United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit June 21, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-20343
GEORGE V. FULLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
HARRIS COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(04-CV-633)
Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant George V. Fuller, a former prisoner of Harris
County, filed suit in district court, alleging constitutional and
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 with
regard to Harris County’s alleged deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs, the result of which was the amputation of
his leg above the knee. The district court issued an opinion in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
which it determined Fuller was not entitled to relief. The
district court thereafter entered final judgment against Fuller.
Fuller filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court
summarily denied. Fuller timely filed the instant appeal. For the
reasons set forth below, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal
order and REMAND for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Fuller was a prisoner of Harris County when, on July 25, 2003,
while participating in recreational activities at the prison, he
sustained a dislocated knee cap. Fuller was taken to LBJ Hospital
in Houston, Texas. The hospital placed him in a knee stabilizer
and told him to return to the hospital on July 31, 2003, for
surgery. Fuller was not taken to the hospital for the prescribed
procedure until August 19, 2003, despite the fact that he filed
repeated sick call requests with officials at the jail beginning on
July 31, 2003.
Following the surgery, Fuller was told by the hospital to
return in 10-14 days for a post-operative examination. According
to Fuller, he notified Dr. Porse in the jail clinic on September 4,
2003, 16 days after the surgery, that he was to be returned to the
hospital for the scheduled follow-up. Dr. Porse examined Fuller
and observed swelling in the knee. Dr. Porse prescribed
antibiotics and sent Fuller back to his cell. The following day,
Fuller noticed “a reddish drain” from the knee and informed the
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duty nurse. According to Fuller, however, it wasn’t until the
fourth day after the drainage was first observed that he received
a shot from the jail clinic. On September 9, 2003, Fuller was sent
to the hospital where he underwent emergency surgery.
Fuller alleged that he received two operations and then
demanded a second opinion at another hospital, which was denied.
He also alleged that he asked a guard to obtain a form so that he
could refuse further treatment, but that a doctor at the hospital
had left specific instructions not to let him sign a refusal.
According to Fuller, on September 12, 2003, he submitted to yet
another surgery because he was under sedation and because he was
previously denied a request to go to another hospital. Fuller’s
leg was then amputated above the knee. He was subsequently
released from custody on November 10, 2003.
Fuller filed suit in district court, asserting constitutional
rights violations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
civil rights violations under 28 U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983.
Specifically, Fuller alleged that his injuries were the result of
Harris County’s deliberate indifference and gross negligence in
responding to his immediate serious medical needs. The district
court issued a brief opinion denying Fuller relief in which it
found that “[t]he objective data show[ed] no lapse of care,” and
further determined that “[s]ince he had drugs and surgeries fit to
his needs, no neglect or indifference appears.” In its concluding
sentence, the district court held that Fuller could “not sue under
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the Constitution’s requirement for regular, national government
processes.” The district court entered judgment against Fuller,
who then filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court
summarily denied. Fuller timely filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
It is unclear from its order whether the district court
dismissed Fuller’s claim as being frivolous or for its failure to
state a claim on which relief may be granted. In the absence of
such an express basis, we evaluate Fuller’s complaint under both
grounds for dismissal.
We review a district court’s determination that a complaint is
frivolous for an abuse of discretion. Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d
578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). A complaint is frivolous if
it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, such as when a prisoner
alleges a violation of a legal interest that does not exist. Id.
A complaint lacks such a basis if it relies on an indisputably
meritless legal theory. Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 472 (5th
Cir. 2001). We must determine, therefore, whether Fuller’s
complaint sets forth facts that, taken together, assert a legally
cognizable claim.
Alternatively, we review de novo a district court’s dismissal
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).
This Court will affirm an order dismissing an action only if it
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appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proven consistent with the allegations. Clay v. Allen,
242 F.3d 679, 680 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court
addressed the rights of prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. The
Court held that “[r]egardless of how evidenced, deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a
cause of action under § 1983.” Id. at 104; see also Lawson v.
Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming a district
court’s award for damages under § 1983 to paraplegic inmate who
alleged prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs).
Based on a review of Fuller’s complaint, we conclude that it
does not rely on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Although
not artfully drafted, Fuller argues his Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when prison
officials delayed in securing him the necessary medical services.
Fuller specifically sets forth facts relating to his medical care
(or alleged lack thereof) that give rise to an actionable claim.
First, Fuller cites the 19-day span in which he argues his surgical
operation, originally scheduled by the hospital, was delayed by
Harris County. Fuller proceeds to detail how, following the first
surgical procedure, Harris County was allegedly dilatory in
returning Fuller to the hospital for a scheduled re-examination.
It was during this delay, argues Fuller, that he began experiencing
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a “reddish drain” in and around his knee in addition to a fever
relating to the infection. Both of these conditions were allegedly
known by the jail clinic, yet, according to Fuller’s complaint,
they nevertheless refused to return Fuller to the hospital to be
examined. Furthermore, in his statement of claims for relief,
Fuller specifically alleges:
The policy, custom and practice by [Harris County]
deprived plaintiff of his civil rights 42 USCA 1983, 1981
(A), his constitutional rights under the 8th amendment
and the 14th amendment, subjecting plaintiff to
deliberate indifference and intentional gross negligence
to his immediate serious medical need.
We are not convinced that “no relief could be granted under
any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the
allegations.” Clay, 242 F.3d at 680. Without speaking to the
merits of his claim, we conclude that Fuller clearly states in his
complaint that Harris County was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. By doing so, Fuller presented the district
court with a complaint containing alleged facts that, if taken as
true, state a claim that has an arguable basis in law and cannot on
its face be deemed frivolous. Such alleged facts require
development through the civil discovery process. Accordingly, we
VACATE the district court’s dismissal of this action and REMAND the
case for further proceedings.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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