{¶ 13} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
{¶ 14} Following the precedent set by this court in Godbeltv. McClain (Nov. 5, 1995), Licking App. No. 94-CA-0066, I find the three-day-notice requirement is a jurisdictional requirement. Other appellate districts have reached the same conclusion. SeeCincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App. 3d 189,193, 2003-Ohio-5671; Velanosky v. White (Jan. 26, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67479, at 2; Knoll Grp. Mgmt. Co. v. Wolfe (June 28, 1994), Adams App No. 93 CA 553, 93 CA 554, at 4;Crigger v. Shaw (Feb. 25, 1994), Erie App. No. E-93-62, at 2;Chillicothe Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Anderson (June 28, 1988), Ross App. No. 1406, at 5; Smith v. Lydia (Nov. 19, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52982, at 1; Gibbes v. Freeman (Sept. 3, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52745, at 2; Label Co. v. Hyde (Aug. 20, 1986), Columbiana App. No. 85-C-63, at 2; and FMJ Propertiesv. Hinton (Apr. 10, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50314, at 2.