08-2721-cv
Stengel v. Black
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 2nd day of March, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Circuit Judges,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,*
District Judge.
__________________________________________
Isaac Stengel,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 08-2721-cv
Bradford Black,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: (Alex Colgan - argued by); Isaac Stengel, pro
*
Richard J. Sullivan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
se, New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: Ambrose Richardson, Solomon Blum Heymann &
Stich LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Isaac Stengel, pro se, appeals from the
judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Daniels, J.), dismissing his complaint
alleging replevin and due process claims. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152
(2d Cir. 2002), and Rule 12(b)(2), see DiStefano v. Carozzi North
America, Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001). Similarly, in
reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), we review
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo,
accepting all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See
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Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d
Cir. 2008).
Here, our independent review of the record and relevant case
law reveals that Appellant’s complaint was properly dismissed.
First, with respect to Appellant’s due process claim, lower
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine). Appellant’s complaint satisfies all of the criteria
for application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, in that: (1) he
lost in an Ohio state court action; (2) he complains that he was
injured by the Ohio state court judgment; (3) he has invited
review and rejection of that judgment, arguing in his complaint
that it was erroneous, and on appeal explicitly calling for it to
be vacated; and (4) the Ohio judgment was entered before the
commencement of the instant proceedings. Accordingly,
Appellant’s due process claim was properly dismissed. See
ACEquip Ltd. v. Am. Eng’g Corp., 315 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Our court may . . . affirm the district court’s judgment on any
ground appearing in the record, even if the ground is different
from the one relied on by the district court.”). Furthermore, as
the due process claim was the only alleged basis for federal
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subject matter jurisdiction, it was proper for the district court
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellant’s
replevin claim arising under state law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will
point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court
is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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