United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 31, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-50763
Summary Calendar
PAUL HOUSTON CAMERON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-02-CV-624
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Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DEMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Paul Houston Cameron, Texas prisoner #792069, appeals from
the order of the magistrate judge denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
application. The magistrate judge granted Cameron a certificate
of appealability (COA) on all issues. Cameron challenges his
state-court conviction of capital murder.
Cameron contends that various state-court findings of fact
and conclusions of law are not entitled to deference. He argues
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-50763
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that trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons; that
trial counsel was rendered ineffective due to a conflict of
interest; and that he was deprived of the favorable testimony of
Jonathan Moore.
Cameron’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in state
court. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946-47 (5th Cir.
2001). Regarding the facts relevant to our disposition of
Cameron’s appeal, Cameron has not rebutted the statutory
presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Nor has
Cameron shown that the state court’s findings of fact were
unreasonable or that its legal conclusions were contrary to, or
unreasonable applications of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2).
The evidence of Cameron’s guilt of capital murder was
overwhelming. He therefore has failed to demonstrate prejudice
arising from any of counsel’s alleged deficiencies. See Ladd v.
Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Cockrell,
301 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 2002). Cameron’s own confession
established that he conspired with Jonathan Moore and Peter
Dowdle to take part in a burglary, that he was sitting in the
back seat of Dowdle’s car when Moore shot and killed San Antonio
Police Officer Fabian Dominguez, and that he knew Moore owned the
firearm Moore used to fire the first shots at Officer Dominguez.
Other testimony at trial established that Cameron knew of Moore’s
desire to kill police officers and his violent tendencies and
No. 03-50763
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that Cameron knew Moore had the firearm with him during the
burglary. Cameron could have anticipated that Moore would kill
Officer Dominguez. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.02(b),
19.03(a)(2)(West 2003).
Cameron’s conflict-of-interest contention is governed by the
standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See
Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265-72 (5th Cir. 1995). As we
note above, Cameron cannot demonstrate prejudice due to the
strength of the evidence against him.
To the extent Cameron contends counsel was ineffective for
failing to call Moore as a witness, that contention is
unavailing. Counsel was prohibited by rules of ethics from
interviewing Moore, whose attorney had not consented to an
interview. See In re News America Publ’g, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97,
100 & n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). Without an interview, counsel
would have had no idea what Moore might say on the stand.
To the extent Cameron contends the state trial court denied
him the benefits of Moore’s testimony, Cameron has failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced. United States v. Viera, 839
F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc). Moore’s own appeal
indicated that he was unpredictable and prone to outbursts and
that he attempted to call his mental competency into question.
See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 392-97 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Moreover, the testimony at Cameron’s trial suggested that
Moore would have faced a devastating cross-examination had he
testified.
No. 03-50763
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AFFIRMED.