08-5477-cr
United States v. Tyson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 15 th day of March, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 GERARD E. LYNCH,
9 Circuit Judge,
10 JANE A. RESTANI, *
11 Judge.
12
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14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15
16 Appellee,
17
18 -v.- 08-5477-cr
19
20 JOSEPH M. TYSON,
21
22 Defendant-Appellant.
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24
25 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: Robert G. Smith, Assistant
26 Federal Public Defender (Jay S.
*
The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
1 Ovsiovitch, on the brief),
2 Office of the Federal Public
3 Defender for the Western
4 District of New York, Rochester,
5 NY.
6
7 APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Stephan J. Baczynski, Assistant
8 United States Attorney (Kathleen
9 M. Mehltretter, United States
10 Attorney), Office of the United
11 States Attorney for the Western
12 District of New York, Buffalo,
13 NY.
14
15
16 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
17 Court for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.).
18
19 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
20 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
21 AFFIRMED.
22
23 Defendant-appellant Joseph M. Tyson appeals from a
24 judgment of conviction entered in the United States District
25 Court for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.),
26 following a jury trial. We assume the parties’ familiarity
27 with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the
28 issues presented for review.
29
30 “The standard of review for evaluating the district
31 court’s ruling on a suppression motion is clear error as to
32 the district court’s factual findings, viewing the evidence
33 in the light most favorable to the government, and de novo
34 as to questions of law.” United States v. Rodriguez, 356
35 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 2004).
36
37 The district court properly denied Tyson’s motion to
38 suppress the tangible evidence seized from his apartment on
39 September 28, 2005. Magistrate Judge Feldman credited
40 Detective McLaughlin’s testimony that he read aloud to Tyson
41 the consent to search form and the handwritten notation
42 including “CPU & electronic storage devices” in the scope of
43 the search. The district court thus agreed with Magistrate
44 Judge Feldman that “the Government established at the
2
1 [suppression] hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
2 that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of
3 his residence.” There is therefore no merit in Tyson’s
4 arguments to the contrary.
5
6 “The applicability of the fruit of the poisonous tree
7 doctrine is a question of law reviewed de novo.” United
8 States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 71 (2d Cir. 2003)
9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
10 properly denied Tyson’s motion to suppress an inculpatory
11 statement he gave on October 11, 2005. Assuming arguendo
12 that Detective Lambert unreasonably seized Tyson’s apartment
13 in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the inculpatory
14 statement is “so attenuated [from the seizure] as to
15 dissipate the taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
16 471, 487, 491 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 “[T]he Supreme Court has declined to adopt a per se or but
18 for rule that would make inadmissible any evidence [] which
19 somehow came to light through a chain of causation that
20 began with an illegal” seizure. Mosby v. Senkowski, 470
21 F.3d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
22 omitted). We instead evaluate the “causal connection”
23 between a Fourth Amendment violation and the statement at
24 issue. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975). At the
25 time Tyson provided the inculpatory statement, he was not in
26 custody and he had received Miranda warnings; there is no
27 indication of flagrant or purposeful misconduct on Detective
28 Lambert’s part. See Mosby, 470 F.3d at 521 (enumerating
29 four indicia of voluntariness). Tyson thus voluntarily
30 provided the inculpatory statement, breaking any causal
31 connection.
32
33 We apply a “particularly deferential form of abuse-of-
34 discretion review” to evaluate the substantive
35 reasonableness of a sentence. United States v. Cavera, 550
36 F.3d 180, 188 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (in banc). “We will set
37 aside a district court’s substantive determination only in
38 exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be
39 located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. at
40 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e take into
41 account the totality of the circumstances, giving due
42 deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion,
43 and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district
44 courts.” Id. at 190. In short, we “patrol the boundaries
3
1 of reasonableness,” but recognize “that responsibility for
2 sentencing is placed largely in the precincts of the
3 district court.” Id. at 191.
4
5 Under this highly deferential standard of review,
6 Tyson’s stacked sentence of 65 years is substantively
7 reasonable. The district court explicitly decided to
8 harness the stacking provision set forth in Guideline
9 section 5G1.2(d) to effectuate the advisory Guideline
10 sentence of life imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d).
11 While the district court recognized that Tyson is “going to
12 die in prison,” it underscored the risk he posed as a
13 “predator” of children, his “horrific conduct,” and “the
14 effect it will have on [a] 9 year old” victim. The district
15 court thus concluded that the sentence was not only
16 sufficient, but also necessary to effectuate the purposes of
17 sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Accordingly, we
18 cannot say that this sentence falls outside the range of
19 permissible decisions.
20
21 Finding no merit in Tyson’s remaining arguments, we
22 AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
23
24
25 FOR THE COURT:
26 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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