United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT December 28, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10674
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT TODD WILLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:00-CR-163-2-A
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Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert Todd Willis was convicted of mail fraud and aiding
and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1341. He appeals
the sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised
release. Willis argues that the district court erred by
sentencing him above the statutory maximum sentence for
revocation. In particular, he contends that once the district
court imposed a two-year term of imprisonment, it was not
authorized to impose an additional one-year term of supervised
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-10674
-2-
release because this violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (2002). The
Government concedes error.
We review the alleged imposition of a sentence above the
statutory maximum de novo. See United States v. Sias, 227 F.3d
244, 246 (5th Cir. 2000). The penalties imposed on revocation of
supervised release relate back to the original offense. See
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701-02 (2000).
Accordingly, the statutes in effect at the time of Willis’s
offense conduct, which occurred in 1995, apply. See United
States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 835, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1989). Because
Willis’s offense was a class D felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 &
3559(a)(4) (1995), the maximum term of imprisonment that he could
receive upon revocation of supervised release was two years. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1995). In light of the district court’s
decision to sentence Willis to the maximum term of imprisonment,
the court erred by also imposing a one-year term of supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); United States v. Ferguson, 369
F.3d 847, 850-52 (2004).
In sentencing Willis, the district court clearly stated its
intention to impose the maximum term of imprisonment in order to
allow Willis to obtain treatment for the drug problems that led
to the revocation of his supervised release. See United States
v. Mills, 9 F.3d 1132, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we
MODIFY the district court’s judgment by VACATING the one-year
term of supervised release, and we AFFIRM the judgment AS
MODIFIED.