United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT December 8, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-50599
Summary Calendar
BILLY GEORGE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON; GERALD GARRETT,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:04-CV-84-LY
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Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Billy George Williams, Texas state prisoner # 840708,
appeals the dismissal of his civil rights action, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Williams contends that the defendants have violated his
right to due process by improperly determining his parole
eligibility relative to two consecutive sentences. We AFFIRM.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-50599
-2-
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The district court’s dismissal
of Williams’s action was correct, although based on another
ground, because “Texas law does not create a liberty interest in
parole that is protected by the Due Process Clause.” Allison. v.
Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1995). Consequently, a prisoner
is not entitled to relief under § 1983 based on alleged lack of
due process in parole procedures, as Williams argues. Id.
In his original complaint, Williams also alleged that the
defendants were applying a prison administrative directive ex
post facto, in violation of his right to equal protection;
violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and violating his
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
“A law need not impair a vested right to violate the ex post
facto prohibition [provided by the Constitution].” Allison, 66
F.3d at 74. However, Williams has abandoned his claims other
than that of due-process violation, including his ex post facto
claim, by failing to brief them. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d
222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.