09-1776-ag
Maniruzzaman v. Holder
BIA
Romig, IJ
A 099 661 278
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 18 th day of February, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
RALPH K. WINTER,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
MOHAMMAD MANIRUZZAMAN,
Petitioner,
v. 09-1776-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Mohammad Maniruzzaman,pro se,
Jamaica, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,
Assistant Director; Gladys M.
Steffens Guzmán, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
Washington D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Mohammad Maniruzzaman, a native and citizen of
Bangladesh, seeks review of the April 2, 2009, order of the
BIA affirming the August 3, 2007, decision of Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) Jeffrey L. Romig denying his application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohammad
Maniruzzaman, No. A 099 661 278 (B.I.A. Apr. 2, 2009), aff’g
No. A 099 661 278 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 3, 2007). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision and
emphasizes particular aspects of it, we review both the BIA’s
and the IJ’s opinions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual
findings, including adverse credibility findings, under the
substantial evidence standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see
also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008). This
Court reviews de novo questions of law and the application of
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law to undisputed fact. Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d
Cir. 2008).
Because Maniruzzaman is a pro se petitioner, we construe
his arguments broadly. See Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d
138, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2002) (in the context of a motion to
dismiss, construing pro se plaintiff’s pleadings so as to
“raise the strongest arguments that they suggest”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Even construing his brief broadly,
however, Maniruzzaman fails to challenge either the agency’s
adverse credibility determination or its denial of his
application for asylum and withholding of removal. Thus, he
has waived any challenge to these determinations and we will
not address them on appeal. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).
The only agency determination Maniruzzaman challenges in
his brief is its denial of his application for CAT relief. We
conclude that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s
determination that Maniruzzaman did not establish that he
would more likely than not be tortured if returned to
Bangladesh. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). In assessing
whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be
tortured, the IJ must consider all relevant evidence including
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evidence of past torture and current conditions in the country
of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The IJ found that
Maniruzzaman’s allegations of past torture were “not
credible,” and gave his testimony “no weight as evidence of
past torture.” Therefore, to the extent that Maniruzzaman
relies on this testimony as evidence that he was tortured in
the past, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination
necessarily precludes success on his claim for CAT relief.
See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523
(2d Cir. 2005); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (holding that the weight afforded
to an applicant’s evidence lies largely within the discretion
of the IJ).
Furthermore, after considering the additional documentary
evidence Maniruzzaman submitted, noting factors that
undermined the authenticity of this evidence, the IJ properly
concluded that the documents “d[id] not support a clear
probability of torture if [Maniruzzaman] were now to return to
Bangladesh.” After examining the record, we conclude that the
remaining evidence that was not undermined by the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination would compel a reasonable
adjudicator to conclude that someone in Maniruzzaman’s
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particular circumstances would not likely be tortured if
returned to Bangladesh. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see
also Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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