Jun Song Chen v. Holder

08-3201-ag (L); 09-0784-ag (Con) Chen v. Holder BIA Schoppert, IJ A098 892 773 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 8 th day of February, two thousand ten. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 Chief Judge, 9 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 10 PETER W. HALL, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _______________________________________ 13 14 JUN SONG CHEN, 15 Petitioner, 16 08-3201-ag (L); 17 v. 09-0784-ag (Con) 18 NAC 19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _______________________________________ 23 24 25 FOR PETITIONER: Dehai Zhang, Flushing, New York. 1 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney 2 General; Barry J. Pettinato, 3 Assistant Director; Tim Ramnitz, 4 Attorney, Office of Immigration 5 Litigation, United States Department 6 of Justice, Washington, D.C. 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of 9 two Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is 10 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that these petitions 11 for review are DENIED. 12 Jun Song Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s 13 Republic of China, seeks review of: (1) a June 5, 2008 order 14 of the BIA, affirming the September 22, 2006 decision of 15 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Douglas Schoppert, which denied his 16 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 17 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), In re Jun Song 18 Chen, No. A098 892 773 (B.I.A. June 5, 2008), aff’g No. A098 19 892 773 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 22, 2006); and (2) a 20 February 19, 2009 order of the BIA, denying his motion to 21 reopen, In re Jun Song Chen, No. A098 892 773 (B.I.A. Feb. 22 19, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 23 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 24 I. Docket Number 08-3201-ag 25 We review the agency’s factual findings, including 26 adverse credibility findings, under the substantial evidence 27 standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia 2 1 Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). We 2 review de novo questions of law and the application of law 3 to undisputed fact. Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 4 110 (2d Cir. 2008). 5 Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse 6 credibility determination. In rendering his decision, the 7 IJ did not err in finding implausible that Chen’s father 8 would submit an affidavit in support of his son’s asylum 9 application, when Chen’s father allegedly beat him severely 10 on two occasions because of Chen’s homosexuality. See Siewe 11 v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding 12 that “speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if 13 the inference is made available to the factfinder by record 14 facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common 15 sense and ordinary experience.”); see also id. at 168 16 (“record support for a contrary inference—even one more 17 plausible or more natural—does not suggest error”). The 18 implausibility finding is further supported by the striking 19 similarities of substance and wording between Chen’s 20 father’s letter and Chen’s own statement. See Mei Chai Ye 21 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) 22 (stating that “striking similarities between affidavits are 23 an indication that the statements are ‘canned’”); Surinder 3 1 Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006); see also 2 Ying Li v. BCIS, 529 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen an 3 adverse credibility finding is based partly or entirely on 4 implausibility, [this Court] review[s] the entire record, 5 not whether each unusual or implausible feature of the 6 account can be explained or rationalized.”). Having called 7 Chen’s credibility into question, the IJ also reasonably 8 relied on his failure to submit corroborating evidence from 9 his boyfriend. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 10 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an applicant’s failure to 11 corroborate his testimony may bear on credibility because 12 the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant 13 unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been 14 called into question); see also Maladho Djehe Diallo v. 15 Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir. 2006). 16 Because a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled 17 to conclude to the contrary, the IJ’s adverse credibility 18 determination was supported by substantial evidence. See 19 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. The agency therefore 20 properly denied Chen’s applications for asylum, withholding 21 of removal, and CAT relief insofar as they were based on his 22 sexual orientation. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 23 (2d Cir. 2006). 4 1 Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial 2 of Chen’s application for CAT relief based on his claim of a 3 likelihood of torture for having departed China illegally. 4 Notwithstanding generalized evidence indicating that torture 5 occurs in Chinese prisons, an applicant cannot demonstrate 6 that he is more likely than not to be tortured “based solely 7 on the fact that []he is part of the large class of persons 8 who have left China illegally.” Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t 9 of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 10 Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2007) 11 (holding that beyond evidence of inhumane prison conditions, 12 a CAT claimant must provide some evidence that the 13 authorities act with the specific intent to inflict severe 14 physical or mental pain or suffering on those detained). 15 Because Chen provided no basis for the agency to conclude 16 that he, or someone in his “particular alleged 17 circumstances,” faces an elevated risk of persecution or 18 torture, Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 143-44 (2d 19 Cir. 2003), the agency did not err in denying his 20 application for CAT relief based on his illegal departure. 21 See Mu Xiang Lin, 432 F.3d at 160; see also Mu-Xing Wang, 22 320 F.3d at 143-44. 5 1 II. Docket Number 09-0784-ag 2 The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for 3 abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d 4 Cir. 2005) (per curiam). When the agency considers relevant 5 evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to 6 reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the 7 substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. 8 Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). The BIA did not 9 abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen 10 based on his failure to establish his prima facie 11 eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 12 (1988). 13 As the BIA concluded, Chen did not establish his prima 14 facie eligibility for relief because he failed to show that 15 the Chinese government was aware of or was likely to become 16 aware of his China Democracy Party (“CDP”) activities in the 17 United States. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 18 143 (2d Cir. 2008). The BIA did not err in rejecting as 19 insufficient the generalized statement in the 2005 U.S. 20 Department of State “Profile of Asylum Claims and Country 21 Conditions” that “[t]he Chinese government sometimes 22 monitors the political activities of students or exchange 6 1 scholars living abroad.” See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 2 F.3d 138, 169-72 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that “[w]e do not 3 ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a 4 task largely within the discretion of the agency”). 5 The evidence that Chen submitted in support of his 6 motion to reopen did not indicate that he had been publicly 7 identified as a CDP member and therefore did not show that 8 the Chinese government would likely discover his CDP 9 activities in the United States. Because the BIA did not 10 err in finding that Chen failed to demonstrate his prima 11 facie eligibility for relief based on his CDP activities, it 12 did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to 13 reopen. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104. 14 For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are 15 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 16 removal that the Court previously granted in these petitions 17 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 18 these petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request 19 for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance 20 with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and 21 Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b). 22 FOR THE COURT: 23 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 24 25 26 7