United States v. Jackson

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the June 23, 2005 United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III for the Fifth Circuit Clerk _______________ m 04-30205 _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, VERSUS JOSEPH LEE JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana m 03-CR-50078-ALL ______________________________ ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Before SMITH and GARZA, Circuit Judges, petition for cert. filed (Mar. 31, 2005) and VANCE,* District Judge. (No. 04-9517). “An appellate court may not Circuit Judges. correct an error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there is ‘(1) error, PER CURIAM:** (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, This court affirmed Joseph Jackson’s con- 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)). viction. United States v. Jackson, 390 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court va- Because Jackson admitted to the quantity cated and remanded for further consideration of drugs on which his sentence was based, in light of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. there is no Sixth Amendment violation. His 738 (2005). Jackson v. United States, 125 only remaining claim is that he nonetheless is S. Ct. 1683 (2005). We requested and re- entitled to be sentenced under an advisory, ceived supplemental letter briefs addressing the instead of mandatory, guideline regime. impact of Booker. “Technically, this is a “Fanfan error, not a Booker error.” United States v. Martinez- Jackson did not raise a Sixth Amendment Lugo, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10432, at * 5 issue in the district court but did so in a letter (5th Cir. June 7, 2005) (per curiam) (referring brief filed in this appeal long before our opin- to Ducan Fanfan, the second defendant in the ion issued. He raised the issue again in his consolidated opinion in Booker). See United petition for writ of certiorari. In his supple- States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 364 (5th Cir. mental brief addressing Booker, he acknowl- 2005) (per curiam) (discussing the difference edges that at his guilty plea hearing, he admit- between Booker and Fanfan error). ted to possessing 1,486 grams of cocaine, a figure that was used to calculate his sentence. The government concedes that although The district court then departed upwardly from there is no Booker error, there is Fanfan error. the range calculated in accordance with the The third prong of the plain-error test requires, then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. under Mares, that “the defendant rather than the government bears the burden of persuasion By virtue of his failure to object in the dis- with respect to prejudice.” Mares, 402 F.3d at trict court, Jackson concedes that he is subject 521 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. to plain-error review. See United States v. 725, 734 (1993)). To show that his substantial Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005), rights are affected, Jackson would have to “point[] to . . . evidence in the record suggest- ing that the district court would have imposed * District Judge of the Eastern District of Loui- a lesser sentence under an advisory guidelines siana, sitting by designation. system.” United States v. Taylor, No. 03- ** 10167, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8701, at *4 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de- (5th Cir. May 17, 2005) (per curiam) (citations termined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited cir- omitted). In other words, “the pertinent ques- cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. tion is whether [the defendant] demonstrated 2 that the sentencing judgeSSsentencing under The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory for the reasons set forth in our initial opinion. oneSSwould have reached a significantly dif- For the reasons herein explained, the judgment ferent result.” Mares, 402 F.3d at 521. To of sentence is likewise AFFIRMED. meet this standard, the proponent of the error must demonstrate a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Unit- ed States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, __, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004). In her supplemental brief, Jackson’s counsel candidly admits that “the record does not satisfy the Mares prejudice standard for plain error review.” She suggests that Mares is wrongly decided but acknowledges it as bind- ing Fifth Circuit precedent. She proceeds, however, to argue further that applying the sentencing guidelines as mandatory is struc- tural error that requires no showing of preju- dice “because it affected the entire framework within which sentencing proceeded [and] should be deemed to have affected Jackson’s substantial rights, in satisfaction of the third prong of Olano’s plain error test.” This contention has no merit, for we have determined that Booker error is not structural error. United States v. Muhammad, No. 03- 10137, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9078, at *3 (5th Cir. May 18, 2005) (per curiam) (unpub- lished). “[W]e reject [the] argument that Booker error is structural and insusceptible to harmless error analysis, and that Booker error 1 (...continued) should be presumed prejudicial, as both claims related argument that “[e]ven if the error is not are in conflict with Mares.” United States v. deemed structural, it should be considered as Malveaux, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5960, among the class of errors that are ‘presumed pre- at * 4 n.9 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2005) (per judicial’” (citing, inter alia, United States v. Rey- curiam). Neither Booker error nor Fanfan na, 358 F.3d 344, 351-52 (5th Cir.) (en banc), error is structural. Martinez-Lugo, 2005 U.S. cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1065 (2004)). As the gov- App. LEXIS 10432, at *8.1 ernment points out, Reyna addressed an entirely different situation, and in any event, Jackson’s argument is foreclosed by the statement in Booker that mandates review under “ordinary prudential 1 In his supplemental brief, Jackson makes the doctrines” such as “the harmless error doctrine.” (continued...) Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. 3