Stewart v. Department of Health & Hospitals

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the December 1, 2004 United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III for the Fifth Circuit Clerk _______________ m 04-30409 Summary Calendar _______________ ALMA C. STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, Defendant-Appellee. _________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana m 3:02-CV-1117-C-M2 _________________________ Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Alma Stewart sued the Louisiana Depart- Circuit Judges. ment of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”), alleg- ing race and sex discrimination, the mainte- PER CURIAM:* nance of a hostile work environment, and con- structive discharge under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de- termined that this opinion should not be published * and is not precedent except under the limited cir- (...continued) (continued...) cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. The district court granted DHH’s motion for junior employee. summary judgment, and Stewart appeals, con- tending that there are genuine issues of mate- Still hoping to return to Washington, Stew- rial fact. We affirm, albeit for reasons that are art retained counsel to help negotiate a further in some respects different from those relied on period of leave. These negotiations yielded an by the district court. agreement by which she would take adminis- trative leave from October 15, 2001, to I. May 11, 2002, at which time she would resign. Stewart began her career with DHH in She accepted that proposal and did resign. 1975, first as a registered nurse, and eventually moved up through the ranks of the depart- II. ment’s civil service employees, finally in 1996 In granting summary judgment, the district being named deputy assistant secretary in the court did not issue a written opinion, but in- Office for Citizens with Developmental Dis- stead orally explained its reasoning at the mo- abilities (“OCDD”). At pay grade GS-28, tion hearing, finding that even if Stewart could Stewart was the highest ranking black female demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimina- civil service employee at DHH. Within a few tion under title VII, DHH had put forth legiti- years, Kendrick Hodge, a white male, was mate non-discriminatory reasons for its ac- made a “co-deputy” with Stewart. tions. The court did not find that there was any evidence refuting these explanations, so In February 2001, Stewart was transferred Stewart could not demonstrate any discrimina- from OCDD to a position that she alleges was tory purpose. The court further held that not comparable to, and was inferior to, her Stewart could not maintain her hostile work former position; Hodge remained in his posi- environment claim in that she had failed to es- tion at OCDD. Stewart claims she was uncer- tablish that she was subjected to any unwel- tain as to the nature and responsibilities of her come harassment, let alone that such harass- new position and as to whom she was to re- ment was based on her race or sex. Lastly, the port to. Stewart claims that this transfer, court concluded that Steward had resigned among other acts and practices, is an adverse voluntarily and that the circumstances did not employment action with discriminatory pur- support her allegation of constructive dis- pose. charge. Stewart further alleges that she was denied III. the opportunity to take leave from her position A. in Louisiana to work temporarily at the Dis- We review a summary judgment de novo trict of Columbia Administration on Mental and are bound by the same standards that Retardation and Developmental Disabilities; guide the district court. See Chaplin v. Na- she was granted one month’s leave instead of tionsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. the six that she requested. After she was un- 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate able to extend the leave, Stewart returned to where “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to Louisiana, where she was given a list of tasks interrogatories, and admissions on file, to- that she claims were beneath her level of ex- gether with the affidavits, if any,’ when viewed pertise and were more appropriate for a more in the light most favorable to the non-movant, 2 ‘show that there is no genuine issue as to any mary judgment on the merits. material fact.’” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) Normally, we would evaluate the district (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 court’s assessment of the case based on this U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). Once the moving methodology. The parties are very much in party has demonstrated that the non-moving dispute as to whether Stewart has demon- party has no evidence such that a reasonable strated at least a genuine issue of fact with re- jury could support a verdict in its favor, the spect to the veracity of DHH’s explanations. non-moving party must put forth specific facts It turns out, however, that we can decide this that demonstrate a genuine factual issue for case on a much easier ground: the fact that trial. Id. this action is time-barred, as we will explain. B. C. Stewart must establish a prima facie case Although DHH argued the time bar in the that she (1) was a member of the protected district court, the court did not address that is- class; (2) was qualified for her job; (3) suffered sue in its oral explanation. “We may affirm for an adverse employment action; and (4) was any reason supported by the record, even if replaced by someone outside the protected not relied upon by the district court.” LLEH, class. According to McDonnell Douglas Inc. v. Wichita County, Tex., 289 F.3d 358, Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), 364 (5th Cir. 2002) once this prima facie case is made, DHH must demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory DHH points out that a charge of discrimi- reason for its action. nation under title VII must be filed within 300 days after its occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- At that point, the burden returns to Stewart 5(e)(1). Stewart was transferred on Febru- to show that the offered explanation is mere ary 19, 2001, yet did not file her EEOC com- pretext and that there was intentional discrimi- plaint until April 3, 2002SSwell outside the nation. Id. Further, demonstrating the falsity statutorily mandated period. The other ad- of a proffered non-discriminatory explanation verse employment actions of which Stewart may suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden.1 complains occurred before June 7, 2001, in- Accordingly, if Stewart can show genuine is- cluding her claims of inadequate working con- sues of material fact as to whether she can es- ditions and her being placed in a less presti- tablish a prima facie case and a genuine issue gious role with unclear responsibilities, and of fact as to the veracity of DHH’s non-dis- therefore were not complained of timely. criminatory explanation, she will survive sum- Stewart in no way refutes this argument. In her reply brief, she essentially abandons her 1 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., claims based on these discrete acts and argues Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, (2000) (“Thus, a plain- that these allegedly adverse actions may be tiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient ev- considered in evaluating her claim based on a idence to find that the employer’s asserted jus- hostile work environment. Citing Nat’l R.R. tification is false, may permit the trier of fact to Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, conclude that the employer unlawfully discrimin- 105 (2002), Stewart argues that we may con- ated.”). 3 sider “the entire scope of a hostile work envi- been a discriminatory motive behind the al- ronment claim, including behavior alleged out- leged adverse actions until she was about to side the statutory time period,” so long as at resign. There is no evidence that the work- least one of the alleged acts contributing to place environment was made intolerable be- hostile environment occurred within the statu- cause of race- or sex-based action, so sum- tory time period. This argument is entirely un- mary judgment was proper on Stewart’s hos- helpful, however, to Stewart’s claims for tile work environment claim. discrete acts of discrimination, and therefore the district court’s decision with respect to E. those claims is affirmed, and we will move on Stewart’s final claim is based on construc- to consider Stewart’s other theories. tive discharge. This claim requires evidence of discharge as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie D. case; without such a showing, the existence of To make out a claim under a hostile work discriminatory purpose or pretext is wholly environment theory, a plaintiff must prove that irrelevant. Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, the “workplace is permeated with discrimina- 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). Such a tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is claim requires evidence that the “working sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions [were] so intolerable that a rea- conditions of the victim’s employment and sonable employee would feel compelled to re- create an abusive working environment.” sign.” Id. In evaluating such a charge, the Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 court will consider, inter alia, whether the (1993) (citations and quotations omitted). plaintiff suffered (1) demotion; (2) reduction in Whether conduct rises to a sufficient level of salary; (3) reduction in responsibility; (4) re- abusiveness or hostility based on a discrimina- assignment to work under a supervisor who is tory intent “depends on a totality of circum- younger and less experienced; (5) harassment; stances, focusing on factors such as the fre- (6) assignment to menial tasks; and (7) offers quency of the conduct, the severity of the to accept early retirement that would make the conduct, the degree to which the conduct is plaintiff worse off. Id. Stewart argues that physically threatening or humiliating, and the she has raised genuine issues of material fact degree to which the conduct unreasonably in- with respect to factors (3), (5), (6), and (7). terferes with an employee’s work perform- ance.” Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d Stewart overlooks the fact that her resigna- 300, 309 (5th Cir. 1996). tion was carefully negotiated by her private counsel. As the district court correctly noted, Stewart has not produced any evidence this negotiation yielded her 300 hours of paid supporting such a claim. In its oral explana- administrative leave. Such conditions can tion, the district court found there was an ab- hardly be described as constituting an involun- sence of any evidence displaying race- or sex- tary termination that resulted from intolerable based ridicule, intimidation, or insults, “either working conditions. “Stated more simply, in the form of comments, derogatory state- [plaintiff’s] resignation must have been reason- ments, epithets, or what have you.” Stewart ab[ly compelled] under all the circumstances.” conceded, in deposition, that she did not even Id. Stewart’s resignation was perfectly rea- begin to contemplate that there might have sonable, not because working conditions were 4 intolerable, but because she voluntarily chose Normally we will not disturb the district to accept a favorable severance package. court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discre- tion. See EEOC v. Tarrant Distrib. Inc., 750 The district court noted that Stewart’s situ- F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1984). Here, how- ation was that “she’s got less work and no ever, it does not appear that the court ever boss . . . . Sounds like a raise to me.” Such is considered the defendant’s request. We con- not the stuff of which constructive discharges clude that it would be an abuse of discretion to are made.2 Because Stewart’s resignation can- award fees here, because the claim is not frivo- not therefore be accurately characterized as lous to the extent that fees would be justified compelled, summary judgment is appropriate under the standards in the statute and caselaw. on that claim. Therefore, it is not necessary to remand for determination of the appropriateness of fees. F. DHH seeks attorney’s fees as a prevailing AFFIRMED. party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(K). DHH also sought attorney’s fees in the district court as part of its summary judgment motion, but apparently that court never ruled on DHH’s request. In its oral assignment of reasons, the court stated with respect to the request for at- torney’s fees, “I’ll worry about that at a later date.” Notwithstanding that comment, the court entered a judgment in which it dismissed all pending motions as moot. Under title VII, a prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees at the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). According to Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978), prevailing defendants may recover such fees only where the court finds that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”4 2 See McCann v. Litton Sys., Inc., 986 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding a “slight decrease 4 in pay coupled with a loss of some supervisory (...continued) responsibilities” insufficient to constitute con- (5th Cir. 2001) (“Thus, attorney’s fees for prevail- structive discharge). ing defendants are presumptively unavailable un- less a showing is made that the underlying civil 4 See also Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 508 rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise (continued...) without merit.”). 5