08-4727-cv
Strujan v. Lehman College
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 29 th day of January, two thousand ten.
5
6
7 PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 Circuit Judges,
10 JOHN GLEESON, *
11 District Judge.
12
13
14
15 Elena Strujan,
16
17 Plaintiff-Appellant,
18
19 v. 08-4727-cv
20
21 Lehman College, Dr. Ricardo R. Fernandez,
22 Dr. Vincent Zucchetto, Dr. Edward Kennelly,
23 Dr. Dwight Kincaid, Dr. Robert Bradley,
24 John/Jane Doe,
25
26 Defendants-Appellees. **
27
*
The Honorable John Gleeson, of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting
by designation.
**
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official
caption as noted to reflect the correct spelling of Lehman
College.
1 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: E LENA S TRUJAN, pro se, New
2 York, NY.
3
4 APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: P ATRICK J. W ALSH, Assistant
5 Solicitor General, for
6 Andrew Cuomo, Attorney
7 General of the State of New
8 York, New York, NY.
9
10 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
11 Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.).
12
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
14 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
15 AFFIRMED.
16
17 Appellant Elena Strujan, pro se, appeals from the
18 judgment of the United States District Court for the
19 Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.), granting
20 summary judgment in favor of Appellees in Appellant’s action
21 brought under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972
22 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., the Age
23 Discrimination Act of 1975 (“ADEA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6101, et
24 seq., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”),
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., and New York law. We assume the
26 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
27 procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
28 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo,
29 and ask whether the district court properly concluded that
30 there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the
2
1 moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2 See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300
3 (2d Cir. 2003).
4 For substantially the same reasons stated by the
5 district court, we conclude that, even drawing all
6 permissible factual inferences in her favor, summary
7 judgment was appropriate on Appellant’s Title IX claim
8 because she failed to demonstrate any conduct by the
9 defendants that would be “sufficiently severe or pervasive
10 to alter the conditions of . . . [her] educational
11 environment.” Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733,
12 745 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor
13 did she identify, for purposes of her Title VI claim, any
14 federally-funded program that subjected her to
15 discrimination. With respect to her ADEA claim, Appellant
16 failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Curto v.
17 Edmundson, 392 F.3d 502, 503 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 28
18 C.F.R. 42.736(a)).
19 Even if Appellant’s pleadings were liberally construed
20 as raising claims under the Due Process Clause of the
21 Fourteenth Amendment or the Americans with Disabilities Act,
22 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., those claims, too, would fail.
23 Where, as here, we “are asked to review the substance of a
3
1 genuinely academic decision, . . . [we] should show great
2 respect for the faculty’s professional judgment . . . [and]
3 not override it unless it is such a substantial departure
4 from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
5 person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
6 professional judgment.” Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
7 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985). There is no indication in the
8 record of any substantial departure from the school’s
9 published policies and procedures with respect to grade
10 appeals, withdrawal from courses, or academic probation.
11 Insofar as Appellant characterizes her request to
12 withdraw from a course as a “reasonable accommodation” for
13 her disability, Appellant did not demonstrate that she was
14 disabled within the meaning of the Americans with
15 Disabilities Act — the record does not reflect she possessed
16 any mental or physical impairment that substantially limited
17 a major life activity such as learning. See 42 U.S.C. §
18 12102. Appellant claimed that her condition only prevented
19 her from continuing in this particular course, and she was
20 successful in her other courses. See 29 C.F.R.
21 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (“The inability to perform a single,
22 particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
23 in the major life activity of working.”).
4
1 It was proper for the district court to decline to
2 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellant’s state
3 law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon
4 Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
5 We have carefully considered Appellant’s remaining
6 claims and find them to be without merit.
7 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
8 court is AFFIRMED.
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
11
12
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5