United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT September 30, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-51406
Summary Calendar
JOSLYN M. HEARNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-02-CV-164
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Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joslyn M. Hearne appeals the district court’s judgment
affirming the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) of Hearne’s application for disability insurance
benefits. The Commissioner uses a sequential five-step test to
determine whether a claimant qualifies as “disabled” for purposes
of obtaining disability insurance benefits. See Leggett v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1995). In this five-step
inquiry, the Commissioner considers: (1) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-51406
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the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment
is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed in appendix I of
the Social Security regulations; (4) whether the impairment
prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and
(5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing
any other substantial gainful activity. Id. at 563 n.2; see also
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant bears the burden of proving
disability for the first four steps, and the Commissioner bears
the requisite burden in the fifth step. See Leggett, 67 F.3d at
564 & n.11. The Commissioner’s decision is given great deference
on review and will not be disturbed unless substantial evidence
does not exist in the record to support this determination, or an
error of law was made. See id. at 564.
Specifically, Hearne asserts that the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred in relying solely upon the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines (“Grid Rules”) when determining that the Commissioner
met her burden in Step Five, thereby establishing that Hearne was
not disabled during the period in question. Hearne’s argument
that the mere presence of a nonexertional mental impairment
prohibited the ALJ’s sole reliance upon the Grid Rules lacks
merit under this court’s precedent. See Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d
1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987)(The ALJ may rely exclusively on the
Grid Rules if the claimant either suffers only from exertional
impairments or his nonexertional impairments do not significantly
affect his residual functional capacity).
No. 03-51406
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Hearne also contends that the ALJ’s finding that Hearne’s
depression, by itself as well as in conjunction with her physical
impairments, constituted a “severe” impairment at Step Two
precluded the ALJ from relying solely upon the Grid Rules in Step
Five. This court’s holding in Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 391,
398-99 (5th Cir. 2000), supports Hearne’s contention. In Loza,
this court linked the definition of a “severe” impairment at Step
Two to the determination of whether a claimant’s nonexertional
impairments significantly affected his residual functional
capacity such that reliance solely upon the Grid Rules at Step
Five would be inappropriate.
As the ALJ’s sole reliance upon the Grid Rules for purposes
of satisfying the Commissioner’s burden at Step Five was
erroneous, the ALJ’s finding that Hearne was not entitled to
disability insurance benefits was not supported by substantial
evidence. See Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 247-48 (5th
Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. Heckler, 767
F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the district court’s
judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the district
court with instructions to return the case to the Commissioner
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.*
*
It is not clear if the ALJ determined that Hearne was able
to perform the full range of unskilled, sedentary work or if
Hearne was limited to unskilled, sedentary work that involved
only simple repetitive tasks. In further proceedings, the
Commissioner should include a determination as to whether
Hearne’s residual functional capacity permits her to perform the
full range of unskilled sedentary work.