United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 9, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-31256
Summary Calendar
TALMADGE M. WALKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana
(USDC No. 1:03-CV-769-FAL)
_________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Reviewing under the same standard as the district court, we affirm the ALJ’s final
decision denying Mr. Walker’s claim for disability insurance benefits under sections
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
216(i) and 223 of Title II of the Social Security Act, (42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.) for the
following reasons:
1. We find there is substantial evidence of record supporting the ALJ’s
determination that Walker is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
2. The ALJ’s decision comports with the legal standards for disability
determination set forth by this Court under the Act and relevant regulations,
including our opinion in Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000).
3. The record indicates that the ALJ properly considered and gave appropriate
weight to the opinions of Walker’s treating physicians, including the
opinion of Dr. Jon DeFrance. The ALJ is not required to give controlling
weight to a treating physician opinion when that opinion is contradicted by
examining physician evidence. Newton at 458. We do not require
consideration of each of the factors set out in Newton where, as here, “there
is competing first-hand medical evidence and the ALJ finds as a factual
matter that one doctor’s opinion is more well-founded than another.” Id. In
this case, there is reliable medical evidence of record from examining
physicians, Drs. Snatic and Quillin, that contradicts the opinions of Dr.
DeFrance.
Dr. DeFrance’s ultimate conclusion that Walker is disabled is an
opinion on an issue reserved for the Commissioner and, as such, is not
entitled to “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). A physician’s
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opinion that a claimant is “disabled” is not entitled to special significance.
Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 2003). Further, Dr.
DeFrance’s conclusion that Walker is disabled because retraining from his
commercial driving position would be difficult clearly ignores the relevant
standard. While all concur that Walker cannot return to his previous work
as a bus driver, the standard is whether he also cannot perform other work
in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). The vocational
expert testified that, despite his limitations, Walker could perform other
work available in the national economy.
4. We note that the ALJ’s determination that Walker was not receiving any
ongoing medical treatment was not accurate because Walker was taking
prescribed medication at the time of both the first and second hearings.
However, we agree with the district court that this error does not affect the
ALJ’s ultimate determination of disability. First, the ALJ’s statement
makes clear that his non-credibility finding was influenced by Walker’s
lack of ongoing medical treatment for all impairments, not only the eye
condition for which Walker continues to take medication. Further, while
discounting Walker’s allegations of severe concentration and pain
limitations related to the eye condition, the ALJ accepted the opinion of Dr.
Bowman, the physician providing the ongoing eye treatment, and accepted
and incorporated Dr. Bowman’s finding that Walker only has use of his
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non-affected eye. Finally, the ALJ also set forth other bases for his
credibility assessment, noting that contrary to his subjective complaints,
Walker’s description of his daily activities was consistent with a wide range
of medium work.
5. We find the ALJ properly considered the disabling effect of each of
Walker’s raised impairments as well as the combined effect of such
impairments in reaching a disability determination. Fraga v. Bowen
810 F.2d 1296, 1306 (5th Cir. 1987). It is apparent that the ALJ considered
Walker’s cognitive as well as physical limitations in framing hypothetical
questions to the vocational expert.
Affirmed.
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