United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT October 28, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10103
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN RAMIREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:03-CR-91-1-M)
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Juan Ramirez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute a controlled substance. He was sentenced,
inter alia, to a 360-month term of imprisonment. He raises several
issues on appeal.
Ramirez claims the district court erred in adjusting his
offense level upward because of his aggravating role in the offense
and in determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him.
Under the terms of his plea agreement, Ramirez waived the right to
raise these issues on appeal. See, e.g., United States v.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1994). Ramirez has not
shown that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
permit Ramirez to withdraw his guilty plea. See, e.g., United
States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 1984); see also, FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
Ramirez contends that the district court abused its discretion
by initially refusing to grant his request for substitution of
counsel. E.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir.
1973). “Although an indigent criminal defendant has a right to be
represented by counsel, he does not have a right to be represented
by a particular lawyer, or to demand a different appointed lawyer
except for good cause.” Id. at 995. Ramirez has not shown that
the magistrate judge abused his discretion in denying the motion
for substitution of counsel for lack of good cause.
Next, Ramirez contests the district court’s determination that
he lacked standing to challenge the warrantless search of the
vehicle where the contraband was found. “We review de novo the
legal question of whether a defendant has standing to challenge an
allegedly illegal search as violative of the Fourth Amendment.”
E.g., United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1000 (1996) Ramirez did not have a possessory
interest in the vehicle, nor was he even in it when it was stopped.
Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that
Ramirez did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
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vehicle. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978); Riazco,
91 F.3d at 754. Because Ramirez lacked standing, we do not reach
the question whether the search was illegal.
Ramirez contends that his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to obtain adequate responses to all of the
defense’s discovery requests prior to the hearing on the
suppression motion. An ineffective assistance claim requires a
defendant show both that his attorney’s performance did not meet an
objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by
the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). Because he lacked standing to challenge the seizure,
Ramirez has not shown that his counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable; in the alternative, he has not shown that
more complete discovery responses would have changed the result of
the proceeding.
Ramirez contends his sentence was illegal, in the light of
Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). This
issue is foreclosed by United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464,
465–66 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed (14 July 2004).
AFFIRMED
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