{¶ 4} Dzina seeks the following through her complaint for a writ of mandamus: (1) "A Writ of Mandamus issue to compel Respondent Judge James P. Celebrezze to fulfill its (sic) obligation and enter and/or execute judgment in accordance with this Court's remand order in Daniel A. Dzina v. Nancy B. Dzina (October 13, 2004), Cuyahoga App. No. 83148, unreported."; (2)"A Writ of Mandamus issue to compel Respondent Judge James P. Celebrezze to void the Motion to Stay and Order granting said stay as a nullity."; and (3)"A Writ of mandamus issue to compel Respondent Judge James P. Celebrezze to dismiss and/or void the Motion for Relief from Judgment as null and void."
{¶ 5} On appeal, this court held that the judgment of the trial court was "affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with the findings in the opinion on pages 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 27, and 28." (Emphasis added.) This court found that eight of the errors raised on appeal were well taken and instructed that Judge Celebrezze, upon remand, conduct further proceedings with the following in mind: (1) Dzina's award to be increased by $153,705 vis-a-vis an improper double deduction; (2) Daniel Dzina ordered to place $153,705 in escrow until the debt of $307,410 was paid to the estate of Rocco Russo; (3) Dzina's award to be increased by $250,000 with regard to her interest in Property 75; (4) Dzina's award to be increased by $65,377 with regard to her interest in Property 152 as the result of improper capital gains tax deduction; (5) Dzina's one-half share of Daniel Dzina's pre-1998 taxes to be placed in escrow until tax liability is finally determined; (6) Valuation of Property 75 to be based upon Board of Tax Revision's valuation; (7) Daniel Dzina to place $40,000 into an escrow account for pending tax liabilities; and (8) Dzina did not hold an "equity interest" pursuant to the terms of the separation agreement.
{¶ 6} Contrary to Dzina's claim, we find that Judge Celebrezze has not failed to implement the judgment of this court upon remand. Each of the aforesaid findings by this court requires that Judge Celebrezze conduct additional proceedings. In fact, a review of the docket in the underlying divorce action clearly demonstrates that Judge Celebrezze has scheduled additional proceedings per the order of this court. At this point in time, Dzina has not demonstrated that Judge Celebrezze has failed to implement the modifications ordered by this court with regard to the distribution of funds under the separation agreement.
{¶ 7} Dzina's attempt to employ mandamus to "void the Motion to Stay and Order granting said stay as a nullity" and "dismiss and/or void the Motion for Reform from Judgment as null and void" must also fail. This court, in State ex rel. Soukup v. Judge Celebrezze (Feb. 12, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 83000, held that:
"Domestic relations court, moreover, has continuing jurisdiction over divorce cases. Dodge v. Keller (1927), 29 Ohio App. 114, 162 N.E.2d 750. Specifically, Civil Rule 75(I) provides in pertinent part: `The continuing jurisdiction of the court shall be invoked by motion filed in the original action, notice of which shall be served in the manner provided the service of process under Civ.R. 4 to 4.6.' The court of appeals inBlake v. Heistan (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 84, 87, 649 N.E.2d 1304, ruled `that pursuant to Civ.R. 75(I), the continuing jurisdiction of the court may be invoked by the filing of any motion by a party, regardlessof the content or subject matter of the motion.' Mrs. Soukup's second motion to show cause, therefore, properly invoked the respondent's continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 75(I)." (Emphasis added.)
Id., at p. 4.
{¶ 8} Herein, mandamus does not lie to vacate or nullify the motion to stay, the order granting the motion to stay, or the motion for relief from judgment. Said motions were properly filed in the underlying divorce action pursuant to Civ.R. 75(I). Hansen v. Hansen (1985),21 Ohio App.3d 216, 486 N.E.2d 1252. In addition, Dzina possesses an adequate remedy at law, through a direct appeal, should Judge Celebrezze deviate from the judgment of this court following remand. State ex rel.Casey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. Transp. (1991),61 Ohio St.3d 429, 575 N.E.2d 181. Thus, we find that Dzina fails to state a claim for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 10} In order for this court to issue a writ of prohibition, Dzina must establish that: (1) Judge Celebrezze is about to exercise judicial authority; (2) the exercise of judicial authority by Judge Celebrezze is not authorized by law; and (3) there exists no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher (1989),43 Ohio St.3d 160, 540 N.E.2d 239. A writ of prohibition will not be issued by this court unless it clearly appears that Judge Celebrezze possesses no jurisdiction over the divorce action filed in Dzina v.Dzina, Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Case No. 263220 or Judge Celebrezze is about to exceed his jurisdiction. State ex rel. Ellis v.McCabe (1941), 138 Ohio St. 417, 35 N.E.2d 571. In addition, a writ of prohibition will not be issued in order to prevent an erroneous judgment, serve the purpose of an appeal, or correct mistakes of the lower court in deciding questions within its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Sparto v.Juvenile Court of Drake County (1950), 153 Ohio St. 64, 90 N.E.2d 598. Furthermore, a writ of prohibition should only be issued with great caution and cannot be issued in a doubtful case. State ex rel. Merion v.Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1940), 137 Ohio St. 273,28 N.E.2d 641. Finally, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a trial court possessing general jurisdiction of the subject matter has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy at law through a direct appeal. State ex rel. Rootstown Local SchoolDistrict Board of Education v. Portage County Court of Common Pleas (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 678 N.E.2d 1365; State ex rel. Bradford v.Trumbull County Court, 64 Ohio St.3d 502, 1992-Ohio-132, 597 N.E.2d 116.
{¶ 11} Judge Celebrezze is authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction in the pending complaint for divorce as filed in Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Case No. 263220. See R.C. 3105.03. Additionally, Judge Celebrezze possesses continuing jurisdiction to preside over and conduct a hearing with regard to the Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment that remains pending following remand upon appeal. State ex rel. Enyartv. O'Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 646 N.E.2d 1110; State ex rel.Soukup v. Celebrezze, supra. See, also, State ex rel. TRW, Inc. v. Jaffe (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 411, 604 N.E.2d 1376. Finally, Dzina possesses an adequate remedy at law, through a direct appeal to this court, should Judge Celebrezze exceed and/or improperly modify the mandate of this court or commit any additional errors of law. State ex rel. LTV SteelCo. v. Oryshkewych, 65 Ohio St.3d 462, 1992-Ohio-12, 605 N.E.2d 30. Thus, we find that Dzina has failed to state a claim for a writ of prohibition.
{¶ 12} Accordingly, we grant Judge Celebrezze's motion to dismiss. Costs to Dzina. It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Eighth District Court of Appeals serve notice of this judgment upon all parties as required by Civ.R. 58(B).
Complaint for mandamus and/or prohibition dismissed.
Blackmon, A.J., concurs Rocco, J., concurs.