United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 31, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-40031
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MATTY SANTIBANEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:03-CR-835-ALL
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Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Matty Santibanez appeals her conviction following a jury
trial for possession with intent to distribute more than 500
grams of cocaine and importation of more then 500 grams of
cocaine. Santibanez was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
100 months on each count, to be followed by a five-year term of
supervised release, the terms to run concurrently.
Santibanez argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support her convictions because the Government failed to prove
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-40031
-2-
that she had knowledge that cocaine was concealed in the battery
in her car. Santibanez’s conduct at the time of her arrest, her
failure to provide any explanation as to how the recent
alterations to the battery could have occurred, and the large
amount of drugs all raised reasonable inferences of guilty
knowledge. See United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 544
(5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 464 (5th
Cir. 1999). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that Santibanez had knowledge of the
presence of the cocaine concealed in her vehicle. See Ortega
Reyna, 148 F.3d at 543.
Santibanez argues that the district court erred in allowing
the prosecutor to make prejudicial and misleading statements
during closing argument. Santibanez objected to statements of
the prosecutor about what was known from the evidence presented.
These comments merely addressed the inferences which the
prosecutor was asking the jury to draw from the evidence. Such
comments are not improper. See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d
401, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1998).
Santibanez’s counsel also unsuccessfully objected to the
prosecutor’s argument on rebuttal that Santibanez was working
with a drug dealer in transporting the drugs. Santibanez
objected that the prosecutor was assuming facts not in evidence.
During his closing argument, defense counsel argued that the
No. 04-40031
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evidence implied that, unknown to Santibanez, the drugs were
concealed in the car by her son or some other party. The
prosecutor responded by arguing that it was unlikely that a drug
dealer would allow Santibanez to unknowingly transport such a
valuable amount of drugs. The prosecutor was merely trying to
counter the argument of defense counsel. See United States v.
Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 2003).
Santibanez did not file an objection to the other comments
by the prosecutor that she is complaining about. Therefore,
review is for plain error. See Munoz, 150 F.3d at 415. These
comments made by the prosecutor were also arguments as to the
inferences raised by the evidence presented, which was not
improper argument. Id. at 414-15. Insofar as any of the
comments went beyond the evidence presented, Santibanez has not
shown that the statements were so prejudicial as to affect her
substantial rights or the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Therefore, allowing the comments did not constitute plain error.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.