Opinion issued July 7, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00702-CV
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WALTER FRANCISCO SALINAS, Appellant
V.
PATRICIA ANN MELTON, Appellee
On Appeal from the 246th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2009-09626
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Walter Francisco Salinas, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal
from the trial court’s temporary order, signed on August 13, 2015, on a petition to
modify the parent-child relationship in the underlying suit affecting the parent-child
relationship (“SAPCR”). While this appeal was still pending, appellant filed a second
pro se notice of appeal on February 8, 2016, in the trial court, purportedly from an
order to be signed on or about February 9, 2016, modifying visitation. This second
notice of appeal was assigned to the pending appellate cause number 01–15–00702–
CV. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, this Court has jurisdiction over appeals only from final orders
arising under the Texas Family Code unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory
appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West Supp. 2015) (“An appeal
may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.”);
see also CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011) (“Unless a statute
authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction
over appeals from final judgments.”).
In a SAPCR, the trial “court may make a temporary order, including the
modification of a prior temporary order, for the safety and welfare of the child,
including an order: (1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child;” but any such
“[t]emporary orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory
appeal.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a)(1), (e) (West Supp. 2015); see also In
re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (noting that
mandamus was appropriate in SAPCR because “trial court’s issuance of temporary
orders [was] not subject to interlocutory appeal”) (citations omitted).
Here, after reviewing the notices of appeal, the clerk’s record, and the
supplemental clerk’s record filed in this Court, there are no final or appealable
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orders. Although the trial court signed “Temporary Orders on Petition to Modify
Parent-Child Relationship” on August 13, 2015, regarding temporary modification
of possession and access to the minor child, A.M.S., that is a temporary order which
is not appealable via interlocutory appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
105.001(a)(1), (e). Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the clerk’s
records do not include or refer to any final orders signed on or about February 8,
2016, or reflect that any other appealable order has been rendered in the underlying
SAPCR. See, e.g., W.F.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01–15–
00689–CV, No. 01–15–01028–CV, 2016 WL 828171, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2016, no pet.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction
appeals of temporary orders in SAPCR because records did not include final order)
(citations omitted).
On June 21, 2016, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that his appeal
was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless he timely responded and
showed how this Court had jurisdiction over his appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a),
(c). Appellant failed to file a timely response.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 42.3(a), (c); 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.
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Walter Francisco Salinas v. Patricia Melton
Combined Opinion