United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 5, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-60465
Summary Calendar
HUSAIN RAFIK KURJI,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
--------------------
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A78 567 258
--------------------
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Husain Rafik Kurji, a native and citizen of India, petitions
for review of (1) an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision
to deny his application for withholding of removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), withholding of removal
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary
departure and (2) an order from the BIA denying his motion to
reconsider. The IJ determined that Kurji’s testimony was not
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-60465
-2-
credible.
Kurji argues that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was
not supported by substantial evidence. He contends that the IJ
pointed out only one minor inconsistency between his application
and his testimony concerning the location of his cousins’ rapes
and their father’s murder and that he gave a reasonable
explanation of the inconsistency at the hearing. However, the IJ
provided many cogent reasons for finding that Kurji was not
credible, and those reasons were amply supported by the record.
See Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1994). As Kurji
concedes, his testimony and application were inconsistent
concerning the location of his cousins’ rapes and their father’s
murder — the application states that the incidents occurred
during a riot in Bombay and Kurji testified that they occurred
during a riot in Surat. Kurji’s vague explanation that there
were riots in both Bombay and Surat does not account for the
discrepancy. Furthermore, Kurji’s assertion that this was the
only inconsistency noted by the IJ is incorrect. The IJ also
correctly determined that the information given by Kurji
concerning how many times he was arrested by police, the dates
and locations of those arrests, and whether he was tortured by
police during those arrests was inconsistent, vague, and
confusing. Accordingly, the record does not compel a credibility
determination contrary to that of the IJ. See Lopez De Jesus v.
INS, 312 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2002).
No. 04-60465
-3-
Kurji also contends that the IJ did not fully consider his
application for withholding of removal under the CAT. He asserts
that the IJ should have separated the analysis of his claim under
the CAT from the credibility analysis used to consider his
requests for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA
because “there is a general atmosphere of torture to Islamia
Muslims in India” that the IJ should have considered in making
its CAT determination. However, because the record does not
support Kurji’s conclusory assertion that there is a general
atmosphere of torture toward Muslims in India, the IJ’s adverse
determination concerning Kurji’s credibility was directly
relevant to the issue whether it was more likely than not that
Kurji would be tortured upon his return to India. See Efe v.
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 907-08 (5th Cir. 2002).
In a related claim, Kurji argues that his application was
not forwarded to the Department of State for an advisory opinion
as is required under 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 and that the IJ failed to
consider country conditions when denying him relief. However,
the record indicates that Kurji’s application was in fact
forwarded to the Department of State. Furthermore, the record
contains several reports of country conditions, and Kurji does
not provide any evidence, other than the IJ’s failure to mention
the reports in his decision, indicating that the IJ did not in
fact consider the reports.
No. 04-60465
-4-
Kurji also argues that the BIA’s summary affirmance of the
IJ’s decision violated his due process rights. As Kurji
concedes, this court has upheld the BIA’s summary affirmance
procedure, determining that it does not violate due process. See
Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
Kurji’s petitions for review of the BIA’s orders are DENIED.