes him to the hazards of asbestos. Moreover, since an order of "removal" will not, and cannot, in fact, remove plaintiff from his employment, let alone the industry, because plaintiff left employment before the directive of the Commission, an order of removal, subsequent to retirement, does not trigger the award of 104 weeks of benefits.Moore, 469 S.E.2d at 596; Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 415; Abernathy,supra; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b).
104 WEEKS NOT APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION FOR PLAINTIFF Plaintiff also suggests that in order to provide compensation within the intent of the Act, the award of 104 weeks is necessary. Plaintiff's argument, however, fails to recognize that plaintiffs, who though they are not currently exposed to the hazards of asbestos and thus entitled to 104 weeks of benefits because of removal, are afforded relief for their diagnosed disease under other statutory provisions. In fact, pursuant to § 97-64, a disabled plaintiff is entitled to recover benefits under §§ 97-29, 97-30, or 97-31. Abernathy, supra; Clark,141 N.C. App. at 428-429; see Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co.,235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952) (entitled to ordinary compensation under the general provisions of the Act). The fallacy of plaintiff's argument was explained in Clark:
Id. at 378, 469 S.E.2d at 596. . . .. . . defendants also contend that "most importantly, the payment of one hundred four weeks of compensation is reserved to those employees who are actually removed from their employment." (Emphasis added). This Court addressed the removal requirement in Moore v. Standard Mineral Co., 122 N.C. App. 375, 469 S.E.2d 594 (1996).
[T]he term "removal" as used by G.S. § 97-61.5 presumed medical diagnosis will occur during the hazardous employment. Thus the language regarding "removal from the industry" has specific application only to occasions when . . . identified victims of occupational disease are thereafter "removed" from hazardous industry by a directive of the Commission. However, the phrase is inapposite to instances as that sub justice wherein a claimant is diagnosed at some point subsequent to leaving hazardous employment.
Clark 141 N.C. App. at 428-29. Although Moore and other decisions12 have questioned appropriate compensation for employees who are not entitled to removal, the Court, in Clark, explained that the Act, as amended, expressly provides workers' compensation benefits for employees who suffer from the occupational disease of asbestosis:
The general rule for recovery for individuals suffering from asbestosis or asbestos-related disorders is found at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-64 (1991), which provides:
Except as herein otherwise provided, in case of disablement or death from silicosis and/or asbestosis, compensation shall be payable in accordance with the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.
Clark 141 N.C. App. at 428-29; see Abernathy, supra. Thus, because the Act does in fact provide benefits to disabled plaintiffs with asbestosis who are not currently exposed to the hazards of asbestos and consequently are not entitled to 104 weeks of benefits, and because there is no sound policy reason to extend the application of § 97-61.5 beyond its express and intended purpose, there is no basis to award § 97-61.5(b) benefits in this case.
The majority inappropriately cites Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co.,235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952), for the proposition that the 104 weeks of compensation has the additional purpose to compensate the employee for the incurable nature of the disease. This finding arises from plaintiff's suggestion that the waiver provision of § 97-61.7 allows an employee to continue in his employment and at the same time receive the 104 weeks of benefits pursuant to § 97-61.5. Although § 97-61.7, and cases interpreting this provision,13 have allowed employees to obtain the 104 weeks of benefits under § 97-61.5, our courts have held that § 97-61.7 applies only after an employee has been ordered removed and awarded compensation under § 97-61.5. SeeAustin, 141 N.C. App. at 416. Thus, § 97-61.7 does not remove plaintiff's burden to prove his entitlement to benefits under §97-61.5(b). Plaintiff's argument that Sections 97-61.5 and 97-61.7 are to be read together was rejected by the Supreme Court in Austin, which adopted the dissent of Judge Greene rather than the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals.
In the instant claim, plaintiff has not sought a waiver from removal from the Commission. In addition, plaintiff has not presented evidence to the Commission on the issue of whether the Commission should approve a waiver of further benefits and allow plaintiff to continue in hazardous employment. Therefore, a § 97-61.7 question is not properly before the Commission.
Moreover, the majority's citation to Honeycutt is not appropriate.Honeycutt is not a 97-61.5(b) case and predates the enactment of this provision. Thus, the Supreme Court in Honeycutt did not award §97-61.5(b) benefits, or otherwise discuss § 97-61.5(b), an order of removal, the award of 104 weeks of benefits, the payment of benefits while continuing in current employment, or the payment of 104 weeks of benefits for the incurable nature of the disease. Rather, Honeycutt supports the proposition that an employee with asbestosis is entitled to recover compensation under the general provisions of the Act (i.e.: §§ 97-29, -30, -31) as expressed in § 97-61.
In Comstock v. Weyerhaeuser Company, I.C. No. 931412, filed on February 3, 2003, the same Commissioners composing the majority in this case, denied plaintiff's claim for § 97-61.5(b) benefits because "a retiree who is no longer employed by the asbestos-exposing industry is not entitled to an order of removal and the subsequent award because he no longer faces the possibility of exposure. See Austin v. General Tire,354 N.C. 344, 553 S.E.2d 680 (2001)." [COL 4 in I.C. No. 931412.] The same majority has also denied the 104 weeks of benefits to retirees in I.C. File No. 002991, Davenport v. Weyerhaeuser. The circumstances are no different in this case, and thereby, the results should be the same.
COORDINATION OF BENEFITS The majority has awarded § 97-31(24) benefits14 and remanded the claim to a deputy to consider whether § 97-61.5(b) benefits should be awarded. No mention is made concerning the coordination of these benefits, therefore, I feel compelled to discuss this issue.
A plaintiff is entitled to recover the greater of § 97-31(24) or § 97-61.5(b) benefits, but not both. Hicks v. Leviton Mfg. Co.,121 N.C. App. 453, 466 S.E.2d 78 (1996). Thus, should the plaintiff in this case ultimately prevail in the recovery of § 97-31(24) and § 97-61.5(b) benefits, he will be presumed to elect the greater recovery, but will not be able to recover benefits under both provisions. Id.
§ 97-88.1 ATTORNEY'S FEES Finally, the majority opinion finds that plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees for unfounded litigiousness pursuant to § 97-88.1 should be "held in abeyance." [Conclusion of Law No. 9.] If a ruling on this issue cannot be made at this time, then clearly there are and will be no grounds to assess attorney's fees. If it cannot be determined that the defense is unreasonable, then in fact the defense is patently reasonable as reasonableness is not determined in hindsight. Further, as noted above, this case includes numerous legal issues on which the parties, including defendant, have a right to a ruling by the Commission and subsequently by the Courts. Thus, plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees pursuant to § 97-88.1 must be denied. See Shaw v. United ParcelService, 116 N.C. App. 598, 449 S.E.2d 50 (1994), aff'd per Curiam,342 N.C. 189, 463 S.E.2d 78 (1995).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's claim for 104 weeks of benefits pursuant to § 97-61.5(b) must be denied. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
S/_______________ DIANNE C. SELLERS COMMISSIONER
DCS/gas
1 The "first hearing" expressed in § 97-61.5 occurred on May 28, 2002.
2 This finding is not supported by the record because there is no competent evidence that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos throughout his employment. Plaintiff's medical records indicate exposure while working in the Turbine room during the early years of employment with defendant.
3 The majority opinion cites the pulmonary function studies and the recommendation that plaintiff avoid use of respiratory protection equipment during period of heat and exertion due to his obstructive disease. The majority, however, fails to recognize that plaintiff's obstructive impairment is not related to asbestos exposure, and thereby is irrelevant to the issues presented in this case. Obstructive disease is generally associated with cigarette smoking.
4 The stipulation of the parties reads:
"Plaintiff was last injuriously exposed to asbestos during plaintiff's employment with defendant, and specifically, plaintiff was exposed to asbestos for 30 days within a seven month period, as is required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57."
5 As explained above, and as found in the majority's Finding of Fact No. 1, plaintiff retired in January 1991. Plaintiff retired at age 63. Plaintiff was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 1999, approximately 8 years after his retirement. Thus, there is no "employment" from which to remove plaintiff at the time of the "hearing after first examination" to trigger the potential application of § 97-61.5(b). "An employee who is no longer employed in a position that causes [allegedly] harmful exposure need not be `removed' from his employment." Austin,141 N.C. App. at 415, 540 S.E.2d at 835.
6 Plaintiff also suggests that the stipulation of the parties also requires the Commission to enter an order of removal. The stipulation states: "The parties agreed further that should plaintiff be awarded compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b) the Deputy Commissioner may include language removing plaintiff from further exposure pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b)." This stipulation is contingent on a finding that "plaintiff be awarded compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b)" and does not otherwise abrogate the requirements of the Commission to comply with § 97-61.5(b) of the Act.
7 In prior opinions the majority's finding on this issue read: "At the hearing before the Full Commission, counsel for plaintiff represented that plaintiff relied upon defendant's representations to him and his fellow employees that defendant's asbestos medical surveillance program would monitor his exposure to asbestos and would medically screen and monitor him for any signs of the development of asbestosis. "After viewing my dissent, the majority has chosen to adopt the language that "plaintiff may have relied upon" See Finding of Fact Nos. 27 and 28. In either event, the "finding" is based on the argument of counsel rather than evidence in the record.
8 In particular, the majority improperly finds in Finding of Fact No. 26: "Defendant convinced the State of North Carolina that defendant need not be included in the state Dusty Trades Program since defendant's asbestos medical surveillance served the same purpose."
9 On the issue of whether the Industrial Commission could or would have designated Weyerhaeuser a dusty trade, Mr. Stephenson testified:
Q. Is it your testimony that the industrial commission could or would have designated Weyerhaeuser as a dusty trade if the commission had been advised that Weyerhaeuser was conducting these annual examinations and all which are documented in the exhibit?
A. The commission would have designated Weyerhaeuser a dusty trade if the commission had been advised by the state board of health that the [asbestos] dust was present as evidenced in this documents.
A. If the commission had known that the dust levels were as indicated here by the industrial hygienist that I believe was employed by Weyerhaeuser, the commission would have asked the state board of health to do their own industrial hygiene survey.
10 Although plaintiff's pulmonary function tests revealed obstructive disease, this condition is not associated with asbestos exposure. Obstructive lung disease is generally associated with cigarette smoking, which plaintiff had a history. Further, plaintiff's restriction on the use of respiratory equipment was for his obstructive disease. Plaintiff was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 1999, long after his retirement.
11 The prerequisites for the order of removal are:
(1) diagnosis of asbestosis or silicosis; and,
(2) current employment that exposes plaintiff to the hazards of asbestosis or silicosis.(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b). The award of 104 weeks of benefits requires that plaintiff additionally prove a third element:
(3) that the employee is removed from the industry at the directive of the Commission.
Id.; Moore, 469 S.E.2d at 596; Clark, 539 S.E.2d at 376.
12 Even, Judge Greene, in Austin, wrote:
"I acknowledge the `removal' requirement of section 97-61.5(b) raises concerns regarding whether an employee who chooses to remove himself from employment prior to diagnosis of asbestos should be precluded from receiving 104 weeks of compensation under section 97-61.5(b). For example, this statute may encourage employees who are exposed to asbestos to remain in their employment until they receive a diagnosis of asbestosis. These concerns, however, should not be resolved by this Court; rather, the proper forum for addressing these concerns is in the Legislature."
Austin, 540 S.E.2d at 836. This inquiry, however, does not remove the requirement explained by the Supreme Court that the removal from hazardous employment must occur at the "directive of the Commission."Moore, 569 S.E.2d at 596.
13 Section 97-61.7 provides that "[a]n employee who has been compensated" under § 97-61.5(b) as an alternative to forced change of occupation may, subject to approval of the Industrial Commission, waive further compensation and continue his employment. Plaintiff incorrectly relies on Bye v. Interstate Granite Company, 230 N.C. 334, 53 S.E.2d 274 (1949), which preexisted the current statutory provision for an order of removal, for the proposition that plaintiff may receive an order of removal and continue to maintain his employment. A careful reading of this case reveals that the Commission did not actually order plaintiff to be removed from his employment, but, advised plaintiff that he should seek new employment based on reports from his examining physician and based on plaintiff's age and long exposure and left the decision to leave his employment to plaintiff. Significantly, the Bye decision pre-dates the changes to the Act requiring the Commission to order removal, and in fact, no order of removal was entered by the Commission in that case, therefore, Bye does not support the proposition for which it is offered by plaintiff. Plaintiff also cites Roberts v. Southeastern Magnesia Asbestos Co., 61 N.C. App. 706, 301 S.E.2d 742 (1983) for the proposition that the Commission can order plaintiff to "refrain from exposing himself to the hazards of employment" and receive 104 weeks of benefits without leaving his employment. Contrary to the suggestion of plaintiff, however, the Roberts decision stands for the proposition that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his removal from employment exposing plaintiff to the hazards of asbestos as an incentive to force change in occupation, or provide a "safety net", without requiring plaintiff to prove an incapacity to earn wages due to his disease.61 N.C. App. at 709. In Roberts, there was no evidence that plaintiff continued to be exposed to asbestos after his removal was ordered. The critical evidence was that plaintiff was the president of defendant-employer, that he was daily exposed to asbestos before the order of removal, regardless of the fact that defendant-employer was phasing out its use of asbestos.
Plaintiff also inappropriately relies on Honeycutt v. Carolina AsbestosCo., 235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952). Honeycutt is not a §97-61.5(b) case, and predates the current statutory provisions. InHoneycutt, plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis at which time his dusty trades card was revoked and the recommendation was made for plaintiff to obtain new employment. Plaintiff found new employment as a police officer where he earned greater wages. The issue was whether plaintiff had "disability" because he had no loss of wage earning capacity. The Supreme Court explained the difference between "disablement" applicable to asbestosis and silicosis cases and "disability" for all other injuries/diseases and held that "disablement" under § 97-54 is not the same as "disability" under § 97-2. The Supreme Court explained that for asbestosis/silicosis cases "disablement" means "the event of becoming actually incapacitated from performing normal labor in the last occupation in which [plaintiff was] remuneratively employed." In Honeycutt the Supreme Court did not approve benefits under §§ 97-61.5(b) or 97-61.7. There is no mention of an order of removal or 104 weeks in this case. Rather, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff "would be entitled to ordinary compensation under the general provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act. G.S. § 97-61;Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797" (1948).
14 The majority has awarded § 97-31(24) benefits for injury to plaintiff's colon, however, has failed to address § 97-31(24) benefits for injury to plaintiff's lungs. Given that plaintiff is not entitled to § 97-61.5(b) benefits there is no reason to delay the award of these benefits until after the third panel examination. Based on the medical evidence, I am inclined to award plaintiff $20,000 per lung, for an additional $40,000, based on the diagnosis of asbestosis with plural plaques and plaintiff's pulmonary impairment rating.