United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 15, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60745
ELISEO MANZANO-GARCIA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
versus
ALBERTO GONZALES, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Before JOLLY, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:
Eliseo Manzano-Garcia, his wife, Reina Manzano-Olea, and their
minor child, Antonio Abraham Manzano-Olea (together, the
“Manzanos”) petition for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen removal
proceedings. For the following reasons, we DENY the Manzanos’
petition for review.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Manzano, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the
United States on or about July 28, 1985, without being admitted or
paroled by an immigration officer. Mrs. Manzano and their two
sons,1 also natives and citizens of Mexico, entered the country in
April and August 1989, without being admitted or paroled by an
immigration officer. In 1998 the four family members were charged
with being subject to removal under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as
aliens present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled.
The Manzanos were scheduled for separate hearings in August
1998; the hearings were continued so the proceedings could be
consolidated. A hearing was held on September 17, 1998, and the
Manzanos, through counsel, admitted the allegations of fact,
conceded removal, and designated Mexico as their country of
removal. The Manzanos sought a 30-day continuance to explore
whether they were eligible for cancellation of removal.
On October 19, 1998, counsel advised that Mr. Manzano was not
eligible for cancellation of removal, but that he had filed,
through separate counsel, a labor certification application, which
was pending with the Department of Labor. The parties agreed to a
two-week continuance to verify the filing of the labor application.
Counsel alternatively sought a period of 120 days to make a
voluntary departure.
On November 12, 1998, Mr. Manzano presented the immigration
1
One of their sons is an adult and did not join in the
Manzanos’ motion to reopen.
2
judge (“IJ”) with a receipt for the labor certification
application, which had been filed on November 17, 1997. Mr.
Manzano requested another continuance, this one for six months, to
obtain approval of the certification and to file and obtain
approval of an immigrant visa petition. The government opposed
this request. During the discussion before the IJ, it was revealed
that Mr. Manzano had been voluntarily returned to Mexico in 1985
and 1995. The IJ indicated he was not pleased with the delays or
the voluntary returns. However, the IJ stated that in the interest
of the minor child, he would allow a three-month continuance to
complete the labor certification process. On February 11, 1999,
the Manzanos appeared and received another continuance of 90 days
because approval of the labor certification application remained
pending.
On May 17, 1999, a hearing commenced, and counsel for the
Manzanos stated that the labor certification had been approved but
that the immigrant visa petition had not been filed. Counsel
stated that the Manzanos’ other counsel had requested additional
information and a filing fee from Mr. Manzano in order to file the
I-140 immigrant visa petition, but Mr. Manzano contended he never
received that request. Counsel reported that earlier that morning,
Mr. Manzano had gone to his other counsel’s office and signed the
necessary paperwork to file the visa petition. However, counsel
indicated the I-140 form still needed to be filed.
The IJ recessed the proceeding to allow counsel to obtain
3
documents from the Manzanos’ other counsel and to determine when
the form would be filed. Counsel provided copies of the labor
certification, which reflected it had been approved on February 1,
1999, and sought another continuance to file and obtain the I-140
petition approval. The government objected, arguing that the labor
certification had been approved on February 1, 1999, and Mr.
Manzano had taken no action to file the I-140 form during the
ensuing three-month period. After further discussion, Mr. Manzano
submitted letters addressed to him from his other counsel, dated
March 18, April 19, and May 13, 1999, requesting that Mr. Manzano
pay a filing fee and submit a signed G-28 form. Mr. Manzano was
apparently in possession of the letters but had not provided them
to his counsel prior to the hearing. The Manzanos withdrew their
request for voluntary departure.
The IJ noted that the labor certificate had been approved on
February 1, 1999, and the immigrant visa petition had not been
filed due to Mr. Manzano’s failure to provide the requested
documents and fees. The IJ also relied on the fact that Mr.
Manzano did not produce the letters from his counsel requesting the
information and fees until the IJ indicated he would deny the
motion for continuance. The IJ determined that the Manzanos had
shown no justification for the lack of action during the three-and-
one-half months since the labor certification was approved and
noted that Mr. Manzano still had not filed an immigrant visa
petition or submitted an application for an adjustment in status.
4
The IJ thus denied the motion for continuance for lack of good
cause. Because the Manzanos had abandoned their request for a
voluntary departure and had no other applications for relief
pending, the IJ ordered them removed to Mexico.
The Manzanos filed a timely notice of appeal from the IJ’s
decision to the BIA, arguing that the IJ abused his discretion in
denying their motion for continuance and ordering their removal
without allowing Mr. Manzano to complete the labor certification
process. The Manzanos further argued that Mr. Manzano’s petition
for alien labor certification had been granted after the IJ ordered
his removal and that, if the case was remanded, Mr. Manzano could
have his status adjusted to being a lawful permanent resident. The
government opposed this appeal, arguing that the IJ had properly
denied the motion for continuance because the Manzanos had not
shown good cause for their delay in processing the adjustment in
status application.
On December 9, 2002, a single BIA member affirmed the IJ’s
decision without opinion. The Manzanos did not file a petition for
review from that decision. On January 9, 2003, the Manzanos filed
a timely motion to reopen to allow Mr. Manzano to apply for an
adjustment of status and to stay removal proceedings. Mr. Manzano
argued he was prima facie eligible for an adjustment of status and
attached an I-485 form to that effect, which he had filed on
December 17, 2002. The government opposed the motion, arguing that
5
Mr. Manzano could have presented this evidence during the former
proceeding.
The BIA denied the motion to reopen, noting that Mr. Manzano’s
visa petition had not been approved prior to the IJ’s decision
because Mr. Manzano had not provided his counsel with the requested
signed G-28 form. The BIA also considered that the Manzanos had
been granted three prior continuances to pursue the labor
certification, two of which were for three-month periods. The BIA
noted the third continuance was granted after the labor
certification had been approved, and during the three subsequent
months, Mr. Manzano failed to facilitate the filing of the visa
petition by signing and submitting the G-28 form. The BIA found
that “although [Mr. Manzano] was not previously eligible to apply
for adjustment of status, the cause is due in part to his
contribution to the delay in the filing of the visa petition.” The
Manzanos timely filed this petition for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review motions to
reopen.
Jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
To begin, the government argues that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen
because, under INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), now codified at 8 U.S.C. §
6
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),2 review of discretionary decisions is
prohibited. The government contends that although the statute
allowing motions to reopen does not per se state that a decision
regarding a motion to reopen is within the sole or unreviewable
discretion of the Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6), such
determinations are universally recognized as inherently
discretionary. See, e.g., INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24
(1992) (noting Attorney General’s broad discretion to deny motions
to reopen). The Manzanos contend this Court retains jurisdiction
under § 1252(a) over an appeal from a final order of a denial of
the BIA of a motion to reopen.
This Court recently undertook to resolve this precise issue –
“the degree to which 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) . . . precludes
judicial review of motions to reopen immigration proceedings.”
Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2005). There, the
Court noted that it is a federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. §
2
Subsection 1252(a)(2)(B) provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court
shall have jurisdiction to review– . . .
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General
the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General, other than the granting of relief under section
1158(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
7
1003.23(b)(3),3 and not any statute, which furnishes the amount of
discretion that the Attorney General enjoys when considering
motions to reopen. Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303. The Court continued on
to discuss how due to this regulatory-provided discretion, §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) could mistakenly be read:
as stripping us of the authority to review any
discretionary immigration decision. That reading,
however, is incorrect, because § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips
us only of jurisdiction to review discretionary authority
specified in the statute. The statutory language is
uncharacteristically pellucid on this score; it does not
allude generally to “discretionary authority” or to
“discretionary authority exercised under this statute,”
but specifically to “authority for which is specified
under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General.”
Id. Thus, the Court found it had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion to reopen because the BIA had not
exercised any statutorily provided discretion under the subchapter
of title 8 governing immigration proceedings, but instead had
exercised discretion as delineated by a regulation of the Attorney
General. Id. This is the precise case here; the BIA exercised its
regulatory-granted discretion to deny the Manzanos’ motion to
reopen their removal proceedings. Therefore, we retain the
authority to review this motion to reopen under §
3
Section 1003.23(b)(3) provides, in relevant part: “The
Immigration Judge has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if
the moving party has established a prima facie case for relief.”
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3).
8
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See id.
Jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
The government also makes the argument that this Court lacks
jurisdiction pursuant to INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), now codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which states that we cannot review “any
judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h),
1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title.” 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The government contends § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars
our review because the BIA’s exercise of its authority to deny
reopening the Manzanos’ proceedings was a discretionary decision
that relates to INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, which governs
adjustment of status. The government also insists Rodriguez v.
Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 797, 799-800 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), where
this Court determined that it had no jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s denial of a petitioner’s motion to reopen, controls such that
we cannot review the Manzanos’ motion to reopen.
In Rodriguez, the IJ concluded that the petitioner had failed
to establish that he would suffer extreme hardship should he be
deported and thus denied his application for suspension of
deportation under INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (now repealed). Id.
at 798. The BIA affirmed; the petitioner did not appeal but
instead filed a motion for reconsideration in light of new
evidence, which the BIA treated as a motion to reopen. Id. at 798-
99. The BIA concluded the new evidence was insufficient to change
9
its prior decision. Id. at 799. The petitioner appealed, arguing
that the BIA abused its discretion in affirming the IJ’s conclusion
that he failed to establish that he would suffer extreme hardship
if deported. Id. We acknowledged that “Congress has expressly
precluded our consideration of the merits of [the petitioner’s]
claim that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his application
for suspension of deportation pursuant to INA § 244 for his failure
to establish that he would suffer extreme hardship if deported to
his native” country. Id. Thus, because § 309(c)(4)(E) of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”) prohibited review of discretionary decisions relating to
the INA § 244 element of “extreme hardship,” we held:
It is axiomatic that if we are divested of jurisdiction
to review an original determination by the [BIA] that an
alien has failed to establish that he would suffer
extreme hardship if deported, we must also be divested of
jurisdiction to review the [BIA]’s denial of a motion to
reopen on the ground that the alien has still failed to
establish such hardship.
Id. at 800; see also IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(E) (“[T]here shall be no
appeal of any discretionary decision under section 212(c), 212(h),
212(i), 244, or 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”). We
noted that “[t]o hold otherwise would create a loophole that would
thwart the clear intent of Congress that the courts not review the
discretionary decisions of the BIA.” Id. Thus, in Rodriguez, we
considered if we had jurisdiction pursuant to the IIRIRA equivalent
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and determined we did not because §
10
309(c)(4)(E) expressly precluded our review of the merits of
extreme hardship determinations under INA § 244. See id. at 800
(distinguishing Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1998),
because there the “merits of the denial to reopen . . . involved a
deportation order under INA § 241(a)(2)” for the petitioner
overstaying her visa, not her request for suspension of deportation
under INA § 244).
Here, unlike in Rodriguez, we would not have been precluded
from reviewing the original determination of the BIA, which
summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision in his order of removal that
the Manzanos had not shown good cause to merit another continuance,
because that judgment did not relate to any of the delineated
subsections of title 8 we cannot review under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Instead, the IJ ordered, and the BIA affirmed, the Manzanos
removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
The IJ did not make any discretionary determination based on
voluntary departure or adjustment of status pursuant to his
statutorily granted discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c or § 1255.
Rather, the IJ expressly noted that the Manzanos had abandoned
their request for voluntary departure and that there was no
adjustment of status application yet submitted to the court because
there was no current, approved immigrant visa petition and no visa
petition had yet been filed. The IJ’s denial of continuance and
the BIA’s summary affirmance of that decision were indeed
11
discretionary; however, such discretion is authorized pursuant to
regulation, not to any statute outlined in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (“The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for
continuance for good cause shown.”).4 Therefore, Rodriguez does
not preclude our review here.
As for any argument that we lack jurisdiction because the
Manzanos’ motion to reopen relates to a request for adjustment of
Mr. Manzano’s status, this would clearly be the case if the BIA had
actually made a discretionary determination on the merits to deny
such adjustment of status under INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. See
Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If
the denial of [the petitioner’s] motion to reopen was a judgment
regarding the granting of relief under . . . § 1255 . . ., then we
are without jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspects of the
BIA’s decision.”). However, the parties’ arguments on appeal here
only relate to the allegedly erroneous factual and legal findings
of the BIA in denying the Manzanos their motion to reopen their
removal proceedings, not to any alleged factual or legal errors
made by the BIA in any decision to actually deny Mr. Manzano
adjustment of status under § 1255.
Mr. Manzano’s basis for the reopening of removal proceedings
was that his visa petition had now been approved; that is, he
4
Such regulatory-based discretionary decision would also be
reviewable under the reasoning of Zhao.
12
alleged he was now prima facie eligible for an adjustment of status
pursuant to INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). The government
opposed the reopening because “[t]he crucial information in this
case . . . is not new and could have been presented earlier.”
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (formerly 8 C.F.R. § 3.2), the BIA could
not grant the motion to reopen unless it found that Mr. Manzano’s
new evidence was “material and was not available and could not have
been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). The record indicates that the BIA
denied the Manzanos’ motion to reopen because of Mr. Manzano’s
prior dilatory actions in not promptly filling out the requisite
paperwork and applying for his visa such that at the time the
Manzanos sought yet another continuance from the IJ and were deemed
removable under INA § 242(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i),
Mr. Manzano was still not eligible to apply for adjustment of
status under § 1255.
Apparently, the BIA determined that Mr. Manzano’s tardiness in
applying for his visa, particularly where multiple continuances had
been granted by the IJ, meant his approved visa could feasibly have
been presented at some time during the former proceeding for him to
apply for adjustment of status. Thus, we reasonably infer that the
BIA denied the motion to reopen based on the second ground
enumerated in INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988): “the movant has
not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence, 8 CFR §
13
3.2.”5 Id. at 104-05. But see Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159,
1163 (10th Cir. 2003) (remanding where it was not clear on what
ground of Abudu the BIA had relied to deny a motion to reopen).
Here, the BIA denied the Manzanos’ motion to reopen pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2 and the “new evidence” ground of Abudu. See 485
U.S. at 105. The BIA thus ultimately affirmed its prior affirmance
of the Manzanos’ removability under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); it did not
make an adverse determination of the merits of Mr. Manzano’s
application for adjustment of status under § 1255.
As the government acknowledges, courts from other Circuits
have held that the analogous judicial review provision of IIRIRA,
§ 309(c)(4)(E), does not bar a court’s jurisdiction over a motion
to reopen where the denial is not based on the merits of any
delineated barred subsection.6 One court has held such in the
5
The other available Abudu grounds are either: that the
petitioner has not established a prima facie case for the
underlying relief sought; or without deciding either that a prima
facie case has not been met or the new evidence was previously
available, leaping ahead and “simply determin[ing] that even if
[the two threshold concerns] were met, the movant would not be
entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.” 485 U.S. at 104-
05.
6
See Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 595-96 (4th Cir. 1999)
(finding BIA’s denial of motion to reopen was a decision that the
petitioner had not shown “exceptional circumstances” under INA §
242B(e)(2)(A), not a merits determination of adjustment of status
under INA § 245, barred from review by INA § 309(c)(4)(E));
Arrozal, 159 F.3d at 432 (finding BIA’s denial of motion to reopen
was a decision under INA § 241(a)(2) that the petitioner had
overstayed her visa, not a merits determination of whether she met
a showing of extreme hardship under INA § 244, barred from review
by INA § 309(c)(4)(E)); see also Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 286, 291
14
context of INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See
Medina-Morales, 371 F.3d at 527 (finding BIA’s denial of motion to
reopen was a decision affirming removal under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i),
not based on an adverse determination of the merits under § 1229c
or § 1255, and thus was not barred from review by §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). We agree with such reasoning here and hold that
review of the BIA’s denial of the Manzanos’ motion to reopen
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 is not barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
because such denial was an affirmance of their removability under
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), not an adverse determination of the merits of
Mr. Manzano’s requested adjustment of status under § 1255.
II. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying the Manzanos’
motion to reopen.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen proceedings
under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. Zhao, 404
F.3d at 303; see also Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 496 (5th
Cir. 2000) (“[M]otions for reopening of immigration proceedings are
disfavored . . . .”) (quoting Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323). Even
where the petitioner has made out a prima facie case of eligibility
for suspension of removal, the BIA can choose to deny the motion to
reopen if it finds “the movant has not introduced previously
(1st Cir. 1999) (“The decision as to which [the petitioner] seeks
review is not a BIA judgment on whether to adjust [her] status
[under INA § 245], which would be a ‘judgment regarding the
granting of relief under’ an enumerated section, but is rather a
decision not to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2” (now 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2) not barred from review by INA § 309(c)(4)(E)).
15
unavailable, material evidence.” Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05 (noting
the proper standard of review for a denial on such ground is abuse
of discretion). Such discretion is not to be disturbed “so long as
it is not capricious, racially invidious, utterly without
foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so aberrational that it is
arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational
approach.” Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted).
The Manzanos argue that the BIA’s decision to deny their
motion to reopen was based on erroneous factfindings and an
improper application of the law, and thus that such denial was
unreasonable and arbitrary. The main facts the Manzanos dispute
are that Mr. Manzano did not sign the G-28 form due to delay on his
part, but rather because he did not receive the form from his
counsel, and that they only received two, not three, prior
continuances for completion of the labor certification process.
The Manzanos argue that even if such facts were correct, their case
is factually distinguishable from other cases where motions to
reopen have been denied for reasons such as repeated violations of
immigration laws and frivolous appeals, INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471
U.S. 444, 450-52 (1985); being a fugitive from justice,
Wittgenstein v. INS, 124 F.3d 1244, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997);
concealment of whereabouts, Arana v. United States Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 673 F.2d 75, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1982); or refusal
16
to comply with a surrender notice, Matter of Barocio, 19 I & N Dec.
255, 257-58 (BIA 1985).
The government responds that the BIA did not err in stating
the facts underlying its decision. Through counsel, the government
argues, Mr. Manzano requested a total of six continuances – of
which he received five. The government maintains the IJ granted
three prior continuances for Mr. Manzano to pursue his application
for labor certification, on October 19, 1998 (to await approval of
the application), November 12, 1998 (again, to await approval of
the application), and February 11, 1999 (pending final decision on
the application). The government also contends the record supports
that the delay in filing the I-140 immigrant visa petition was due,
in part, to Mr. Manzano’s failure to respond to his counsel’s
repeated communications in that regard.
We find that the record does not support the Manzanos’
assertion that the BIA made erroneous factfindings. Mr. Manzano’s
assertion that he did not receive the G-28 form from his counsel
was belied by the fact that Mr. Manzano had three letters from such
counsel handling his immigrant visa status on his person at the May
17, 1999, hearing before the IJ. The record also does not reflect
that the Manzanos received only two prior continuances related to
the labor certification process. While the government only
contested the latter two continuances, the IJ was aware that
separate counsel was handling the labor certification process and
17
allowed the Manzanos a two-week continuance on October 19, 1998; a
three-month continuance on November 12, 1998; and a three-month
continuance on February 11, 1999, to conclude Mr. Manzano’s
certification. The Manzanos offered no, much less any reasonable,
explanation for their delays in filing the forms necessary to
obtain an adjustment in Mr. Manzano’s residency status.
Here, the BIA considered whether the Manzanos merited the
exercise of its discretion to grant reopening for adjustment of
status and noted that Mr. Manzano was partly the cause for an
approved visa petition not being presented during the former
proceeding such that he would have, at that time, been eligible for
adjustment of status. Thus, the BIA concluded that Mr. Manzano’s
dilatory actions did not merit such exercise because the evidence
was not “new” and could have been presented earlier. See Abudu,
485 U.S. at 104-05; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(i). Because such
decision was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, we conclude the
BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.
See Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 450 (approving the discretion to
“legitimately avoid creating a further incentive for stalling by
refusing to reopen [removal] proceedings for those who became
eligible for such [removal] only because of the passage of time”
through repeated delays).
III. Whether the BIA violated the Manzanos’ due process rights.
The Fifth Amendment requires that aliens subject to removal
18
proceedings be provided due process: “(1) notice of the charges
against him, (2) a hearing before an executive or administrative
tribunal, and (3) a fair opportunity to be heard.” United States
v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1135 (2003) (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590, 597-98 (1953)).
The Manzanos make no contention that they were not properly
afforded either notice, a hearing, or a fair opportunity to be
heard. The Manzanos merely make a one-sentence argument that their
constitutional due process rights have been violated due to the
legal and factual errors committed by the BIA in the denial of
their motion to reopen. Thus, what the Manzanos presuppose is that
they have a constitutionally protected right to actual
discretionary relief from removal or to be eligible for such
discretionary relief, and that because the BIA denied their motion
to reopen, it follows that their due process rights have been
violated. This is incorrect. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353
(1956) (“[T]hough we assume a statutory right to a full hearing on
those issues, it does not follow that such a right exists on the
ultimate decision – the exercise of discretion to suspend
deportation.”); Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d at 230-31 (holding in illegal
reentry criminal case that petitioner had no constitutional due
process interest in eligibility for discretionary relief from
removal under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act); see
19
also Nguyen v. Dist. Dir., Bureau of Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 400 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding same in a
collateral civil proceeding). We find no evidence in the record
that indicates the BIA violated the Manzanos’ due process rights.
CONCLUSION
Having carefully considered the record of the case and the
parties’ respective briefing, for the reasons set forth above, we
DENY the petition for review.
DENIED.
20