In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: July 8, 2016
S15G1295. BICKERSTAFF v. SUNTRUST BANK.
Benham, Justice.
Appellee SunTrust Bank created a deposit agreement to govern its
relationship with its depositors that permits an individual depositor to reject
the agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause by giving written notice by a
certain deadline, containing certain identifying information such as name and
account number. SunTrust claims it drafted the arbitration clause in such a
way that only an individual depositor may exercise this right to reject
arbitration on his or her own behalf, thereby permitting that individual to file
only an individual lawsuit against the bank. But SunTrust asserts that even if,
as it has been determined here, the filing of a lawsuit prior to the expiration of
the rejection of arbitration deadline operates to give notice of the individual
plaintiff’s rejection of arbitration, the complaint cannot be brought as a class
action because the filing of a class action cannot serve to reject the arbitration
clause on behalf of class members who have not individually given notice.
Instead, SunTrust claims, its arbitration rejection clause is drafted in such a
manner as to make it impossible for a class representative to act on behalf of
class members in this lawsuit. We disagree.
Factual and procedural background
On July 12, 2010, Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., who was a SunTrust Bank
depositor, filed a complaint against SunTrust on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated alleging the bank’s overdraft fee constitutes the
charging of usurious interest.1 At the time Bickerstaff opened his account,
thereby agreeing to the terms of SunTrust’s deposit agreement, that agreement
included a mandatory arbitration provision. In response to the ruling of a
federal court in an unrelated action finding the arbitration clause in SunTrust’s
deposit agreement was unconscionable at Georgia law,2 and after Bickerstaff’s
complaint had been filed, SunTrust amended the arbitration clause to permit a
1
Mr. Bickerstaff passed away after certiorari was granted in this appeal, and this Court granted
the motion to substitute his legal representative as the appellant in this case.
2
In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 734 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1292 (II) (E) and n. 15 (S.D.
Fla. 2010), later overturned in In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, MDL No. 2036, 459
Fed.Appx. 855, 858-859 (III) (11th Cir. 2012). We note that after the Southern District of Florida
opinion was issued, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a class action waiver in a contract
arbitration clause is enforceable, and that the application of state law doctrine holding that such a
waiver is unconscionable is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act. AT&T Mobility LLC, v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (131 SCt 1740, 179 LE2d 742) (2011).
2
window of time in which a depositor could reject arbitration by sending
SunTrust written notification that complied with certain requirements.
SunTrust had not notified Bickerstaff or its other customers of this change in
the arbitration clause of the deposit agreement at the time Bickerstaff filed his
complaint, but the complaint, as well as the first amendment to the complaint,
was filed prior to the amendment’s deadline for giving SunTrust written notice
of an election to reject arbitration. It was only after Bickerstaff’s complaint
was filed that SunTrust notified Bickerstaff and its other existing depositors,
by language printed in monthly account statements distributed on August 24,
2010, that an updated version of the deposit agreement had been adopted, that
a copy of the new agreement could be obtained at any branch office or on-line,
and that all future transactions would be governed by the updated agreement.
The section of the updated deposit agreement setting forth the arbitration
agreement contained the right to reject provision which directed customers, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Right to reject arbitration agreement. You may reject this
arbitration agreement provision and therefore not be subject to being
required to resolve any dispute, controversy or claim by arbitration.
To reject this arbitration agreement provision, you must send the
Bank written notice of your decision so that we receive it at the
address listed below by the later of October 1, 2010 or within forty-
five (45) days of the opening of your Account. Such notice must
3
include a statement that you wish to reject the arbitration agreement
section of these rules and regulations along with your name, address,
Account name, Account number and your signature and must be
mailed to SunTrust Bank Legal Department, Attn: Arbitration
Rejection, P.O. Box 2848, Mail Code 2034, Orlando, FL 32802-
2848. This is the sole and only method by which you can reject this
arbitration agreement provision. . . . You agree that our business
records will be final and conclusive with respect to whether you
rejected this arbitration agreement provision in a timely and proper
fashion.
Bickerstaff was unaware of the arbitration rejection provision or its deadline
until SunTrust filed a motion to compel arbitration on the first business day
after the October 1, 2010, notice deadline. That motion was denied in an order
finding Bickerstaff had substantially complied with the contract’s arbitration
rejection requirements when he supplied the required information to SunTrust
in the pleadings filed by his attorney on his behalf prior to the notice deadline.
On April 13, 2013, Bickerstaff moved to certify a class of all Georgia citizens
with a SunTrust deposit agreement who, from a date four years prior to the date
Bickerstaff filed his complaint, had at least one overdraft of $500.00 or less
resulting from an ATM or debit card transaction and paid an overdraft fee on
that transaction. That motion was also denied.3
3
The deposit agreement also includes a jury trial waiver for all matters not submitted to arbitration
that also stipulates that any such litigation is to proceed on an individual basis and not as part of a
class action. Bickerstaff challenged the enforceability of this provision as being unconscionable
4
SunTrust appealed the order denying its motion to compel Bickerstaff to
arbitrate his claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding
that the information contained in the complaint filed by Bickerstaff’s attorney
substantially satisfied the notice required to reject arbitration. Bickerstaff v.
SunTrust Bank, 332 Ga. App. 121 (1) (a) (770 SE2d 903) (2015). Bickerstaff
appealed the order denying his motion for class certification, and in the same
opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Id. at (2). In considering
Bickerstaff’s appeal, the Court of Appeals held, in essence, that the contractual
language in this case requiring individual notification of the decision to reject
arbitration did not permit Bickerstaff to reject the deposit agreement’s
arbitration clause on behalf of other putative class members by virtue of the
filing of his class action complaint. Id. at (2) (b). This Court granted
Bickerstaff’s petition for certiorari review.4
The requirements to obtain class certification are set forth in OCGA § 9-
11-23 (a) and (b). “Under Georgia law, a case may proceed as a class action if
and unenforceable at Georgia law, but that challenge has not yet been addressed by the trial court
and is not an issue in this appeal.
4
SunTrust did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ ruling finding Bickerstaff substantially
complied with the arbitration rejection notice requirements by filing his complaint.
5
all prerequisites of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) are satisfied: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and if at least one ground of OCGA §
9-11-23 (b) is satisfied.” EarthLink, Inc. v. Eaves, 293 Ga. App. 75, 76 (1)
(666 SE2d 420) (2008).5 Here, the trial court analyzed only the issue of
numerosity, and found it was lacking in this case. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, finding that pursuant to the terms of the deposit agreement,
Bickerstaff could reject the arbitration agreement only for himself and not for
any other depositor. Bickerstaff was deemed to have timely rejected the
arbitration agreement for himself by filing his complaint prior to the deadline
for notifying SunTrust of rejection of arbitration. But, the Court of Appeals
opined, since Bickerstaff’s complaint could not serve as notification of
5
OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) reads as follows:
(a) One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if:
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable:
(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
6
rejection of arbitration by any other depositor, the class consists of only one
depositor and lacks numerosity for class certification. For reasons set forth
below, we reverse.
Legal analysis
1. Application of the rule of tolling to contractual limitations
As we have previously noted, “[m]any provisions of OCGA § 9-11-23
were borrowed from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and for this reason,
when Georgia courts interpret and apply OCGA § 9-11-23, they commonly
look to decisions of the federal courts interpreting and applying Rule 23.”
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner, 295 Ga. 524, 525 at n.3 (1)
(762 SE2d 419) (2014). In the 1974 landmark decision in American Pipe and
Construction Co. v. Utah,6 the Supreme Court of the United States applied
Rule 23 and held that “the filing of a timely class action complaint commences
the action for all members of the class as subsequently determined.” Id. at 550.
Accordingly, in American Pipe, the statute of limitation was tolled for all who
made timely motions to intervene in the lawsuit after class certification was
ultimately denied for failure to satisfy the requirement of numerosity. Id. at
6
414 U.S. 538 (94 SCt 756, 38 LE2d 713) (1974).
7
552-553. In the case filed by Bickerstaff, it is undisputed that the purported
class numbers at least 1,000, and SunTrust has stipulated that it is unfeasible
for so many depositors with relatively small claims to bring such claims
individually. The determinative issue is whether the filing of Bickerstaff’s
complaint, thereby signaling his rejection of the arbitration agreement, tolled
the time in which the putative class members were required to notify SunTrust
of their intent to reject arbitration. The answer is yes.
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have ruled that putative class
representatives may satisfy certain conditions such as a limitation period for
filing suit or making a claim on behalf of those class members who ratify the
representatives’ actions by remaining in the class after the class is certified. In
Schorr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,7 individual plaintiffs, who were
mortgage borrowers, sought class certification for damages allegedly due the
class members for the defendant lender’s failure to comply with a statutory
requirement to cancel a security deed, upon repayment of the loan, within the
time set forth in the statute. This Court answered a certified question posed by
the federal district court by holding that the named plaintiff in a class action
7
287 Ga. 570 (697 SE2d 827) (2010).
8
could satisfy the pre-suit written demand requirement of the applicable code
section on behalf of putative class members. In Barnes v. City of Atlanta,8 a
group of plaintiffs, who were attorneys practicing law in that city, challenged
the constitutionality of an occupational tax and sought tax refunds on behalf of
a putative class of individuals pursuant to a statute that required exhaustion of
administrative remedies by the taxpayer seeking a refund, including making a
written claim prior to filing suit. This Court held that the named plaintiffs had
satisfied those requirements for the class. The contractual notice requirements
placed upon a depositor in this case do not preclude a class representative from
acting on behalf of other depositors any more than the statutory requirements
placed upon taxpayers precluded the Barnes class representatives from acting
on behalf of other taxpayers. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has held that a class
representative may satisfy contractual notice requirements. See Resource Life
Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 304 Ga. App. 719, 727 (1) (698 SE2d 19) (2010) (class
certified in a case involving form credit life or credit disability insurance
contracts that included a statement that unearned premiums would be refunded
on written notice).
8
281 Ga. 256 (637 SE2d 4) (2006).
9
This Court, however, has never examined whether a party who files suit
and seeks class certification may satisfy a contractual limitation period on
behalf of absent class members. SunTrust argues no legal authority exists for
the proposition that contractual deadlines become suspended by the filing of a
class complaint. In fact, this issue has been addressed by other courts in cases
involving disputes between passengers and cruise lines, and those courts held
contractual deadlines may be tolled on behalf of putative class members by the
filing of a class complaint. Both in cases applying federal class action law, as
well as the law of at least one other state, courts have held that because the
filing of a class action commences suit for the entire class for purposes of the
statute of limitation, the same rule applies to a contractual period of limitation
for filing suit or giving notice of a claim. See, e.g., Kornberg v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument that
since plaintiffs had no authorization from other passengers, the suit seeking
class certification filed by a small number of cruise line passengers did not
operate as notice of a claim by the absent class members within a specified
number of days as required by the ticket contract); Freeman v. Celebrity
Cruises, Inc., 1994 WL 689809 (S.D.N.Y, Dec. 8, 1994) (a contract
requirement that a claim be filed with the defendant within a certain period of
10
time is satisfied by the filing of a claim by the plaintiff in a class action);
Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So2d 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(rejecting the argument that as a prerequisite to maintaining a class action on
behalf of passengers on a cruise line, every member of the class must submit a
written claim within the limitation period contained on the ticket).
a. Tolling the contractual limitation in this case does not violate
Georgia contract law.
SunTrust would have us exempt the application of such a rule to this case
because it claims the terms of its deposit agreement specifically require
individual action that can only be performed by the individual depositor. The
arbitration clause states that “[y]ou may reject this arbitration agreement.” In
another part of the agreement, “You” is defined as “the owner of the account,”
and the agreement further states it is “not for the benefit of, and may not be
enforced by, any third party.” SunTrust asserts that permitting the attorney for
a single depositor to reject arbitration on behalf of other depositors runs afoul
of the plain language of the deposit agreement, and that permitting Bickerstaff
to reject arbitration for other depositors with whom he is not in privity violates
the substantive legal rights of these other parties by permitting the contract
between SunTrust and these other depositors to be modified or altered by a
11
stranger to the contract. But we are unconvinced by SunTrust’s argument that
a contractual deadline requiring individual action may not be suspended until
the certification of a class (and the attendant opportunity of class members to
opt out or remain bound by the result of the class action) when it is clear that
deadlines imposed by statutes or regulations requiring individual action can be
suspended by the filing of a class action. See Schorr, supra (where the
applicable statute required a pre-suit written demand for liquidated damages
be filed by a claimant); Barnes, supra (requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies, including making a written claim, prior to filing suit for a tax refund).
See also American Pipe, supra (even where the class ultimately was not
certified, the statutory limitation period was tolled for all who made timely
motions to intervene in the lawsuit once certification was denied).
In its analysis of this issue, the Court of Appeals focused on whether
Bickerstaff was in privity with the putative class members so that he could toll
the contractual limitation period for rejecting the arbitration clause, or whether
he could act as a third party to do so. Finding that Bickerstaff was not in privity
with the purported class members and was not authorized to act for the
members as a third-party beneficiary of their accounts, the Court of Appeals
concluded he could not reject the arbitration clause for anyone other than
12
himself. Bickerstaff, supra, 332 Ga. App. at 131. But this faulty reasoning
ignores the fact that the entire class action scheme is based upon the premise
that a member of a class may act as a representative of the other purported class
members. See OCGA § 9-11-23 (a). If a class is certified and the putative
members are notified, as set forth in subsection (c), a member may opt out,
pursuant to subsection (c) (2), after which the class representative no longer
represents that party. That the SunTrust contract requires individual
notification of rejection of arbitration does not mean that Bickerstaff cannot
act as a representative for that purpose until such time as a class member may
opt out of such representation. Georgia contract law provides that contractual
obligations may be performed by an agent, where personal skill is not required.
OCGA § 13-4-20. Likewise, the law of agency provides generally that
“[w]hatever one may do himself may be done by an agent . . . .” OCGA § 10-
6-5. As the Eleventh Circuit held with respect to proofs of claim filed on behalf
of a class of claimants in a bankruptcy proceeding, “the representative in a
class action is an agent for the class members.” In re Charter Co., 876 F2d
866, 873 (11th Cir. 1989). A class action “is a device by which the
representative is an agent for persons who have not appeared or given even
tacit consent.” In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F2d 487, 493 (7th Cir.
13
1988). The class representative is a putative agent who “keep[s] the case alive
pending the decision on certification.” Id.
We reject SunTrust’s assertion that permitting Bickerstaff’s rejection of
arbitration to be applied to other depositors illegally permits Bickerstaff to
abridge the contractual rights of others. The deposit agreement’s arbitration
clause grants the prevailing party the right to collect attorney fees and costs,
and SunTrust points to the fact that those depositors who remain bound by the
arbitration clause and do not reject it are thereby entitled to recover fees and
expenses in the event they prevail in an arbitrated dispute. Contrary to
SunTrust’s assertion, Bickerstaff does not argue he can reject arbitration for
other depositors and thereby abrogate this contractual right to recover fees
prior to class certification and the subsequent election by class members to
remain in the class or opt out of it. Again, Bickerstaff’s complaint serves only
to toll the contractual period for making such an election until such time as the
class is certified, and does not improperly abridge the contractual rights of
others. Furthermore, courts routinely permit a putative class representative to
seek a ruling invalidating contractual arbitration clauses prior to class
certification. See, e.g., Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC 764 F3d 765, 779 (7th Cir.
2014) (putative class representative obtained pre-certification ruling that
14
arbitration provision is void); Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F3d 599, 614 (4th
Cir. 2013) (putative class representative obtained pre-certification ruling that
arbitration provision is unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration); In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 84 FSupp3d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2015)
(putative class representative obtained pre-certification ruling that arbitration
provision is unconscionable). Once a class is certified, such rulings bind class
members who do not opt out, thereby affecting their contractual rights.
Invalidating an arbitration clause is no more of an alteration of contract rights
than exercising a contractual right to reject arbitration.9
SunTrust notes that the arbitration rejection notice requirements involve
more than simply meeting a deadline. It argues the terms of the contract must
be enforced, and in this case that means in order to reject the arbitration clause
each depositor must provide individual information: name, address, account
9
SunTrust sets up a false dilemma—that in the interim between the filing of Bickerstaff’s
complaint and the time an election is made by a depositor (if a class is certified), it cannot know
its own contractual rights with respect to its customers or know, for example, whether a dispute
between the bank and a given depositor is governed by the arbitration clause or not. Practically
speaking, if a depositor sues SunTrust and rejects SunTrust’s demand to arbitrate on the ground
that he or she timely rejected the arbitration clause at the time Bickerstaff’s class action complaint
was filed, then that depositor’s election under the arbitration clause is obvious. By its terms, the
contract’s arbitration requirement also applies to the bank. Likewise, then, if the bank pursues a
dispute with a depositor and files an arbitration claim against a customer and that customer
responds by seeking dismissal on the ground that the customer rejects the arbitration clause, any
uncertainty about the bank’s rights based on the customer’s rejection, or not, of the arbitration
clause would appear to be resolved.
15
name, account number, and the depositor’s signature. But this is frequently
the case in class action disputes, and yet this does not typically defeat the
pursuit of the claim as a class action so long as the class plaintiff has met the
prerequisites for filing suit. The Barnes case involved a demand for refund of
taxes paid, and although it had already been determined that the tax was
unconstitutional, claimants were nevertheless subject to administrative
exhaustion requirements that called for the individual filing of a written claim
for refund that provided information required by the taxing authority, as set
forth in the governing statute. Barnes, supra, 281 Ga. at 257-258.
Nevertheless, this Court applied the general principles of class actions which
hold that the satisfaction of a precondition for suit by the class plaintiff
typically avoids the necessity for each class member to satisfy the precondition
individually. Id. at 258. Likewise, Schorr involved a demand for liquidated
damages that, by statute, required the claimant to make a written demand upon
the lender who allegedly owed the statutory damages. Again, this Court
applied “the general rule allowing the named plaintiffs in a class action to
satisfy preconditions for suit on behalf of the entire class.” Schorr, supra, 287
Ga. at 573. What is important is that the named plaintiff’s fulfillment of each
precondition and the filing of the class action provide notice of “the nature of
16
the suit, the governing law, and the extent of the class.” Id. Compare J.M.I.C.
Life Ins. Co. v. Toole, 280 Ga. App. 372, 374-375 (1) (b) (634 SE2d 123 (2006)
(where the statute on which the class plaintiff filed suit did not require pre-suit
notice, filing the suit satisfied the notice requirement on behalf of the
individual class representative, and the Court of Appeals went on to affirm the
certification of the class) to the facts of this case in which it has already been
determined that the filing of the lawsuit provided notice of Bickerstaff’s
rejection of arbitration.
Bickerstaff’s lawsuit informs SunTrust of the nature and scope of the
claim and provides it with the information necessary to frame a legal defense
to the claim of usury. As to the extent of the class, the identity of customers
who are putative class members, and the individual information required from
a depositor who rejects arbitration, the record shows SunTrust stipulated that
its business records are sufficient to identify the customers who were charged
an overdraft fee during the relevant period by name, account number, address,
and the dates and amounts of the fees charged.
b. Tolling in this case does not illegally bind the putative class
members to the class representative’s decision to reject
arbitration.
17
The Court of Appeals further concluded that in order to satisfy the
numerosity requirement, Bickerstaff “would have to legally bind class
members to a rejection of the arbitration clause—at least until they opted out
of the class itself once it was certified.” Bickerstaff, supra, 332 Ga. App. at
130-131. But this analysis, based upon an assumption that a class cannot be
certified unless Bickerstaff can legally bind putative class members before
certification, thereby satisfying the numerosity requirement, again
demonstrates a fundamental misconception about the way class actions work.
The entire scheme of class actions, as set forth in OCGA § 9-11-23, is that all
putative class members benefit from the class representative’s filing of the
complaint just as if each member had filed the complaint himself or herself.
See In Re American Reserve Corp., supra. The Court of Appeals disregarded
“those principles which apply generally in class actions, including that which
permits a representative to act on behalf of an entire class” with respect to a
precondition for filing suit. Barnes, supra, 281 Ga. at 258. The Court of
Appeals itself correctly noted that Bickerstaff was acting for the class members
only until such time as they chose whether or not to opt out of the class. In
damages class actions such as this one brought pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-23
(b) (3), a putative class representative cannot bind class members before a class
18
is certified and the members have the opportunity to opt out of the complaint.
See OCGA § 9-11-23 (c) (2). It follows that in the interim, the filing of
Bickerstaff’s lawsuit simply serves to mark time and toll the contractual period
of limitation for putative class members to elect to remain in the class or opt
out of it after class certification. If a member opts out, he or she is not bound
by Bickerstaff’s decision to reject arbitration. The Court of Appeals’ reliance
upon Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,10 is misplaced. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that a class plaintiff’s jurisdictional amount stipulation
could not bind absent class members to the amount in controversy prior to class
certification. Here, Bickerstaff is not attempting to bind any other class
member to rejection of arbitration prior to class certification; his class action
complaint, in which he personally rejects arbitration, simply tolls the time in
which the other putative class members may elect to opt out of the class action,
or remain in it. A class member’s decision to remain in the class after class
certification and notification is what will serve as his or her own election to
reject the arbitration clause.
10
___ U.S. ___ (133 SCt 1345, 185 LE2d 439) (2013).
19
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals deemed the
filing of Bickerstaff’s complaint, with respect to Bickerstaff himself, to have
satisfied the contractual requirement that he rejected the arbitration clause in
writing within the required period of time and, given the information contained
within his complaint, to have satisfied the other notice requirements such as
name, address, and account number. We add that, applying the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in American Pipe and subsequent decisions of this and other
courts, the filing of Bickerstaff’s complaint tolled the required time period for
giving notice to SunTrust for all putative class members until a certification
decision is made and the notified class members elect whether to opt out or
remain in the class. See American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at 551. This preserves
the numerosity issue for a determination of whether the total number of
putative class members whose contractual conditions have been tolled meets
the numerosity requirement of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (1). To hold otherwise—
that the filing of the class action complaint tolls the required time period for
giving notice of a claim or filing suit only for the named plaintiff—would
defeat numerosity in many cases in which any sort of notice requirement exists.
20
The concept of numerosity applies to the number of putative class members,11
and does not require that the actual number of class members be determined
before a class is certified. That Bickerstaff’s rejection of the arbitration
agreement by the act of filing his complaint does not bind others until the class
is certified does not defeat numerosity.
2. Relation back
Assuming a class is certified in this case, as in any subsection (b) (3)
class action, each class member will be notified and required to decide whether
to opt out of the lawsuit. See OCGA § 9-11-23 (c) (2). At that point, each
notified depositor will be exercising his or her own contractual right to reject,
or not, the deposit agreement’s arbitration clause. Bickerstaff will not be
making that decision for the other depositors and thus will not be acting as a
party to those depositors’ contracts or as a person in privity with the other
depositors, and will not be acting as a beneficiary of anyone else’s deposit
agreement. Any member of the certified class who remains and does not opt
out of the class will be deemed to have brought suit at the same time
11
William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:13 (5th ed.) (“Generally, a plaintiff must
show enough evidence of the class’s size to enable the court to make commonsense assumptions
regarding the number of putative class members.” (Emphasis supplied.) )
21
Bickerstaff’s complaint was filed, which was within the deadline for rejecting
arbitration for existing depositors, the class Bickerstaff seeks to represent. See
Barnes, supra, 281 Ga. at 257 (1).
Consistent with the law of agency, depositors who remain in the class
will thereby ratify the filing of the complaint, and that ratification will relate
back to the timely notice of rejection Bickerstaff made when he filed the
complaint. See OCGA § 10-6-52. This is consonant with, and simply another
aspect of, the tolling rule adopted by the Supreme Court in American Pipe,
supra, whereby the commencement of class action satisfies the statute of
limitation for all those who ultimately participate in the suit. As we have
previously noted, in this case it is the class representative’s timely notification
of rejection of arbitration by filing the complaint that serves to toll the time for
the remaining class members to give notice. And for those members who ratify
the class representative’s acts by remaining in the class, the complaint provides
the necessary notice. It demonstrates the member’s intent to sue SunTrust in a
court of law and to reject the requirement to arbitrate the claim. Tolling and
the notion of relation back are simply two sides of the same coin.
3. Remaining enumeration of error
22
In his remaining enumeration of error, Bickerstaff claims the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to hold SunTrust is barred due to lack of assent and
waiver from enforcing the deposit agreement’s arbitration clause against all
putative class members. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not address that
ground for reversing the trial court because it deemed the issue to be moot as
a result of its decision that class certification was properly denied. Bickerstaff,
supra, 332 Ga. App. 132 (3). Upon remand to the Court of Appeals, that
alleged trial court error remains to be addressed.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse. We hold the terms
of the arbitration rejection provision of SunTrust’s deposit agreement do not
prevent Bickerstaff’s class action complaint from tolling the contractual
limitation for rejecting that provision on behalf of all putative class members
until such time as the class may be certified and each member makes the
election to opt out or remain in the class. Accordingly, the numerosity
requirement of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (1) for pursuing a class complaint is not
defeated on this ground.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
23