United States v. Washington

08-6088-cr USA v. Morton UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F OR T HE S ECOND C IRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 2 nd day of February, two thousand and ten. Present: RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges, MARK R. KRAVITZ, District Judge. * ________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, - v. - (08-6088-cr) RASHEEM WASHINGTON, Defendant JAMES MORTON, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________________________________ Appearing for Appellant: COLLEEN P. CASSIDY, of counsel, Federal Defenders of New York, New York, New York * The Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation. 1 Appearing for Appellee: JENNIFER EILEEN BURNS, Assistant United States Attorneys Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.). 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District 3 Court for the Southern District of New York be AFFIRMED. 4 Defendant, James Morton, appeals from a judgment entered 5 on December 12, 2008 in the United States District Court for 6 the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.) revoking 7 Defendant’s term of supervised release and sentencing him to 8 24 months’ imprisonment. We presume the parties’ 9 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 10 history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 11 Defendant was on supervised release pursuant to a 12 sentence from June 10, 2005, following his conviction on one 13 count of possession of crack-cocaine with intent to 14 distribute in violation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 15 (b)(1)(C)). On April 10, 2008, Defendant was released from 16 custody and began his term of supervised release. On May 3, 17 2008, Defendant was again arrested and charged with criminal 18 sale of a controlled substance (to wit: crack cocaine). On 19 July 28, 2008, the Probation Office submitted a Request for 2 1 Court Action charging Defendant with violation of the terms 2 of his supervised release based on his arrest. Following an 3 evidentiary hearing on November 25 and December 9, 2008, the 4 district court found that Defendant violated the terms of 5 his release by selling crack cocaine. 6 Where a district court finds that a defendant has 7 violated the terms of his or her supervised release, we 8 review that court’s factual findings for clear error and its 9 ultimate conclusion that the terms of supervised release 10 were violated for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 11 Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 810 (2d Cir. 2006). 12 “Because revocation proceedings generally have not been 13 considered criminal prosecutions, they have not been subject 14 to the procedural safeguards, including the rights to trial 15 by jury and to accusations proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 16 associated with a criminal trial.” Id. at 807. The 17 district court was therefore only required to find that 18 Defendant violated the terms of his supervised release by a 19 preponderance of the evidence. It relied principally on the 20 testimony of Detective Hernandez in that regard. Defendant 21 argues that the district court erred in relying on the 22 testimony of that single eyewitness. We find that argument 23 unpersuasive. 3 1 The court found that Detective Hernandez had an 2 unobstructed, well-lit view of the drug transaction from a 3 distance of not more than fifty-feet, after which he kept 4 the Defendant in his sight until he was apprehended by 5 police only minutes later. The court found Detective 6 Hernandez’s testimony credible; we see nothing to suggest 7 that conclusion was in error. 8 Because the testimony of Detective Hernandez was 9 sufficient to support a finding by a preponderance of the 10 evidence that Defendant engaged in the sale of crack 11 cocaine, the district court did not err in revoking 12 Defendant’s supervised release. See United States v. 13 Frampton, 382 F.3d 213, 222 (2d Cir. 2004). 14 The Court has reviewed Defendant’s remaining arguments 15 and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the 16 judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. 17 For the Court 18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 19 20 21 4