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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES LEE TROUTMAN
Appellant No. 3477 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003674-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016
Appellant James Lee Troutman appeals pro se from the order entered
in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his
petition filed for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1
We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of
this appeal as follows:
On March 19, 2012, [Appellant] entered into a negotiated
guilty plea to the charges of first degree murder,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child,
kidnapping and abuse of a corpse for heinously raping,
murdering and disposing of the young victim, 9 year-old
[S.K.] on May 9, 2011. [Appellant] also agreed to be
sentenced to a life term of imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, followed by a 10 to 20 year term of
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546.
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imprisonment, in exchange for the Commonwealth’s
withdrawal of its intent to seek the death penalty.
This negotiated guilty plea followed an extensive oral
colloquy, in addition to two written plea colloquies, which
were reviewed by [Appellant] with his attorney and signed
by him. Pertinent to this appeal are the portions of the
oral and written colloquies that addressed his previous
mental health issues and hospitalizations. During the oral
colloquy, the then 25 year-old [Appellant] affirmed that in
the past he had received mental health treatment at
various facilities, although he denied being under the care
of a psychiatrist or taking medication for any mental health
issue at the time of the guilty plea. (Negotiated Guilty
Plea 3/19/12 p. 6, 9). The District Attorney also
questioned [Appellant] during the oral colloquy and
verified that he had been in and out of several facilities in
regard to his mental health and that his last mental health
treatment occurred in 2005, when he was 17 years old and
that from the time he was 18 until the time of the colloquy
he had not undergone mental health treatment Id. at 24-
25. Also important is his acknowledgement in his written
colloquy that he has a history of mental illness. See,
Exhibit “D-2”, Guilty Plea Colloquy, p. 1. [Appellant] did
not file a direct appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior
Court.
On September 21, 2012, [Appellant] filed a timely pro se
PCRA petition. PCRA counsel was appointed to assist
[Appellant] with his petition. After a conscientious review
of the record, PCRA counsel determined all issues lacked
merit and submitted a no-merit letter dated November 9,
2012, [and also sought] to withdraw. [Appellant] filed an
opposition to counsel’s request on November 23, 2012.
On December 6, 2012, pre-dismissal notice was issued in
accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. [Appellant] did respond
by filing a motion for leave to amend PCRA petition under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 905. Prior to ruling on his request to amend,
on January 22, 2013, [Appellant] filed an amended PCRA
petition, alleging in part that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to pursue an insanity defense rather than advising
him to plead guilty. On January 23, 2013, [the PCRA c]ourt
denied [Appellant’s] request to amend and on January 24,
2013, [the PCRA c]ourt dismissed his improperly filed
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amended PCRA petition. Finally, on January 25, 2013,
[the PCRA c]ourt issued a final order of dismissal,
dismissing his PCRA petition without a hearing. [Appellant]
appealed from the orders dated January 24, 2013 and
January 25, 2013 to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On
February 25, 2014, the Superior Court affirmed both
orders.
On September 10, 2015, [Appellant] filed his untimely
second PCRA petition, which is at issue in this appeal.
Therein, he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to pursue an organic brain disease defense rather
than have him plead guilty.
PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed January 8, 2016, at 2-4.
On September 16, 2015, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
On October 26, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. On
November 18, 2015, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The court
ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he timely complied.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. DID THE PCRA COURT COMMIT LEGAL ERROR AND /OR
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS WERE NEWLY
DISCOVERED FACTS THAT DEMONSTRATE [APPELLANT]
SUFFERS FROM AN ORGANIC BRAIN DISEASE THAT
IMPAIRS HIS MENTAL CAPACITY TO THE DEGREE THAT NO
REASONABLE TRIER OF FACT COULD FIND THE
DELIBERATE INTENT NECESSARY TO CONVICT HIM ON
THE MURDER CHARGE FOR WHICH HE [PLED] GUILTY
BEFORE DISMISSING THE PCRA PETITION WITHOUT
HOLDING A[N] EVIDENTIARY HEARING[?]
2. WHETHER PLEA COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
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AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES BY PERSUADING [APPELLANT] TO PLEAD GUILTY
RATHER THAN PURSUING AN ORGANIC BRAIN DISEASE
DEFENSE[?]
3. WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO RAISE PLEA COUNSEL’S DEFICIENT
PERFORMANCE IN PERSUADING PETITIONER TO PLEAD
GUILTY RATHER THAN PURSUING AN ORGANIC BRAIN
DISEASE DEFENSE[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine
whether his PCRA petition was timely. The timeliness of a PCRA petition
implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal
denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that no
court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id. To “accord
finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority
upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With
respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, this Court has further explained:
The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a
PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.
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Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010)
(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011);
see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). This Court may review a PCRA petition filed
more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the
claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the
petitioner must plead and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these
exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant was sentenced on March 19, 2012. Because he did
not file a direct appeal, his judgment of sentence became final on April 18,
2012, when his time to appeal to this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3). Accordingly, he had until April 18, 2013 to file a timely PCRA
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petition. He filed the present pro se PCRA petition on September 9, 2015.
Thus, his PCRA petition is facially untimely, and we must determine whether
Appellant has pled and proved any of the exceptions to the PCRA time
limitation. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Appellant attempts to invoke the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception to the
PCRA time-bar by claiming that he just discovered his medical records when
his mother gave them to him on August 17, 2015. He alleges he brought his
claim within 60 days of the date his mother gave him the records, and thus
we should consider it as a newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time-
bar. We disagree.
To establish the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time-bar,
the petitioner must allege and prove that
there were facts that were unknown to him and that he
could not have ascertained those facts by the exercise of
due diligence. The focus of the exception is on the newly
discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly
willing source for previously known facts.
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa.2008) (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Appellant likely knew about the existence of his medical records, and if
he did not, they could have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence. His medical records indicate that he had a mental health
condition. Appellant, however, was aware of his mental illness when he was
sentenced for his crimes. Both in his written guilty plea colloquy and at his
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oral guilty plea colloquy on March 19, 2012, Appellant indicated that he had
been committed to mental institutions and mental treatment facilities for the
treatment of various issues. See N.T. 3/19/2012, at 6. His medical records
are only additional sources for previously known facts. Thus, Appellant fails
to invoke the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception to the PCRA time-bar.
The PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition as
untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2016
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