09-0433-cr
USA v. Plata-Zuniga
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2
3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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5 S U M M A R Y O R D E R
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7 RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
8 CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
9 PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
10 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
11 ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
12 EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
13 NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
14 SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
15
16 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
17 the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
18 States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
19 the 17th day of February, two thousand ten.
20
21 Present:
22 JON O. NEWMAN,
23 RALPH K. WINTER,
24 REENA RAGGI,
25 Circuit Judges.
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30 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
31 Appellee,
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34 v. No. 09-0433-cr
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37 JUAN ALEJANDRO PLATA-ZUNIGA,
38 Defendant-Appellant.
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45 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: David J. Goldstein, Goldstein &
46 Weinstein, Bronx, New York.
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48 APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Lev L. Dassin, Acting United States
49 Attorney for the Southern District
50 of New York (Mark D. Lanpher and
51 Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant
52 United States Attorneys, of
53 counsel), New York, New York.
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1 Appeal from the January 30, 2009 judgment of the
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3 United States District Court for the Southern District of New
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5 York (Batts, J.).
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7 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
8 DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
9 Juan Plata-Zuniga appeals from the sentence imposed by Judge
10 Batts following his guilty plea to a charge of illegal reentry
11 into the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). We assume
12 the parties’ familiarity with the facts and various proceedings
13 in this court and the district court.
14 We review a district court’s sentence under a “deferential
15 abuse-of-discretion standard.” See United States v. Cavera, 550
16 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United
17 States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
18 omitted). We review for procedural or substantive error.
19 Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. We find procedural error where a
20 district court “fails to calculate the Guidelines range . . .
21 [,] makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation, . . . treats
22 the Guidelines as mandatory[,] . . . does not consider the §
23 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous
24 finding of fact.” Id. at 190 (internal citations omitted).
25 “[W]hen conducting substantive review, we take into account the
26 totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the
27 sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind
28 the institutional advantages of district courts.” Id. “[W]e
29 will not substitute our own judgment for the district court’s on
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1 the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a)
2 considerations in any particular case.” Id. at 189.
3 Appellant argues that the district court committed
4 procedural error by failing to articulate specific reasons for
5 his sentence, and, in particular, neglecting to enunciate any of
6 the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s so-called “parsimony
7 clause,” see United States v. Habbas, 527 F.3d 266, 274 (2d Cir.
8 2008). Although the district court is required to give the
9 reasons for imposing its chosen sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c),
10 there is no requirement as to the length or detail of the
11 district court’s explanation. United States v. Villafuerte, 502
12 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the district court imposes a
13 Guidelines sentence, it may not need to offer a lengthy
14 explanation . . . .”); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
15 338, 356 (2007) (holding that Section 3553(c) does not require a
16 full opinion in every case). Nor is there a duty upon the
17 district court to discuss each factor of Section 3553(a) with
18 particularity. United States v. Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 190 (2d
19 Cir. 2006) (“There is no requirement that the court mention the
20 required factors, much less explain how each factor affected the
21 court’s decision.”); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30
22 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e will not conclude that a district judge
23 shirked her obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors simply
24 because she did not discuss each one individually . . . .”).
25 In the instant case, the district court explained that it
26 “considered the submissions of the parties, the defendant’s
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1 guilty plea and relevant sections of the advisory sentencing
2 guidelines, and the sentencing factors set forth in [Section
3 3553(a)]” to determine that a non-Guideline sentence was not
4 warranted. Sent. Tr. at 7. In addition, the court denied a
5 downward departure “based on the factors contained in . . .
6 Section 3553(a).” Id. at 7-8. Included in the written
7 submissions of the parties were repeated references to the
8 parsimony clause, as well as other sentencing arguments and
9 considerations for the district court to weigh in its sentencing
10 decision. Although it omitted a particularized discussion of
11 each relevant sentencing factor, the district court’s sentencing
12 explanation was sufficient to meet the objects of Section
13 3553(c). Specifically, it: (i) informed appellant of “the
14 reasons for his sentence,” (ii) allowed this court meaningful
15 review, (iii) enabled the public to understand why appellant
16 received his sentence, and (iv) “guide[d] probation officers and
17 prison officials in developing a program to meet [appellant’s]
18 needs.” See United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir.
19 2004) (explaining the underlying objectives of § 3553(c)).
20 Accordingly, we find no procedural error.
21 Appellant also argues that the district court’s sentence was
22 substantively unreasonable because it rejected his claims for a
23 downward departure. In particular, he notes his role as sole-
24 care provider to his 83-year-old mother, who currently resides in
25 the United States and suffers from severe cardiac dysfunction.
26 However, given the facts that appellant has five felony
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1 convictions, that he did not stay with his wife and child upon
2 reentry, and that seriously ill relatives are not uncommon among
3 incarcerated prisoners, we find no unreasonableness in the
4 sentence, which is at the low end of the Guidelines range.
5 Last, appellant argues that the district court misunderstood
6 the applicable legal standards for variance from the Guidelines.
7 He asserts that the district court erroneously required a basis
8 for departure to support a non-Guidelines sentence, based on the
9 district court’s statement at sentencing that “there is no reason
10 to depart from the advisory sentencing guideline range.” Sent.
11 Tr. at 7. However, when viewed in the broader context of the
12 sentencing transcript, this excerpt provides no indication that
13 the district court misunderstood the applicable legal standards
14 as to the issuance of a non-Guideline sentence. The district
15 court’s statement, when read in full, indicates that it found no
16 reason to depart from the Guidelines based on the submissions of
17 the parties, the defendant’s guilty plea, relevant sections of
18 the Guidelines, and the factors set forth in Section 3553(a).
19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment order of the
20 district court is AFFIRMED.
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22 FOR THE COURT:
23 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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