United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED MAY 18, 2005
March 17, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
_____________________
No. 03-21220
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
FORTINO SAUCEDO VILLEGAS
Defendant - Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
_________________________________________________________________
Before KING, Chief Judge, and BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Fortino Saucedo Villegas pled guilty and
was sentenced in the district court before the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125
S. Ct. 738 (2005). This appeal requires us to re-examine the
proper standard of review to employ in our resolution of a claim
that the district court improperly applied the Sentencing
Guidelines in calculating the sentencing range under the
previously mandatory, now advisory, sentencing guideline regime.
We re-examine our standards in order to determine the possible
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effect, if any, of Booker on our previously announced standards
in reviewing such claims.
Villegas pled guilty to being an alien in unlawful
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)
and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court imposed a four-
level sentence enhancement under UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) (2003) because it found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Villegas possessed a firearm in connection with his
use of fraudulent immigration documents. Villegas now appeals
the sentence enhancement. We VACATE Villegas’s sentence and
REMAND for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On April 26, 2003, Fortino Saucedo Villegas, a Mexican
national unlawfully present in the United States, attended a gun
show at the Pasadena Convention Center in Pasadena, Texas. At
the show, Villegas approached Roland Kulish, who was operating a
booth at the show, and he expressed an interest in purchasing a
Colt semi-automatic pistol. Kulish informed Villegas that he did
not have any at the show but that he did have some at his store
and would bring one to the next gun show, scheduled for the
following weekend. The next week, Kulish returned to the gun
show and brought the firearm Villegas had requested. Villegas
also returned to the gun show and sought out Kulish to purchase
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the firearm. According to Kulish and his wife, Villegas
submitted three forms of identification: (1) a Texas driver’s
license, no. 19476405; (2) a Texas identification card, no.
12088537; and (3) a resident alien card, no. 12088537. On the
ATF form 4473, Villegas stated that he was a resident alien. In
response to line eleven, which asks for an “INS-issued alien
number or admission number,” Villegas listed 12088537. The words
“pictured Texas resident I.D. card” were written directly above
this response. Kulish sold the handgun to Villegas on May 3,
2003.
On June 5, 2003, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (“ATF”) received information from the National
Instant Check System (“NICS”) about Villegas’s firearm purchase.
A check with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
revealed Villegas’s criminal immigration history.1 Based on this
information, the ATF obtained a search warrant for the residence
that Villegas had listed on his ATF forms.
On June 26, 2003, ATF agents executed the search warrant.
When the agents arrived, Villegas was asleep in his bedroom. The
agents found several firearms, ammunition, and a resident alien
card suspected to be counterfeit. A search of Villegas’s
automobile revealed receipts for an AK-47 and the Colt handgun he
had purchased from Kulish. The agents placed Villegas under
1
In June 1999, he was allowed to depart the United
States voluntarily in lieu of deportation after being found
illegally present in the United States.
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arrest and advised him of his constitutional rights. He waived
his right to remain silent and admitted that he was a Mexican
citizen illegally present in the United States. He also
acknowledged that the gun on the headboard belonged to him and
claimed he kept it for protection. Further, he admitted to
purchasing the Colt handgun from Kulish. He stated that he had
taken it to a gunsmith to have the finish changed from black to
chrome.
B. Procedural Background
On July 24, 2003, a grand jury indicted Villegas for “being
an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States, knowingly
and unlawfully possess[ing] in and affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, one or more firearms . . . [i]n violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2).”
On September 8, 2003, Villegas pled guilty to this charge. In
the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”), the probation
officer recommended that Villegas receive a four-level sentence
enhancement pursuant to UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES (“U.S.S.G.”
or the “Guidelines”) § 2K2.1(b)(5) for using or possessing a
firearm in connection with another felony offense. The probation
officer stated that “[t]he defendant falsified an ATF Form 4473
and possessed a counterfeit resident alien card for
identification in order to illegally obtain possession of the
Colt .38 caliber pistol . . . .” The United States Code makes it
a felony to create or possess fraudulent immigration documents.
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18 U.S.C. § 1546. Thus, the probation officer reasoned, Villegas
used a firearm in connection with another felony.
Prior to sentencing, Villegas filed written objections to
the PSR, arguing that he did not in fact present Kulish with a
counterfeit resident alien card. Villegas’s factual assertions
notwithstanding, the district court found that it was more likely
than not that Villegas used a counterfeit resident alien card to
obtain the Colt handgun. Thus, the district court accepted the
PSR’s recommendation of the four-level enhancement. The district
court sentenced Villegas to twenty-one months imprisonment.
Villegas now appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court erred
as a matter of law in applying a four-level enhancement for his
use of a firearm in connection with a felony; and (2) his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated because the government did not
bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he used
a counterfeit resident alien card.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Villegas did not raise in the district court either his
legal objection to the imposition of the four-level enhancement
or his Sixth Amendment claim. Because of the lack of objections
below, this court’s review is for plain error. See, e.g., United
States v. Aderholdt, 87 F.3d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 1996); cf.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (instructing appellate courts to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines such as plain-error review). This
court finds plain error when: (1) there was an error; (2) the
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error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 732-37 (1993); United States v. Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *8
(5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005). “If all three conditions are met an
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a
forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *8 (quoting United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)).
In resolving Villegas’s claim that the district court
misapplied § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the Guidelines to enhance his
sentence, we must first address the possible effect of Booker on
our standard of review. It is beyond question that before
Booker, this court would have reviewed the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo. E.g.,
United States v. Martinez-Mata, 393 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir.
2004); United States v. Deavours, 219 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir.
2000); United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 687 (5th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1993).
The initial question presented here is whether this standard was
somehow changed by Booker’s excision of § 3742(e), which had
statutorily set forth the standards for reviewing sentencing
decisions, and its declaration that the remaining provisions of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq.,
imply a standard of unreasonableness. We conclude that when a
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district court has imposed a sentence under the Guidelines, this
court continues after Booker to review the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo. We do
not speak in this opinion, however, to the situation in which a
district court elects to exercise its post-Booker discretion to
impose a non-Guidelines sentence.
The Supreme Court in Booker instructed that although the
Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory, § 3553(a) of
Title 18 still requires the district courts to consider the
Guidelines when determining a defendant’s sentence. See Booker,
125 S. Ct. at 764-65, 767; Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *6-7; see
also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(4) (West Supp. 2004).2 A number of
2
Section 3553 provides:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence.--The court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph
(2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider-- . . .
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing
range established for--
(A) the applicable category of offense
committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the
guidelines--
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of
title 28, United States Code,
subject to any amendments made to
such guidelines by act of Congress
(regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be
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other circuits have determined that the requirement that district
courts still consider the Guidelines means that Booker did not
alter the standard for reviewing a district court’s
interpretation and application of the Guidelines. See United
States v. Doe, 2005 WL 428916, at *2 & n.5 (10th Cir. Feb. 24,
2005); United States v. Hazelwood, 2005 WL 415681, at *1, *7 (6th
Cir. Feb. 23, 2005); see also United States v. Hughes, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4331, *10-11, 40-42 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 2005) (on panel
reh’g) (holding that district courts post-Booker must still
correctly calculate the sentencing range under the Guidelines;
reviewing district court’s application of the Guidelines de
novo). In Doe, the district court calculated the Guidelines
range but decided to depart upwardly. The Tenth Circuit
determined that the district court had erred as a matter of law
in upwardly departing because it did not fully take into account
the defendant’s cooperation with the government when making its
sentencing decision. Doe, 2005 WL 428916, at *2. In setting
forth the standard of review, the Tenth Circuit noted: “When
reviewing a district court’s application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, we review legal questions de novo . . . .” Id.
(emphasis omitted). By way of a footnote, the court then stated:
incorporated by the Sentencing
Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title
28) . . . .
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (Supp. 2004).
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During the pendency of this appeal the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Booker which rendered the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory only and replaced the
prior standard of appellate review with review for
unreasonableness. Although the Guidelines are now
advisory, district courts must still “consult the
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”
Thus, appellate review continues to encompass review of
the district court’s interpretation and application of
the Guidelines. Because we conclude that the district
court erred as a matter of law under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a) and 3661, we need not address any further
impact of Booker on appellate review.
Id. at *2 n.5 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in
Hazelwood, 2005 WL 415681, at *1, the Sixth Circuit stated that
“[w]hen reviewing sentencing decisions, we review the district
court’s . . . conclusions of law de novo.” The appellate court
reasoned that Booker did not affect its review because it left
intact the requirement that district courts consult the
Guidelines. Id. at *7. The court then found that the district
court had erred as a matter of law by imposing a two-level
enhancement under the Guidelines for threatening death, and it
vacated and remanded for resentencing.3 Id. at *7-8.
This court recently reached a similar conclusion regarding
Booker’s effect on the standard of review in an unpublished
opinion, United States v. Davis, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3770, *23-
24 & n.41 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2005) (unpublished). In that case,
3
It is worth noting that both Doe and Hazelwood involved
preserved error because the defendant objected below. Although
Doe does not address the issue, Hazelwood reviewed the error for
harmlessness as instructed by the Booker Court. Conversely, we
review Villegas’s sentence for plain error because he did not
object below.
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the district court sentenced the defendant as a career criminal
under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, which “classifies a defendant as
a career offender if the offense is a crime of violence or
controlled substance offense and the defendant has at least two
previous felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled
substance offenses.” Davis, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3770, at *23.
The defendant claimed that the district court erred in applying
the Guidelines because his two prior felonies were related and
therefore should have been considered only a single offense under
the Guidelines. This court agreed that the Guidelines “instruct
a sentencing judge to count as a single prior felony conviction
all those that are ‘related’ to one another.” Id. We stated
that the question of relatedness continues to be reviewed de novo
after Booker, noting that although the Supreme Court “determined
that the courts of appeals review sentencing decisions for
unreasonableness[,] [t]hat determination does not appear to
disturb this circuit’s standard of review for determining whether
two prior convictions are related.” Id. at *24 & n.41 (internal
citations omitted). Reviewing the relatedness question de novo,
the court found that the defendant’s prior offenses were not
related under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines. Id. at *27. Therefore,
this court found that the district court did not err in applying
the Guidelines, and we affirmed the sentence imposed by the
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district court.4 Id.
The remedial opinion in Booker does not foreclose or
otherwise caution against this approach. It is true that the
Court excised § 3742(e), which statutorily set forth the
standards of review, and stated that the remaining statute
implied a reasonableness standard for reviewing sentences.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-66. It is also true that we must apply
both Booker’s constitutional and remedial holdings to all cases
pending on direct review. Id. at 769. Even so, nothing suggests
that Booker injected a reasonableness standard into the question
whether the district court properly interpreted and applied the
Guidelines or that an appellate court no longer reviews a
district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines
de novo.
Booker left standing all sections of the Sentencing Reform
Act other than §§ 3553(b)(1)5 and 3742(e).6 Booker, 125 S. Ct.
4
This court took a similar approach in United States v.
Montgomery, 2005 WL 469607 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2005). In
Montgomery, the court reviewed de novo the district court’s
application of a statutory minimum provision, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
as implemented by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Id. at *2. The court found
that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding that
a prior conviction qualified as “a crime of violence.” Id. at
*2-5. On that ground, the court vacated the defendant’s
sentence, stating that it therefore need not address the impact
of Booker on the defendant’s alternative argument that the
sentence enhancement violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at
*5.
5
Section 3553(b)(1), which made the Guidelines
mandatory, provided:
(b) Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.--
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(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the court shall impose a sentence of the
kind, and within the range, referred to in
subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described. In determining
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into
consideration, the court shall consider only the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and
official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
In the absence of an applicable sentencing
guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate
sentence, having due regard for the purposes set
forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an
applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an
offense other than a petty offense, the court
shall also have due regard for the relationship of
the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by
guidelines applicable to similar offenses and
offenders, and to the applicable policy statements
of the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
6
Section 3742(e) provided:
(e) Consideration.--Upon review of the record, the
court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence--
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and
(A) the district court failed to provide the
written statement of reasons required by
section 3553(c);
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable
guideline range based on a factor that--
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at 764. Thus, § 3742(a) still remains in force, providing that
“[a] defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court
for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence . . .
was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). Moreover,
§ 3742(f) still provides: “If the court of appeals determines
(i) does not advance the objectives set
forth in section 3553(a)(2); or
(ii) is not authorized under section
3553(b); or
(iii) is not justified by the facts of
the case; or
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable
degree from the applicable guidelines range,
having regard for the factors to be
considered in imposing a sentence, as set
forth in section 3553(a) of this title and
the reasons for the imposition of the
particular sentence, as stated by the
district court pursuant to the provisions of
section 3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no
applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly
unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the
opportunity of the district court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the
findings of fact of the district court unless they are
clearly erroneous and, except with respect to
determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall
give due deference to the district court's application
of the guidelines to the facts. With respect to
determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the
court of appeals shall review de novo the district
court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.
18 U.S.C.A. §3742(e) (West Supp. 2004).
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that . . . the sentence was imposed in violation of law or
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further
sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court
considers appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). The survival of
these provisions further counsels that we maintain our review of
the district court’s interpretation and application of the
Guidelines when it has imposed a sentence under the Guidelines.7
III. DISCUSSION
Villegas argues on appeal that the district court erred as a
matter of law when it enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) for using or possessing a firearm in connection
7
This conclusion is informed in part by this court’s
pre-2003 practice of reviewing sentencing departures from the
range established by the Guidelines. Before the PROTECT Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, amended § 3742(e) to provide
for a complete de novo review of all departures, this court
reviewed departures in two steps: first, we asked whether the
departure was proper under the Guidelines, which was reviewed de
novo; and second, we asked whether the degree of the departure
was reasonable, which was reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Fierro, 38 F.3d 761, 775 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1994) (“We review the degree or reasonableness of a
departure for abuse of discretion. However, whether the ground
for departure is proper is a question of law reviewable de novo
because it involves an interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines.” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Caldwell, 985
F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 757-58 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Because
a court’s classification of potential bases for departure is a
matter of guideline interpretation, we review such rulings de
novo in the context of our ultimate review for abuse of
discretion.”). Analogously, post-Booker, as part of its overall
review of the sentence, this court reviews a district court’s
interpretation and application of the Guidelines in the same
manner as we did pre-Booker.
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with another felony offense. Specifically, Villegas contends
that this enhancement provision does not apply to him because the
firearms that he possessed were not used to facilitate the other
felony offense at issue here (his use of a fraudulent immigration
document) and because the presence of the firearm did not make
the commission of the other felony inherently more dangerous.
Further, Villegas argues that he did not yet possess the firearm
at the time he used the fraudulent immigration document, so he
could not have used the firearm in connection with his use of
forged documents.
In reviewing Villegas’s claim for plain error, our first and
second steps are to determine whether the district court
committed an error and whether that error was plain. See Olano,
507 U.S. at 732-34; Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *8. As explained
above, in making this determination, we review the district
court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo.
Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides for a four-level sentence
enhancement “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense . . . .”
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2003). For the purposes of
§ 2K2.1(b)(5), a felony offense “means any offense (federal,
state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or
conviction obtained.” Id. at cmt. n.7. Villegas’s use of
fraudulent immigration documents qualifies as a felony offense
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under this definition because it is punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546. The
question, however, is whether Villegas possessed the firearm “in
connection with” his use of the fraudulent documents.
Although the Guidelines do not define the phrase “in
connection with” as it appears in § 2K2.1(b)(5), we must give
this language its ordinary and natural meaning. See United
States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1196 (5th Cir. 1994). This
circuit’s precedent interpreting § 2K2.1(b)(5) supports
Villegas’s argument that § 2K2.1(b)(5) was meant to address
circumstances where the presence of a firearm facilitated, and
made inherently more dangerous, another crime. In United States
v. Armstead, 114 F.3d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1997), this court noted
that § 2K2.1(b)(5) was added in 1991 out of concern for crimes of
violence and drug offenses and the use of firearms in connection
with those offenses. In Armstead, the defendants pled guilty to
the charge of stealing firearms from a licensed firearms dealer.
114 F.3d at 506. The district court enhanced their sentences for
using the firearms in connection with another felony (the
burglary of the store). Id. at 506-07. We held that the
enhancement was proper under § 2K2.1(b)(5): once the defendants
acquired possession of the firearms during the burglary, they
possessed the weapons in connection with the burglary because
they could have used the guns to facilitate the crime and they
created an increased concern for public safety. Id. at 511-12.
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However, in United States v. Fadipe, 43 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.
1995), the defendant was convicted of bank fraud and unlawful
possession of a firearm. The district court levied a four-level
sentence enhancement pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5) because at the
time he committed the fraud, he possessed a firearm in his
automobile. Id. at 994. On appeal, we reversed the imposition
of the enhancement because there was no evidence that the firearm
was used in connection with the bank fraud. Id. at 995. Even
though the defendant had the firearm in his car at the time he
was arrested, it was not reasonable to assume that the defendant
possessed the weapon to prevent others from stealing his
fraudulent bank checks. Id. We specifically noted that “[t]he
presence of a gun near instruments of bank fraud does not create
the same automatic increase in the danger of physical violence
that exists when drugs and guns are present together.” Id. at
994-95. Similarly, in United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243
(5th Cir. 2004), the defendant was arrested for unlawful
possession of a firearm. At the time of his arrest, he possessed
counterfeit government identification documents. Id. at 245. We
nevertheless held that “[t]he possession of a false government
instrument, like the bank fraud at issue in Fadipe, is not an
offense that inherently provokes the type of violent
confrontation compelling offenders to protect themselves with a
firearm.” Id. at 250.
Thus, our precedent indicates that § 2K2.1(b)(5) applies
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only when the defendant’s use or possession of a firearm may have
facilitated or made more dangerous the other felony offense. It
is clear that Villegas’s possession of a firearm did nothing to
facilitate his use of a fraudulent identification card or to make
it a more dangerous crime. This is particularly so considering
the chronology of events in this case: Villegas’s offense of
using false immigration documents occurred the day before he
actually acquired possession of the firearm. Hence, Villegas’s
possession of a firearm was not in connection with his use of a
counterfeit alien registration card for the purposes of
§ 2K2.1(b)(5), and the district court erred in imposing a
sentence resulting from its incorrect application of the
Guidelines. Moreover, because Fadipe and Houston clearly
establish that the sentence enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) was
inappropriate in this instance, we also find that the district
court’s error was plain, in the sense that it was clear or
obvious. Thus, Villegas has satisfied the first two prongs of
the plain-error test.
The third step in the plain-error analysis requires us to
consider whether the district court’s error affected Villegas’s
substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35; Mares, 2005
WL 503715, at *8. At this point, it is important to keep in mind
the relevant error. The error in question here is the district
court’s misinterpretation and misapplication of the then-
mandatory Guidelines by finding that an enhancement was
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appropriate under § 2K2.1(b)(5). Thus, it is different than the
error in Booker (i.e., the Sixth Amendment error of enhancing a
sentence based on judge-found facts under the mandatory
Guidelines) and Fanfan (application of the mandatory Guidelines
absent Sixth Amendment error).8 For that reason, the question in
the third step of the plain-error test is not the same as it was
in Mares, 2005 WL 503715--i.e., it is not whether the defendant
can show a reasonable probability that the district court would
have imposed a different sentence had the Guidelines been
advisory instead of mandatory. Instead, the proper question here
is whether the defendant can show a reasonable probability that,
but for the district court’s misapplication of the Guidelines, he
would have received a lesser sentence. We find that Villegas has
satisfied this burden.
In the absence of the four-level enhancement, Villegas’s
sentencing range would have been reduced from between twenty-one
and twenty-seven months to between ten and sixteen months.
Because these two sentencing ranges do not overlap, the district
court’s error necessarily increased Villegas’s sentence and thus
affected his substantial rights. See, e.g., Aderholt, 87 F.3d at
744 (holding that the defendant’s substantial rights were
affected by the court’s erroneous application of the Guidelines
8
It is true that Villegas also alleges a Sixth Amendment
Booker error on the ground that the district court found facts to
enhance his sentence and imposed the sentence under the mandatory
Guidelines. However, we must first address the antecedent error
that the district court committed by misapplying the Guidelines.
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because a correct application of the Guidelines would have
resulted in the defendant receiving a lesser sentence). Villegas
has satisfied his burden under the plain-error test because he
has shown that the district court misapplied the Guidelines in
calculating the sentencing range, the court imposed a sentence
under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on that miscalculation,
and the sentence was higher than the correct range under the
Guidelines.9 Under these circumstances, there is at least a
reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed
a lesser sentence if it had properly applied the Guidelines.
Furthermore, because the district court’s error clearly affected
Villegas’s sentence, we also find that the error seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Aderholt, 87 F.3d at 744
(finding that sentencing calculation errors affected “the
fairness and integrity of this judicial proceeding”). Thus, we
conclude that the district court committed plain error when it
imposed a four-level sentence enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(5). Accordingly, we must vacate his sentence and
remand for resentencing. See, e.g., United States v.
9
Moreover, the record contains nothing to suggest that
the district court would have imposed the twenty-one month
sentence had it not been required by the Guidelines, nor does it
include any explanation of why the court would have considered
such a sentence appropriate even if it were contrary to the
Guidelines.
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Antonakopoulos, 2005 WL 407365, at *9 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2005).10
Although the district court on remand is not bound by the
Guidelines, it must consider them, and in doing so, it ordinarily
is required to calculate the proper Guidelines range. See, e.g.,
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65, 767; Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *7
(“This duty to ‘consider’ the Guidelines will ordinarily require
the sentencing judge to determine the applicable Guidelines range
even though the judge is not required to sentence within that
range.”); United States v. Shelton, No. 04-12602, 2005 WL 435120,
at *6 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005).
Because we have determined that the district court’s
misapplication of the Guidelines requires a remand in this case,
we need not consider Villegas’s argument that his Sixth Amendment
rights were violated.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we VACATE Villegas’s sentence and
10
In Antonakopoulos, the First Circuit stated:
[W]here in a pre-Booker world we would have remanded
for procedural or substantive error in the application
of the Guidelines, that would normally lead to a Booker
remand. Where, as in pre-Booker cases, we engage in
plain-error review and find it clear that the district
court has made a sentencing error under the Guidelines,
the correction of which ordinarily would have led to a
lower sentence in the pre-Booker era, there is a strong
argument for remand. This means that in some cases we
will continue to review pre-Booker type claims of
Guideline error where it is plausible that the error
committed affected the sentence.
2005 WL 407365, at *9 (internal citation and footnote omitted).
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REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
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