IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
DYCK-O'NEAL, INC.,
Appellant,
v. Case Nos. 5D15-3790
LARRY HENDRICK, JR.
AND CATHY HENDRICK,
Appellees.
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Opinion filed July 1, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
David Dugan, Judge.
Susan B. Morrison, of Law Offices of Susan
B. Morrison, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Austin Tyler Brown, of Parker & DuFresne,
P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
LAMBERT, J.
The issue we address in this case is whether a trial court’s reservation of
jurisdiction in a final judgment of foreclosure to enter a deficiency judgment precludes a
party from filing a separate action at law to recover a deficiency when the foreclosure
court has neither granted nor denied the deficiency judgment. Our answer to this question
is "no."
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Appellees were defendants in a foreclosure
action in which the plaintiff included in its complaint a request that the trial court reserve
jurisdiction to award a deficiency judgment, if appropriate. The court eventually entered
its final judgment of foreclosure and reserved jurisdiction to award a deficiency judgment.
After the foreclosure sale, the plaintiff assigned the judgment and note, including the right
to pursue a deficiency judgment, to Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. ("Appellant"). Rather than pursuing
the deficiency judgment in the foreclosure action, Appellant filed a separate action at law
against Appellees to recover a deficiency judgment. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the court that entered the final judgment of foreclosure
and reserved jurisdiction to consider the entry of a deficiency judgment was the only court
that had jurisdiction to consider the deficiency. The lower court agreed and entered the
final order on appeal, dismissing the action based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The resolution of this appeal comes from the language of section 702.06, Florida
Statutes (2014), which provides in pertinent part:
In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages heretofore or
hereafter executed the entry of a deficiency decree for any
portion of a deficiency, should one exist, shall be within the
sound discretion of the court; however, in the case of an
owner-occupied residential property, the amount of the
deficiency may not exceed the difference between the
judgment amount, or in the case of a short sale, the
outstanding debt, and the fair market value of the property on
the date of sale. . . . The complainant shall also have the right
to sue at common law to recover such deficiency, unless the
court in the foreclosure action has granted or denied a claim
for a deficiency judgment.
§ 702.06, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).
Our sister courts in Garcia v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 178 So. 3d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015), Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Weinberg, 190 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), and Cheng v.
2
Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1076 (Fla. 4th DCA May 4, 2016), have recently
addressed the same issue pending before us. Both courts determined that the language
in section 702.06 is unambiguous and that a separate action at law for a deficiency was
permitted, notwithstanding the foreclosure court’s reservation of jurisdiction in its final
judgment to consider a deficiency. More recently, the First District Court of Appeal
reached the opposite result, holding that a party is not entitled to pursue a separate action
at law where the foreclosure complaint includes a prayer for a deficiency judgment and
the trial court reserves jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment. Higgins v. Dyck-O'Neal,
Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1376 (Fla. 1st DCA June 9, 2016).
We agree with the Third District and Fourth District that section 702.06 is
unambiguous. The dispositive question under the statute is whether the foreclosure court
has granted or denied a claim for a deficiency judgment. In the case below, the
foreclosure court had not granted or denied a deficiency judgment. Thus, the plain
language of section 702.06 permitted Appellant to bring the suit at issue to recover a
deficiency against the Appellees, and the trial court erred in dismissing the action based
on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 Accordingly, we reverse the final order of
dismissal and remand with instructions to reinstate the complaint filed. We certify conflict
with Higgins v. Dyck-O'Neal, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1376 (Fla. 1st DCA June 9, 2016).
REVERSED and REMANDED, with instructions; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
LAWSON, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.
1 Although not applicable to the present case, we note that section 95.11(5)(h),
Florida Statutes (2015), now provides for a one-year statute of limitations for an action to
enforce a claim of a deficiency related to a note secured by a mortgage against a
residential property that is a one-family to four-family dwelling unit.
3